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METAPSYCHOLOGY AND THE AMERICAN SCENE: A CRITIQUE OF EGO
PSYCHOLOGY FROM HARTMANN TO HOLT

California School of Professional Psychology, Berkeley   PH.D.   1986

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METAPSYCHOLOGY AND THE AMERICAN SCENE

A CRITIQUE OF EGO PSYCHOLOGY FROM HARTMANN TO HOLT

A Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of

The California School of Professional Psychology

Berkeley

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements of the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

By

Martin H. Klein

June 1986

METAPSYCHOLOGY AND THE AMERICAN SCENE

A CRITIQUE OF EGO PSYCHOLOGY FROM HARTMANN TO HOLT

This dissertation, by Martin H. Klein, has
been approved by the committee members
signed below who recommend that it be
accepted by the faculty of the California
School of Professional Psychology at
Berkeley in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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June 27, 1986
Date

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ABSTRACT

METAPSYCHOLOGY AND THE AMERICAN SCENE:

A CRITIQUE OF EGO PSYCHOLOGY FROM HARTMANN TO HOLT

Martin H. Klein

California School of Professional Psychology at Berkeley

Hartmann and his students perceptively raise the question of metapsychology and the problem of the subject, but their proposed solutions to these issues are epistemologically as well as ontologically inadequate. Psycho-analysis cannot be reduced to an act psychology (Schafer, 1976) or confined to the status of a natural science (Grunbaum, 1984) without eliminating crucial theoretical views Freud advanced and defended -- metapsychology as a depth psychology of the unconscious.

The movement of ego psychology from Hartmann to Holt represents the problematics encountered when Freud's critical theory is replaced by the positivistic values of the natural sciences. In attempting to reconstruct psycho-analysis into a general psychology within a natural science epistemological framework Hartmann and his students reverted to the premetapsychological assumptions of Cartesian dualism.

Counter to what the American antimetapsychological

coalition assumes, Freud never wavered in his justification of his metapsychology. Freud's question was not psychology versus metapsychology, but rather, what is the appropriate theoretical framework for a human science whose object of study is the unconscious? At different stages of Freud's theoretical development "metapsychology" invoked various paradigms. The metapsychology moved from a neurological model to a metahermeneutical model concerned with the social grounding of human nature.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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I would like to thank the committee member of my dissertation, Dr. James Jarrett, for his emotional support as well as his philosophical guidance. Dr. Jarrett was most helpful during the exploratory phases of this project when I suffered from existential doubt or was weighted down by philosophical assumptions. Though trained as a philosopher, Dr. Jarrett is one of the best clinical psychologists I have ever encountered.

I would express my graditude and admiration to Dr. Rollo May. More than a psychoanalyst, Dr. May has been there for me as a teacher and a friend. Dr. May has not only helped me

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to develop an inner sense of personal integrity and will, but has also helped me to restore my courage to shape ideas into words.

To Dr. William Pizante I bow my head. For it is Dr. Pizante and the members of the Ontoanalytic Center of Vestal New York who have over the years opened my eyes and taught me alternative ways of knowing. Dr. Pizante is truly my Socrates.

I would like to thank my friends and colleagues, Donald Glauber, Glen Sherman and Andrew Stoll, for their spiritual as well as emotional support. In particular, I would like to acknowedge Leslie Glazer for his willingness to be there for me as "Other" as I journeyed through this strange and sometimes terrifying world of "professional psychology."

Last, but not least, I would like to thank my parents, Charlotte Klein for her unconditional support and love and Bernard Klein for teaching me very early in life about the sweetness of wine as well as the bitterness of herbs.

As for the biographers, let them worry, we have no
desire to make it too easy for them. Each one of
them will be right in his opinion of "The
Development of the Hero," and I am already looking
forward to seeing them go astray.

<div align="right">
Sigmund Freud
letter to fiancee
1895
</div>

In Europe it has become customary for people to
appropriate a large part of Freud's life-work, to
dish it up in a new form and with a new
terminology, and publish it as their own original
work...On the other hand, it seems as though in
America...people are much readier than we are in
Europe to accept the watered-down and attenuated
views of Freud's former disciples.

<div align="right">
Sandor Ferenczi
lecture in America
1926
</div>

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CHAPTER ONE

EGO PSYCHOLOGY FROM HARTMANN TO HOLT

> It is autonomous! That's a good one! It's the
> latest fetish introduced into the holy of holies
> of a practice that derives its authority from the
> superiority of the superiors...But the last
> finding is the best: the ego, like everything else
> we've been dealing with of late in the human
> sciences, is an o-pe-ra-tion-al notion.
>
> Jacques Lacan
> 1966

Who Killed Metapsychology?

In a recent article, entitled "The Current Status Of
Psychoanalytic Theory", Robert Holt (1985) proclaims Freud's
metapsychology to be "virtually dead" and begins to recite
an elegy, on behalf of the entire psycho-analytic community,
for this object loss.

> For a long time, I clung to the hope that if one
> could simply purge metapsychology of these
> stylistic defects it would prove to be not only
> helpful to the clinician but a fertile source of
> testable propositions for the experimenter and
> other systematic researchers in personality as
> well as clinical psychology. But after a couple of
> decades spent in studying metapsychology and
> attempting to make it scientifically useful, I
> relucantly concluded that the task was
> impossible...I recognize the harshness of the
> above indictment, but do not make it lightly or
> with any pleasure. It is anything but a comforting
> reflection to realize that most of one's career
> has been devoted to as worthless a theory as

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metapsychology proved to be (Holt, 1985, p. 292).

Under the subtitle, "The Decline And Fall Of Metapsychology," Holt (1985) summarizes what he and his colleagues believe to be the main reasons for the tragic death of Freud's metapsychology. He refers to the following list of antimetapsychological propositions as "the collective critique of metapsychology" (pp. 290-291).

-- The relationship between metapsychology and the clinical theory has not been clarified.
-- Concepts are poorly defined.
-- Concepts overlap one another partly or completely.
-- Concepts are often reified.
-- Metapsychology contains many self-contradictions.
-- Freud committed a good many logical errors and fallacies of reasoning.
-- Freud made extensive use of metaphors and other figures of speech at points of theoretical difficulty.
-- Much of metapsychology is a translations into other terms of outdated physiology, anatomy, and early evolutionary biology.
-- Metapsychology fails to take clear and consistent stands on basic philosophical issues.
-- Psychic energies, forces, and structures are assigned a metaphysical status separate from the world of material realities.
-- Metapsychology is a closed system.

The above statements make it sound as if Holt has finally given up on metapsychology, after a long struggle to defend its propositions. This implication, however, is far from the truth. For many years, Holt, the ardent advocate of the antimetapsychological position, has criticized Freud's theoretical assumptions from every possible direction (1962, 1965, 1967, 1972, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1981, 1982). To support this claim, I offer the reader two quotations from Holt's

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earlier writings, in which he clearly attempts to exterminate (and not support!) Freud's metapsychological points of view.

> In the long run, I am not even sure that psychoanalysis will have a general theory of its own, nor that there will be any valid scientific need for a recognizable psychoanalytic theory to replace metapsychology. As science mature, schools wither (Holt, 1975, p. 573).

> I might epitomize the rest of this paper by saying that it is an attempt to recover and rehabilitate the clinical theory of motivation by clearing away the deadwood of metapsychology, which has buried it to a great extent (Holt, 1976, p. 161).

Why has Holt, for so many years (1962-1985), been invested in repudiating Freud's metapsychology? A historical sketch of metapsychology and the American scene may help clarify the reasons for Holt's critical disposition toward Freud's metapsychological views.

The Americanization Of Psycho-analysis

Robert Holt -- like his colleagues, George S. Klein, Merton Gill, and Roy Schafer -- was a student of Heinz Hartmann and David Rapaport during the 1950's. Hartmann was the leader of the ego psychology movement and Rapaport the movement's foremost advocate. Ego psychology sought to transform psycho-analysis into a general psychology, to expand psycho-analysis beyond the narrow confines of psychopathology and to research normal behavior. This

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transformation of psycho-analysis into a general psychology was to be accomplished by synthesizing psycho-analysis with the rational and descriptive theories of academic psychology.

> The trend toward developing psychoanalytic psychology beyond its medical origin, including in its scope a growing number of aspects of normal as well as pathological behavior, is clearly inherent in ego psychology today...Even the field of psychopathology proper, its clinical and technical aspects, has already greatly profited from that trend in the work of Freud and many of his followers which aims at the more comprehensive conception of analysis as general psychology. While we know how much psychology owes to pathology, especially to the pathology of neuroses, hereby means of a detour the reverse takes place (Hartmann, 1950, pp. 116-117).

Hartmann believed there was an inconsistency at the heart of the psycho-analytic paradigm: metapsychology portrayed the ego as a weak and subservient entity with no mind or will of its own, whereas clinical practice presumed the ego to be an autonomous and self reflective agent capable of insight and self transformation.

If the ego is in complete servitude to the id how can a patient be freed of neurotic complexes? Or, if the ego is unable to exert itself outside the region of mental conflicts, how can a scientist achieve a neutral, objective stance toward empirical data? It was such questions which lead Hartmann to develop the central tenet of ego psychology -- the "conflict-free ego sphere."

> Not every adaptation to the environment, or every
> learning and maturation process, is a conflict. I
> refer to the development outside of conflict of
> perception, intention, object comprehension,
> thinking, language, recall-phenomena, product-
> ivity, to the well-known phases of motor
> development, grasping, crawling, walking, and to
> the maturation and learning processes implicit in
> all these and many others...I propose that we
> adopt the provisional term "conflict-free ego
> sphere" for that ensemble of functions which at
> any given time exert their effects outside the
> region of mental conflicts. I do not want to be
> misunderstood: I am not speaking of a province of
> the mind, the development of which is in principle
> immune to conflicts, but rather of processes in so
> far as, in an individual, they remain empirically
> outside of the sphere of mental conflict
> (Hartmann, 1939, pp. 8-9).

For Hartmann the autonomous ego was a necessary addendum
to Freud's metapsychological formulations. The autonomous
ego construct, Hartmann maintained, made it possible for
psycho-analytic theory to explain the ego's adaptive
capacities and autonomous functions which are "prerequisites
of all reality relations" (1939, p. 8).

> One approach to ego development has been somewhat
> neglected in psychoanalytic theory, though it
> mighthold out a promise for a more consistent
> integration of the analytic findings and
> hypotheses with the data of direct observation.
> Some aspects of early ego development appear in a
> different light if we familiarize ourselve with
> the thought that the ego may be more -- and very
> likely is more -- than a developmental by-product
> of the influences of reality on instinctual
> drives; that it has a partly independent origin --
> apart from those formative influences which of
> course, no analyst would want to underestimate;
> and that we may speak of an autonomous factor in
> ego development in the same way as we consider the
> instinctual drives autonomous agents of
> development (Hartmann, 1950, p. 119).

Due to its emphasis on psychopathology, psycho-analysis has tended to down play "not only the ego's adaptive capacities but also its synthetic, integrating, or organizing functions" (Hartmann, 1950, p. 117). This radical view of the ego as a weak and subservient entity with no mind or will of its own is understandable when one considers the historical context in which psycho-analysis was first conceived. Psycho-analysis began as a reaction against the rational and descriptive psychology of Freud's day, which viewed the ego as a purely rational, autonomous, and self-conscious agent and confined its focus to the laws governing unconscious mental processes. As a consequence psycho-analysis, over the years, paid little or no attention to the adaptational capacitites and autonomous functions of the ego (Hartmann, 1950, p. 113). If psycho-analysis is to develop into a comprehensive psychological theory it must take into account both the unconscious drives and mental conflicts as well as the adaptational capacitites and autonomous functions of the ego.

> Psychoanalysis evinced quite early, and perhaps even from the very beginning, a narrower and a broader objective. it started out with the study of pathology and of phenomena which are on the border of normal psychology and psychopathology. At that time its work centered on the id and the instinctual drives, But soon there arose new problems, concepts, formulations, and new needs for explanation, which reached beyond this narrower field toward a general theory of mental life. A decisive, and perhaps the most clearly delineated, step in this direction is our recent ego psychology (Hartmann, 1939, p. 4).

During the 1950's, Hartmann and Rapaport were both invested in two interrelated projects: 1. the further development of the "autonomous ego" construct and 2. laying the ground work for the development of psycho-analysis as a systematic behavioral science (the incorporation of Freud's metapsychology within the metascientific framework of logical empiricism).

According to Hartmann, it is the ego's ability to develop a certain degree of independence, from the conflictual sphere of the instincts, that allows the scientist to achieve a neutral and objective stance toward empirical data.

> The questions of objectivation and of "reality testing," as Freud called it, are also accounted for in psychoanalytic theory and lead again to the concept of degrees of ego autonomy that I mentioned before (Hartmann, 1939, p. 23).

Hartmann did not believe his theoretical innovations were antithetical to the basic tenets of the Freudian paradigm. On the contrary, he argued ego psychology is not only in accord with the psycho-analytic ethos, but its theory is atuned to Freud's own vision as portrayed in his later works.

> Freud in the early 20s explicitly constituted ego psychology as a chapter of analysis, this step was made possible, and as a matter of fact imperative, by the convergence of clinical and technical as well as theoretical insight he had gained in the meantime. Today the phase in the development of ego psychology is accepted by most analysts as an integral part of their theoretical and practical

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thinking. It had a far-reaching modifying influence also on many earlier hypotheses in other fields of analysis, e.g.. technique, the theory of anxiety, or the theory of instinctual drives. Despite all this, one gets the impression that Freud himself considered his formulations of that period as a bold first inroad into a new territory rather than as a systematic presentation of ego psychology or as the last word on the structural aspects of personality. In his later papers, including his last ones, we find modifications and reformulations the importance of which has as yet not always been realized (Hartmann, 1950, pp. 113-114).

Is Metapsychology A Scientific Theory?

On March 28 and 29, 1958, Hartmann participated in a symposium, sponsored by the New York University Institute of Philosophy, entitled Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method, And Philosophy. The purpose of this conference was to develop an open interchange of views, between psychoanalysts, academic psychologists, and philosophers of science, on the scientific status of psycho-analysis.

After the conference, the papers presented were edited and published in book form. In the editor's introduction to the text, Sidney Hook describes the high level of intellectual excitement that was sustained throughout the symposium.

> So far as I am aware, this is the first time in the United States that a distinguished group of psychoanalysts has met with a distinguished group of philosophers of science in a free, critical interchange of views on the scientific status of psychoanalysis...In the nature of the case, the printed record cannot capture the spirit of the

proceedings and the liveliness and humor of the
discussion. Particularly noteworthy was the sense
of absorption and intellectual excitement among
the participants, which was sustained from the
first moments of the opening session to the
closing of the last word. As a seat-calloused
veteran of innumerable conferences and institutes,
I have never experienced its like before (Hook,
1959, p. xiii).

The first paper, presented at the conference, was
Hartmann's "Psychoanalysis as a Scientific Theory" (1959).
As the title suggests, the paper served as an introduction
to the two day discussion. While the majority of the
article consisted of a review of the literature (psycho-
analysis as a scientific theory, from Freud until the
present), its major objective was to convey, to the
distinguished panel, how important it was for the scientific
community to begin to work together and develop the
appropriate methods and tools that would permit Freud's
metapsychological theories to be empirically tested and
verified.

The first step in this arduous task, argued Hartmann, was
to systematically clarify and reformulate Freud's
metapsychological theories so its terms would be more
acceptable to the members of the scientific community.

> It appears that a neater classification as to
> these points and a higher degree of
> systematization (considering the different levels
> of theorizing) than exists today would not only
> facilitate my task in discussing psycho-analysis
> as a scientific theory but also clarify the
> standing of analysis as a scientific discipline
> (Hartmann, 1959, p. 5).

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After completing the literature review, the paper concludes on an optimistic note, with a discussion denoting the progress psychoanalysts and academic psychologists have already made, in the direction of this "potentially fruitful" project. In addition to the contributions from the experimentally oriented psychologists (Sears, 1943; Kris, 1947; Benjamin, 1950; Frenkel-Brunswik, 1954; and Hilgard, 1952) and the learning theorists (Dollard and Miller, 1950), Hartmann, in his concluding remarks, mentions the accomplishments of his colleague and friend David Rapaport (1958), the great systematizer and reformulator of Freudian metapsychology.

> Promising efforts in this direction have been made and are being made by analysts and also by nonanalysts, but as yet no complete and systematical outline drawn from this angle is available; a recent work by David Rapaport (1958), soon to be published, may come close to performing this task (Hartmann, 1959, p. 5).

Encouraged by students and colleagues, David Rapaport accepted Hartmann's challenge, and set out to bring scientific rigor to the psycho-analytic paradigm. In his two papers of 1959 -- "The Points Of View And Assumptions Of Metapsychology" (coauthored with Merton Gill, 1959a) and "The Structure Of Psychoanalytic Theory: A Systematizing Attempt" (1959b) -- Rapaport strives to accomplish this monumental task.

> A science can be a "good science" without being ready for a systematic presentation: all old

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sciences were once in this position. The existence
of this essay is thus in need of explanation. I
was prompted to write it partly by the urging of
Drs. Gill, Hartmann, Holt, Klein, and last but not
least, Dr. Koch, the coordinator of this APA
project, and partly by my wishes to pave the way
for an adequate systematic presentation of
psychoanalysis (Rapaport, 1959b, p. 59).

The objective of the first paper -- "The Points Of View

And Assumptions Of Metapsychology" (1959a) -- was to clarify

and assess the different concepts and formulations of

Freud's metapsychology: "to state explicitly and

systematically that body of assumptions which constitutes

psycho-analytic metapsychology" (Rapaport and Gill, 1959a,

pp. 153-154).

According to the coauthors, the paper was written as a

counterpoint to the increasing wave of misuse and

misrepresentation of the metapsychological constructs that

have, in recent years, flooded the psycho-analytic

literature.

Yet a systematization of metapsychology is
necessary, if only because the increasing use of
the metapsychological points of view in the
literature is often at odds with Freud's
definitions, without the author's justifying this
or even indicating an awareness of it. Moreover,
often only one point of view is made use of
(...The economic point of view enjoys particular
popularity...) although according to Freud a
metapsychogical analysis is to describe a mental
process in all its aspects,i.e. from all the
points of view (Rapaport and Gill, 1959a, p. 154).

After defining the "metapsychology," as the "minimal set

of assumptions on which the psycho-analytic theory rests,"

Rapaport and Gill (1959a) set out, in the remainder of the article, to systematically analyze the different aspects of Freud's metapsychological propositions (p. 153). In addition to the three metapsychological assumptions, explicitly formulated by Freud, in his paper "The Unconscious" (S.E. XIV, p.181) -- the dynamic, the topographical, and the economic points of view -- Rapaport and Gill (1959a) argue, that implicit in the Freudian paradigm are two more sets of assumptions in need of exposition and assessment -- the genetic and the adaptation points of view. According to the coauthors, the genetic and adaptation points of view were so important to the constitution of the psycho-analytic framework, Freud must have taken them for granted, when he decided to explicate the other three metapsychological principles.

> Moreover, while the psycho-analytic theory is undoubtedly a genetic psychology, Freud apparently took this so much for granted that he saw no necessity to formulate a genetic point of view of metapsychology...Finally, since Hartmann's and Erikson's studies of adaptation, it has become clear that psycho-analytic theory has always implied basic assumptions concerning adaptation, though with varying degrees of emphasis (Rapaport and Gill, 1959a, p. 154).

The objective of the second paper -- "The Structure Of Psychoanalytic Theory: A Systematizing Attempt" (1959b) -- was to systematically revise the different aspects of the psycho-analytic theory, so that it's propostions would be in accord with the operational language of the behavioral

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sciences: "the task ahead is to add to the necessary conditions of prediction the sufficient conditions, by tightening the theory and by developing adequate methods of quantification and confirmation" (Rapaport, 1959b, p. 66).

According to Rapaport (1959b), the paper was written as a reaction to the psycho-analytic community's failure to achieve a systematic exposition of the metapsychological points of view, on a par with the rigorous standards of scientific psychology.

> The expositions of psychoanalytic theory has been informal rather than systematic; in the main they were directed by internal consistency within the theory and between observables and the theory. In the last twenty years attempts at systematic formulation have been made, but no hypothetico-deductive system-building is in sight...In order to discuss the systematic independent, intervening and dependent variables of the psychoanalytic theory, it seems necessary to sketch the theory's structure (Rapaport, 1959b, p. 82).

After performing a history and systems analysis of the Freudian paradigm, Rapaport (1959b) set out, in the remainder of the paper, to assimilate the different aspects of psycho-analytic theory with the "observable facts" of scientific psychology. In addition to comparing and contrasting Freud's metapsychological assumptions with alternative models of scientific explanation -- e.g., the topographical with the reflex-arc, the economic with the entropy model, and the genetic with the recapitulation model -- Rapaport (1959b) began the arduous task of translating the psycho-analytic theories into the

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quantitative language of the natural sciences.

> By the very nature of psychoanalytic theory,
> intervening variables are indispensable in its
> function forms. ..But the issues of quantification
> cannot be dismissed lightly. Psychoanalysis --
> like all other sciences -- orders, equates,
> compares, and distinguishes observables, and these
> procedures, once made precise, reveal themselves
> as mathematical operations (Rapaport, 1959b, pp.
> 124-125).

While Rapaport's work was at first highly praised by the members of the psycho-analytic community, its reign as the "summa psychoanalytica" was short lived. Contrary to Hartmann's 1958 vision, the publication of Rapaport's two papers marked the decline (and not the rise) of the project for a scientific metapsychology.

> [Rapaport's papers] succeeded as has no other
> psycho-analytic work in drawing basic psycho-
> analytic propositions together within the net of
> normal science...This work became a sort of "summa
> Psychoanalytica"...That the period of its
> ascendancy was a brief one is shown by the
> antimetapsychological movement itself (Kovel,
> 1970, p. 32).

Whereas Rapaport set out to bring scientific rigor to the psycho-analytic paradigm, ironically his two papers, had the reverse effect, and ended up being the springboard for an antimetapsychological coalition. It is interesting to note, the leaders of this antimetapsychological movement -- Merton Gill, George S. Klein, Robert Holt and Roy Schafer -- were the same men to whom Rapaport, in the introduction sections of his papers, acknowledged his indebtedness for their

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numerous suggestions and corrections (Rapaport, 1959a, p. 153n; 1959b, p. 54).

Why would a group a scholars, dedicated to the advancement of psycho-analysis as a systematic and scientific theory, make a 180 degree turn in their philosophical position and become leaders of a coalition to jettison metapsychology?

The attempt to surgically remove metapsychology from psycho-analytic theory can be viewed as a an ingenious effort, on the part of Rapaport's student -- the action psychologists -- to redeem Freud's clinical discoveries from the discrediting antimetapsychological rebuttals waged against the Freudian paradigm by members of the logical empirical school. These philosophers of science, in response to Hartmann's (1959) claim that psycho-analysis is a scientific theory, set out to prove once and for all that Freud's metapsychology does not satisfy the minimum criteria of an exact science.

Is Metapsychology Empirically Testable?

In a paper, entitled "Methodological Issues In Psychoanalytic Theory," Ernest Nagel (1959) presented a devastating critique of the Hartmann-Rapaport project for a scientific metapsychology. The paper -- which followed Hartmann's presentation at the 1958 symposium -- began with a direct response to Hartmann's claim that psycho-analytic

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concepts and formulations should be evaluated by the same critieria employed in judging the theories of the natural and social sciences. According to Nagel it would be "absurdly pedantic" to expect the Freudian theory to adhere to the rigorous standards demanded of an exact science.

> Dr. Hartmann's comprehensive paper makes amply clear that psychoanalytic theory is intended to be a theory of human behavior in the same sense of "theory" that, for example, the molecular theory of gasses set of assumptions which systematizes, explains, and predicts certain observable phenomena of gasses. Accordingly, he is in effect inviting us to evaluate the merits of Freudian theory by standards of intellectual cogency similar to those we employ in judging theories in other areas of positive science. It would of course be absurdly pedantic to apply to Freudian theory the yardstick of rigor and precision current in mathematical and experimental physics (Nagel, 1959, p. 38).

In the body of the paper, Nagel argues that there are two major reasons why the Freudian theory fails to satisify the minimal criteria of an observational science: 1. it is incapable of empirical verification (i.e., its theories are irrefutable, and it is impossible to deduce determinate consequences from its propositions) and 2. it does not satisfy the requirements of a logic of proof (i.e., it is inaccessible to a community of independent inquirers, and it lacks an objective procedure to decide between rival interpretations, it is unable to develop laws that can predict behavior, and it lacks criteria for therapeutic success).

The paper concludes on an interesting note: while Nagel

acknowledges the important contributions Freud and his
school have made toward the advancement of the human
sciences, he firmly says "not proven" to Hartmann's (1959)
claim that psycho-analysis is itself a behavioral science
"for which factual validity can be reasonably claimed."

> I certainly acknowledge the great service Freud
> and his school have rendered in directing
> attention to neglected aspects of human behavior,
> and in contributing a large number of suggestive
> notions which have leavened and broadened the
> scope of psychological, medical and
> anthropological inquiry. But on the Freudian
> theory itself, as a body of doctrine for which
> factual validity can be reasonably claimed, I can
> only echo the Scottish verdict: Not proven (Nagel,
> 1959, p. 55).

Nagel (1959) was not the first philosopher of science to
repudiate the Freudian doctrine from a verificationist
theory of meaning and truth (a deductive-nomological model
of explanation). As Jahoda (1977) points out, much of
Nagel's logistical arguments ran parallel to Karl Popper's
(1934) falsification theory. The Popperian version of the
verification theory claims a theory can be scientifically
verified if and only if its premises are empirically
refutable: "It must be possible for an empirical scientific
system to be refuted by experience" (p. 41). Since Freud's
theory does not abide by this falsifiability criterion of
demarcation -- its premises are too vague to be refuted by
any logically possible empirical findings -- Popper (1962)
concluded psycho-analysis does not meet the minimum
requirements demanded of a positive science.

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Psychoanalysis is a very different case. It is an interesting psychological metaphysics (and no doubt there is some truth in it, as there is so often in metaphysical ideas), but it never was a science. There may be lots of people who are Freudian or Adlerian cases: Freud himself was clearly a Freudian case, and Adler an Adlerian case. But what prevents their theories from being scientific in the sense here described is, very simple, that they do not exclude any physically possible human behavior (Popper, 1974, p. 985).

The Popper-Nagel critique has had a detrimental effect upon the professional morale of the members of the psychoanalytic community. The Hartmann-Rapaport vision, of uplifting psycho-analysis to the level of a natural science, was, within a short period of time, derogated. In the last analysis, Freud's metapsychology was, by the logician's theories of verification, "proven" to hold no more water than a pseudoscience or a pre-scientific myth. To quote Popper's (1957) final verdict: "no substantially stronger claim to scientific status can be made for it than for Homer's collected stories of Olympus" (p. 137).

Was there any possible way to save Freudian theory from paradigmatic collapse? How could the psycho-analytic establishment respond to such challenges to its legitimacy as a scientific enterprise?

Good Psychology Versus Bad Metapsychology

It is interesting to note, that the leaders of the second phase of the antimetapsychological movement -- the action

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oriented psychologists -- were the very persons whom

Rapaport, in his two papers (1959a, p. 153n; 1959b, p. 59),

acknowledged as helpful and supportive in the scientific

renovation of Freud's metapsychological theories: Merton

Gill, Robert Holt, George S. Klein, and Roy Schafer.

> But it is interesting that within the walls of
> orthodoxy it has been the students and colleagues
> of David Rapaport (Gill, 1967), the man who
> extended the metapsychology to its most baroque
> realization, who have lead the revolt against it.
> Among them, Holt (1967) showed the connection
> between "psychic energy" and biological vitalism.
> Klein (1969) distinguished between two models of
> sexuality in psychoanalysis...this essay is often
> cited in support of the increasing popular
> distinction amongst analysts between the "clinical
> theory" and the "metapsychology." Recently, Gill
> (1976)... concludes, then, that "metapsychology is
> not psychology (Gill, 1976). Finally, Schafer
> himself early on began to point to these problems
> in his book on internalization (1968a) suggesting
> that representation could not be explained by
> "cathexis" (Fourcher, 1977, pp. 135-136).

As Holt points out, this turn of events should come as no

surprise. Even though Rapaport was a protagonist in the

historic saga of metapsychology, he was also one of the

first theoreticians to distinguish between Freud's two

psycho-analytic theories -- the clinical propositions, based

upon empirical observation and the metapsychological

propositions, which reinstate the clinical hypotheses in

abstract and impersonal language.

> Along with most other contemporary students of
> psychoanalysis, I find very helpful Rapaport's
> (1960) distinction between two rather different
> theories within it; a clinical theory, made of
> propositions about people and their problems,

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incorporating concepts that can be fairly easily
defined emprically; and a more abstract,
scientifically more ambitious theory called
metapsychology, the propositions of which largely
restate clinical hypotheses in a more austere and
impersonal language (Holt, 1985, pp. 289-290).

In addition, it must be recalled that Rapaport was a firm
believer in the ego's ability to act as an autonomous agent,
free from the conflictual sphere of the instincts (Rapaport,
1967, pp. 358-366). In this light, Hartmann's (1939) ego
psychological constructions, which Rapaport fully endorsed,
can be identified as the theoretical precursors to the
action psychologist's notion of a self-motivated and self-
responsible unified agent.

Both Hartmann and Rapaport have been responsible
for introducing the adaptive point of view to
psychoanalytic thinking, and placed the adaptive
ego at the core of the psychic apparatus as the
definitive and ultimate source of psychic agency
and regulation. In so doing, Schafer points out,
they only reintroduce the issue of psychic agency
which the elaboration of metapsychology has
intended to exclude, namely, the self determining,
choice-making, responsible, subjectively
experienced self -- in other words, the human
being himself, the person who acts (Meissner,
1979, p. 84).

What comes as a surprise, however, is the way in which
these action psychologists chose to define the parameters of
Freud's metapsychological propositions. As previously
mentioned, one of the objectives of Rapaport's writings was
to call into question the increasing misrepresentations and
misuses of Freud's metapsychological theories that have, in
recent years, flooded the psycho-analytic literature --

especially the reduction of the metapsychology to the economic point of view (Rapaport and Gill, 1959a, p. 154). Yet, as I will illustrate shortly, it was the constriction of the Freudian metapsychology to the economic (or neurobiological) point of view, ·which ironically was one of the major catalysts in the rise of the action oriented psychological movement.

Two Theories Or One?

George S. Klein, in an article entitled, "Two Theories Or One?" (1970), devised a strategy to save psycho-analysis from the brink of collapse. By splitting the psycho-analytic paradigm into two independent theories, G. S. Klein hoped to save Freud's clinical work from the pejoratives directed against the metapsychological assumptions and views by the philosophers of science.

According to G. S. Klein (1976), Freud had constructed two independent psycho-analytic theories, the metapsychological and the psychological theories. The psychological theories were based upon Freud's clinical discoveries, whereas the metapsychological theories were constructed and superimposed upon the empirical data to justify their scientific status -- "Squeezed through the eyelet of the drive-discharge model is perhaps a more appropriate expression" (p. 15).

> The existence of two theories -- the two cultures
> of psychoanalysis -- is I believe, a historical
> aberration traceable to Freud's philosophy of
> science. Freud's philosophy assumed: (1) that
> concepts of purposefulness and meaning are
> unacceptable as terms of scientific explanation;
> (2) that an acceptable explanation must be purged
> of teleological implications...There is no
> occasion for surprise in this. Freud was brought
> up in the by now well-documented tradition of the
> Brucke-Meynert scientific value system, which held
> it as axiomatic that no phenomenon was to be
> considered "explained" except in physical-chemical
> terms (Klein, 1976, pp. 43-44).

G. S. Klein believed that if psycho-analysis could be
purged of its anthropomorphic scientisms, a purely
psychological theory would emerge, based upon meanings and
intentions, rather than instincts and drives. A new and
improved psychological theory would then be possible, one
free of Freud's nineteenth century ideological assumptions,
but empirically testable and worthy of scientific
verification.

In 1967, G. S. Klein began a book about his two theory
hypothesis. The purpose of the manuscript was threefold: 1.
to further disentangle Freud's two psycho-analytic theories,
2. to lay out the groundwork for a pure psychological theory
based upon clinical observation, and 3. to systematically
analyze the psychological theory and develop methods to
scientifically test its hypotheses.

> My approach is anchored in the conviction that two
> modes of explanation distinguish the many
> strands of theoretical concepts in
> psychoanalysis...Metapsychology does in fact try
> to encompass all of psychology, but this has been
> one of its chief sources of muddiness, which has

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obscured the distinctive aspects of clinical
psychoanalysis as a theory...Before we can make
precise confrontations with rival assertions we
must see the clinical concepts in more systematic
form that would allow us to make definitive
testable statements...Thus the present work takes
the position that progress would be marked by a
greater articulation of the fundamental critical
principles, the axiomatic basis, of clinical
propositions in terms of which meaning, motives,
and aims are read in the clinical situation
(Klein, 1976, pp. 1-5).

His unexpected death in 1971, terminated G. S. Klein's
radical project. His incompleted manuscript, extensively
edited by Gill and Goldberger, was posthumously published
(Psychoanalytic Theory: An Exploration of Essentials, Klein,
1976).

In 1976, Merton Gill published a collection of essays
dedicated to his late colleague and friend: Psychology
Versus Metapsychology: Psychoanalytic Essays In Memory Of
George S. Klein (Gill and Holzman, 1976). The monograph
reviewed G. S. Klein's theoretical innovations to the field
of clinical psycho-analysis. The most important contribution
was Merton Gill's essay, "Metapsychology Is Not Psychology."
That paper sought to demonstrate the validity of G. S.
Klein's two theory argument: the thesis that Freud
constructed two psycho-analytic theories, the
metapsychological and the psychological, and that the
metapsychological theory rather than a higher level of
abstraction, was instead a different order of discourse; a
discourse restricted to biological and neurological
propositions about the material substrate of psychological

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functions. In short, Gill attempted to demonstrate that
metapsychology is not a psychological theory based upon
clinical observation, but a set of biological and
neurological assumptions remaining from Freud's early days
as a medical student in Brucke's physiological institute.

> My position is that the metapsychological points
> of view are posited in a natural-science
> framework, which is a reductionistic attempt to
> convert psychological discourse to a universe
> alien to it -- the universe of space, force, and
> energy (Gill, 1976, p. 72).

Until the distinction between metapsychology and
psychology is clearly established, Gill claims, the
controversy surrounding psycho-analytic theory can not be
resolved. By demonstrating that metapsychology is not
psychology, Gill hoped to save the clinical theory from the
antimetapsychological rebuttals waged against psycho-
analysis by the philosphers of science. If metapsychology is
criticized and proven to be invalid, this does not mean
psycho-analytic theory has to be rejected in toto, is I
believe, one point Gill is attempting to make.

> Not much headway will be made in resolving the
> controversy until we can reach some agreement on
> what is meant by the distinction between
> metapsychological and clinical theory, and how
> these two are related to one another...Many
> psychoanalysts seem to believe that metapsychology
> simply means psychoanalytic theory and that
> therefore anyone who criticizes the general
> enterprise of metapsychology is rejecting
> psychoanalytic theory in toto...I propose that the
> term metapsychology should be restricted to
> propositions about the material substrate, both

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neurological and biological, of psychic
functioning (Gill, 1976, pp. 71-72).

In the concluding section of his paper, Gill (1976) lists
what he considers to be the six major themes which "unify"
the members of this antimetapsychological coalition:

> 1. Metapsychological propositions are in the
> natural- science framework of force, energy, and
> structure.
> 2. Psychological propositions deal with intention
> and meaning.
> 3. Although Freud's metapsychology was originally
> explicitly neurobiological, he later denied,
> sometimes explicit, the continuing implicit
> neurobiological assumptions of psychoanalytic
> metapsychology.
> 4. Metapsychological propositions are not an
> abstraction from psychological propositions, nor
> are they derivable from, translations of, or
> explanatory of such propositions. There is
> therefore no direct connection between
> metapsychology and psychology.
> 5. A "pure" psychology based on data like that of
> the psychoanalytic situation is possible and can
> be a science that is valid in its own right.
> 6. Metapsychological propositions and clinical
> propositions that are purely psychological must be
> disentangled and then examined on their
> appropriate grounds. For this reason, despite the
> argument that there is no direct connection
> between metapsychology and psychology, the present
> state of affairs in psychoanalytic theory is such
> that it makes no sense to say globally that one
> accepts or rejects metapsychology (pp. 103-104).

While most of the contributors to the monograph, agreed
with G. S. Klein's antimetapsychological rebuttals, there
appeared to be little concordance amongst these
theoreticians about the status of this new formulation of a
psycho-analytic paradigm. For example, should this
alternative psycho-analytic theory be deemed within natural

science (Rubinstein, 1976) or human science (Klein, 1976),
depth analysis (Gill, 1976) or descriptive psychology
(Schafer, 1976), a set of testable scientific propositions
(Holt, 1976) or a configuration of rules and regulations
(Schafer, 1976)?

As Alvin Frank (1979) noted in "Two Theories Or One? Or
None?," Gill's psychological monograph turned out to be
more a collage of conflictual interpretations than a
delineated assertion of a unified and plausible alternative
to Freudian metapsychology.

> Among the most thoughtful, incisive, and energetic
> of these critics are Roy Schafer and the late
> George Klein. Their arguments and criticisms
> (similar often to the point of identity) as well
> as their proposals (often dissimilar to the point
> of antithesis) are probably as reasonable
> viewpoints as any from which to consider the
> dilemmas of metatheoretical and theoretical
> psychoanalysis. In addition, the Klein memorial
> essays...offer an invaluable opportunity to
> compare, contrast and follow the implications of
> this extraordinary potpourri of sophisticated
> thought (Frank, 1979, pp. 170-171).

In recent years, two of the most outspoken members of the
antimetapsychological coalition have been Roy Schafer (1976)
and Adolf Grunbaum (1985). While both men consider
themselves to be advocates of the antimetapsychological
position, their reasons are as different as a punctuation
mark and a standard deviation. Schafer has set out to
develop a new language for psycho-analysis, free from the
anthropomorphic constructs of Freud's metapsychology,
Grunbaum has insisted upon an increase in systematic

empirical research in order to establish the scientific status of Freud's clinical discoveries.

In chapters two and three I will critically examine the theoretical propositions proposed by Roy Schafer and Adolf Grunbaum. It will be pointed out, that beneath the surface-dissimilarities, Schafer's and Grunbaum's philosophical arguments can be viewed respectively as derivations upon the two themes that preoccupied Heinz Hartmann throughout his writing career: 1. the development of the autonomous ego construct (the ego as a self-conscious, self-responsible and self-motivated agent) and 2. the absorption of psycho-analysis into the metascientific framework of logical empiricism (psycho-analysis as an empiricially verifiable natural science). I propose to demonstrate, in these two chapters, that while Hartmann and his students are perceptive in raising the question of metapsychology and the problem of the subject, their proposed solutions to the problems at hand are epistemologically as well as ontologically inadequate. Psycho-analysis cannot be reduced to an ego psychology or confined to the status of natural science without eliminating those theoretical views Freud heroically struggled to advance and defend -- metapsychology as a depth psychology of the unconscious.

Chapter four questions: "What Did Freud Mean By The Term Metapsychology?" The purpose of such an archeological exploration is to demonstrate that Freud constructed his

metapsychological theory as a reaction against both the materialistic principles of the natural sciences, which tended to reduce psychological processes to the physical realm of objects, and the descriptive psychological disciplines, which tended to reduce ego processes to the intentional realm of consciousness. Chapter four concludes by reflecting whether it is possible to construct a critical epistemology for the psycho-analytic paradigm without returning to the pre-metapsychological views of the natural sciences or the consciousness oriented psychologies of the nineteenth century?

CHAPTER TWO

SCHAFER AND THE WORLD OF CONSCIOUSNESS

It is existential psychoanalysis then which claims
the final intuition of the subject as decisive.
...It is a method destined to bring to light, in a
strictly objective form, the subjective choice by
which each living person makes himself a person;
that is, makes known to himself what he is...
Existential psychoanalysis rejects the hypothesis
of the unconscious; it makes the psychic act co-
extensive with consciousness...This psychoanalysis
had not yet found its Freud.

                                        Jean-Paul Sartre
                                             1953

A New Language For Psycho-analysis Or An Old Language Of Existentialism?

Among the theorists who contributed to the 1976
monograph, Psychology Versus Metapsychology, it is Roy
Schafer who made the most significant contribution to the
action psychology movement (Kovel, 1978). Schafer, more than
a man of words, is a man of action. Unlike many of his
colleagues, Schafer argues that critique is not enough,
members of the action psychology movement must begin to
replace Freud's metapsychological propositions with
alternative metatheories based upon the central tenets of
action psychology. To quote Schafer (1975): "We shall be on
much firmer ground if before we abandon metapsychology, we

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have at least a rudimentary version to replace it. Not just omission however; also a new ordering and new elements" (p. 41). By making the shift from critic to reconstructionist, Schafer has become the leading spokesman for action psychology, the first theoretician to have the courage and vision to go beyond the deconstructive phase of the antimetapsychological movement and begin to systematicially construct an alternative theoretical frame of reference to replace Freud's outdated metapsychological points of view.

> For the foreseeable future, psychoanalysis is in the awkward position of having to abandon metapsychology without having any equally comprehensive and more tenable substitute ready at hand. Psychoanalysts who are interested in going beyond critique of theory to a more positive, reconstructive phase might give serious consideration to joining Roy Schafer in his exciting new venture. In his current work...he is seeking a relatively modest objective -- to formulate not a new metapsychology or basic model but a language that will be free of metapsycholgy's besetting errors and fallacies, consistant and appropriate for clinical use. I believe that his action language may become a permanent contribution, regardless of what happens on the loftier theoretical front, and that psychoanalysts may find it more liberating and clinically helpful than The Ego and the Id. (Holt, 1985, p. 573).

In his book, A New Language For Psychoanalysis, Roy Schafer (1976) begins to construct the theoretical foundation for an alternative metatheory for psycho-analysis -- an action oriented language free from the "mechanistic and anthropomorphic modes of thought that are essential and correlative aspects of metapsychological conceptualizations"

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(p. xi). Schafer (1976) proposes to accomplish this "relatively modest objective" by eliminating from the psycho-analytic vocabulary all modes of language such as nouns and adjectives which tend to reduce human actions to thinglike entities or substantivelike traits and by replacing these phrases with verbs and adverbs, which tend to be more suggestive of human actions and motives. To quote Schafer's "fundamental rule of action language":

> We shall regard each psychological process, event, experience, or behavior as some kind of activity, henceforth to be called action, and shall designate each action by an active verb stating its nature and by an adverb (or adverbial locution), when applicable, stating the mode of this action.
> (A) When speaking of any aspect of psychological activity or action, we shall no longer refer to location, movement, direction, sheer quantity, and the like, for these terms are suitable only for things and thinglike entitites.
> (B) So far as possible, we shall not use the verb "to have" in relation to psychological activity, for, in using it, we should by implying that things and thinglike entities are the referents of pychological propositions.
> (C) In order to state observations in a form suitable for systmatic general propositions as well as to state these general propositions properly, we shall use only the active voice and constructions that clarify activity and modes of activity.
> (D) We shall give up the idea that there are special classes of processes that repare or propel mental activity, that is to say, classes that are qualitatively different from the mental activity they prepare or propel; for now everything is an action (1976, pp. 9-15 and 363-373).

By adopting this "fundamental rule," Schafer claims, psychoanalysts will finally be able to communicate in a

manner of speaking which is more attuned to clinical work and place less emphasis on metapsychological speculation.

> Adopting this rule entails, that, insofar as it is possible to do so sensibly, we shall not use nouns and adjectives to refer to psychological processes, events, etc. In this, we should avoid substantive designations of actions as well as adjectival or traitlike designations of modes of actions (Schafer, 1976, p. 9).

It might appear at first glance that Schafer's action language is a superficial gesture and not an actual reformulation of the psycho-analytic paradigm. What difference could it possibly make theoretically if an analyst instead of remarking to a colleague, "A change was occuringin his attitude from friendliness to belligerence," would say, "He changed from acting friendly to acting belligerently" or instead of saying, "No hope was held that things could get better," to say, "No one hoped any longer to be able to improve his or her situation," or, instead of saying, "The goal of perfection was emphasized" might remark, "He (or) she emphasized the goal of perfection" (Schafer, 1976, pp. 11-12)? In other words, does it really make a significant difference to the essential constitution of psycho-analytic theory if analysts begin to express insights in active rather than passive voices or designate interpretations using verbs and adverbs instead of nouns and adjectives?

When Schafer (1976) states that he is constructing an alternative language for psycho-analysis, he does not use

the term "language" in the ordinary sense. Rather, he is using "Wittgenstein's conception of language as a set of rules for saying things of the sort that constitute or communicate a version of reality or a world" (p. 4). In this light, translating psycho-analytic theory into action language means more than a readjustment in elocution or style, it signifies a systematic revision of basic postulates of Freud's metapsychological paradigm, including the elimination and replacement of such fundamental psycho-analytic concepts as id, ego, superego, the dynamic unconscious, the mechanisms of defense, repression, resistance, impulse, libidinal energy, instinctual drive, primary and secondary process, psychic complexes, internal conflicts, and sublimation.

> Thus we should not use such phrases as "a strong ego," "the dynamic unconscious," "the inner world," "libidinal energy," "rigid defense," "an intense emotion," "autonomous ego function," and instinctual drive." This radical departure from accustomed designations is what it takes really to discontinue physicochemical and biological modes of psychological thinking (Schafer, 1976, p. 9).

While Schafer's "new language for psycho-analysis" is quite effective in accomplishing its objective which is the elimination of Freud's metapsychological language -- its theoretical renovations have been criticized by several members of the antimetapsychological coalition for being too drastic. For example, Barratt (1978) accuses Schafer of

regressing to a prepsycho-analytic model of explanation.

> I can accept the censorious component of Schafer's theory, which challenges the scientistic reification of metapschology, and so I shall focus herein upon his reinterpretation. My view is that Schafer takes one step forward and then slides three back. He raises exigent issues, but his solutions to them in terms of "action language" is, as I can demonstrate, a prepsychoanalytic formulation. Schafer's book is of interest insofar as it questions the natural-scientific approach to psychoanalysis, but his alternative approach requires unequivocal refutation (Barratt, 1978, p. 289).

Rubinstein (1976) argues that a "strictly clinical psychoanalytic theory, based upon the actions and motives, is merely a partial theory," more on a par with the "descriptive psychologies" of the nineteenth century hermeneuticists (e.g., Dilthey, Weber, Spranger, and Jasper), than with the depth psychologies of the contemporary psychoanalysts (pp. 229-264); and in a similar vein, Wallerstein (1976) comments that Schafer's action psychology is more the old language of existentialism (e.g., Sartre, Binswanger, Boss, and Straus), than the preferred new language for psycho-analysis.

> In so stating it, has Schafer brought psychoanalysis close to losing its distinctive character, moving it almost to an identity with the existential psychology that, translated into an approach to psychotherapy, regards the goal of therapy as but the assessment of experience in its moment-to-moment quality and texture, rather than, as traditionally in psychoanalysis, seeing the mind's experience as the backdrop for wishes and intentions, conscious or unconscious, in short the world of avowed or hidden meanings as motivations (Wallerstein, 1976, p. 214)?

Before determining whether Schafer's (1976) action psychology is in fact a "new language for psycho-analysis," or merely an old language of existentialism Schafer's critique of Hartmann's ego psychology must first be addressed.

What Is An Autonomous Ego?

Acknowledging his indebtedness to Heinz Hartmann, "the guiding genius of modern metapsychology," the theoretician who achieved the "ultimate refinement of Freud's metapsychology," Schafer claims that its is the duty of all students to surpass the work of their teachers (pp, 99 and 6).

> And yet the student must not only attempt the arduous climb, he or she must try to get above that range in order to be able to include Hartmann's work within his or her own vision of psychoanalysis , for that work is not the whole of psychoanalysis, nor can it be the last word on psychoanalytic theory; it is and can only be part of the terrain of scientific psychoanalysis and of science generally. (Nietzsche said: "One repays a teacher badly if one always remains a pupil only.") (Schafer, 1976, p. 57).

It is with this inner calling, that Schafer begins his critical evaluation of Hartmann's "autonomous ego" construct (pp. 57-102).

According to Schafer (1976), Hartmann underestimated the extent to which his theoretical innovations altered the foundation of the psycho-analytic paradigm. While Hartmann

considered himself to be a dedicated psychoanalyst, committed to the systematic advancement of the Freudian ethos, his theoretical writings were, in fact, radical and challenged the very core assumptions upon which Freudian metapsychology rests.

> Hartmann rather consistently underestimated (or underemphasized?) the extent to which he disagreed with Freud, correcting him, altering some of the foundations of his theory, and perhaps above all establishing a basis for a continuing challenge of psychoanalytic theory by psychoanalysts...Hartmann was engaged in revisions in psychoanalytic thought and modes of thinking about psychoanalysis that are, in some respects at least, revolutionary, their modest and emendatory tone notwithstanding (Schafer, 1976, p. 59).

Contrary to what Hartmann (1938) would like us to believe, ego psychology is more than a mere systematic reiteration of the different points of view and assumptions of the Freudian doctrine. In his writings, not only does Hartmann (1939) disclose the contradictory propositions inherent within psycho-analytic theory, he further elaborates on this theme by developing an ego psychology which clearly conceptualizes the two conflictual poles of the Freudian paradigm to the point of antithesis.

> Dualism cannot survive if close and systematic examination of each of its components shows it to be internally heterogeneous, multidirectional, conflicted, or caught up in self-contradiction. And this is precisely, the kind of examination that Hartmann, unlike Freud, undertook in a rigorous manner (Schafer, 1976, p. 63).

Rather than remain at the level of criticism, Hartmann

sought to free Freudian theory from its "binary straitjacket" by introducing additional constructs which were to subsume, discredit, or supersede Freud's dualistic framework.

> Hartmann revised some of these polarities by introducing notions of degree; some by establishing the equal theoretical dignity of third factors or multiple factors; some by showing that one of the terms could subsume the other; still others by thoroughly discrediting one or both of the dialectical opposites, either by showing that the concepts had been superseded or that one concept was not on the same conceptual plane as its opposite (Schafer, 1976, p. 61).

The "autonomous ego," the central concept of ego psychology, can be viewed as a metaphor which best represents the paradoxical nature of Hartmann's revisionary project. On the one hand, it signifies the beginning stages of a paradigmatic crisis in psycho-analytic theory -- "a reaction against the mechanistic-organismic mode of conceptualization" that is "so distant and unrelated to subjective experiences and their interpretation which make up the primary data of clinical psychoanalysis." While on the other hand, it signifies Hartmann's uncompromising dedication to Freudian metapsychology with its "so-called field of physicalistic psychobiological determinants" (pp. 102-120).

> I go on to argue two propositions concerning the growing appeal of such concepts as "ego autonomy," "identity," and "self" within the field of Freudian psychoanalysis: first, that this appeal

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represents a reaction against the mechanistic-
organismic mode of conceptualization owing to, the
subjective experiences and their interpretation
that make up this primary data of clinical
psychoanalysis; secondly, that this reaction
typically miscarries owing to the continuing use
of mechanistic-organismic modes of thought by
those who are reacting against them (Schafer,
1976, p. 102).

The "autonomous ego" construct, to paraphrase Jacques
Lacan (1977), is like the button in the upholstery of
Hartmann's psycho-analytic couch. The mythical stud which is
supposed to prevent ego psychology from sliding into the
abyss of unintelligibility (pp. 131-135).

Giving a theoretical inconsistency a name, however, does
not allow antithetical principles to magically coincide in a
unified fashion without a clash of opposition. As Schafer
points out, the idea of a construct being simultaneously
"autonomous" and "dependent" is a contradiction in terms.
Even if the construct is proclaimed to be empowered with
only "relative autonomy."

Hartmann emphasizedfunctions of primary and
secondary autonomy. This step seemed to allow
recognition of apparently "free" or conflictual-
free behavior without any compromise of the natural
science, deterministic model of explanation.Two
points must be noted here: if "autonomy" is to
retain any meaning, designating these functions
"autonomous" amounts to stating that they are or
can be self-activating and self-regulatory; and to
speak of "relative autonomy," though it represents
hedging to the point of self-contradiction, is
still ascribing freedom to functions (Schafer,
1976, p. 100).

Hartmann's (1939) autonomous ego construct is tainted

with logical inconsistencies from its head to its toes (Apflebaum, 1966; Holt, 1975; and Schafer, 1976). Even the name of this construct, the "autonomous ego," is a contradiction in terms. The term "autonomous," means "independent, making or having one's own laws, self-governing, not a mere form or state of some other organism (Oxford English Dictionary, 1971, p. 575). Whereas the term "ego," as defined by Sigmund Freud, refers to "a poor creature owing service to three masters and consequently menaced by three dangers: from the external world, from the libido of the id, and from the severity of the superego"; an entity whose "relation to the id is like a man on horseback, who has to hold in check the superior strength of the horse; with this difference, that the rider tries to do so with his own strength while the ego uses borrowed forces" (S.E. XIX, 1923b, pp. 25 and 56).

Hartmann is caught in an intrasystematic conflict. On the one hand he is the "leader of a new" movement, occupied with the development of the autonomous ego construct; on the other hand, he is a "steward of an older order," committed to the establishment of psycho-analysis as a general psychobiology.

> I venture to suggest that these arbitrary tendencies reflect an intrasystematic conflict of Hartmann's -- that between holding fast to Freud's basic concepts concerning psychic structure and his pressing ahead with his own observation and theoretical explorations (This conflict is even more apparent in Hartmann's psychoeconomic theorizing.) Having chosen to be both a steward of

an older order and a leader of a new, Hartmann had
at times to contradict himself and confuse his
readers (Schafer, 1976, p. 79).

It was Hartmann's commitment to the "older order," argues
Schafer, that prevented this "critical" and "openminded"
theoretican from completely emancipating ego psychology from
the outdated metaphors of the Freudian metapsychology and
developing a new metatheory for psycho-analysis based upon
the motives and actions of the ego as an autonomous and
self-responsible agent.

> The problems arise from Hartmann's commitment to
> the natural science approach to conceptualization.
> This approach excludes meaning from the center of
> the psycho-analytic theory. It deals with meaning
> only by changing it into something else(function,
> energies, "principles," etc.)...We see in
> Hartmann's use of intentionality both a narrowing
> of the scope of a concept with a broad and
> significant philosophical background and the
> sacrifice of metapsychological consistency in one
> important respect in order to be able to work
> consistently with the language of functions and
> energies...It is not the same biology as Freud's
> in many respects, but it is the same in one
> essential respect, the one that has created more
> theoretical problems than it has solved in
> psychoanalytic thinking, i.e., the assumption that
> the postulating of "psychic energy" with
> qualitative aspects would be a help in theory
> development and would be essential to a natural
> science approach to the psychology of human beings
> (Schafer, 1976, pp. 100, 93 and 84).

While Schafer appreciates the important issues raised by
Hartmann's theoretical inquiry, he disagrees with the
proposed solutions to the problems at hand.

> On the basis of these considerations, I come to
> this conclusion: however much Hartmann eliminated

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blatant anthropomorphism from Freud's metapsychological formulations, in certain crucial respects he did not succeed in resolving the problems latent in them. His efforts were incomplete, insecurely founded , and unconvincing. Incorporated in them were the problems they meant to solve. Further, I believe that in principle a mechanistic-organismic model of human psychology, so long as it is an attempt to deal with fundamental and complex phenomena and relations, must in the end turn into an anthropomorphic model. Within any psychology, mechanism, oganism, and anthropomorphism imply each other. Hartmann had to fail in this respect. He had to hide a mover in the mental apparatus.For an apparatus cannot move itself; nor can it, like the human mind, move the world (Schafer, 1976, p. 111)

In essence, the "autonomous ego" construct -- like several of the new concepts that have recently made their theoretical debut in psycho-analytic literature (e.g., self, identity, observing ego, working alliance, higher levels of organization) -- can be viewed as a symptom-like formation. A sign that reflects Heinz Hartmann's heroic struggle to save Freudian theory by way of an intrasystematic compromise, a recasting of the psycho-analytic framework so that it would "seemingly" appear to account for the existential actions of the agent as person without abandoning the mechanistic-organismic tenets of metapsychology.

Sooner or later, these concepts are used, they have to be used, to imply an agency that stands more of less outside the so-called field of determinants. They have to be so used because they express attempts to avoid, on the one hand, making manifestly anthropomorphic formulations, and, on the other, rethinking the fundamental conceptualization of psychoanalysis.There is the gap: between the person on one side and the

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natural science apparatus on the other (Schafer, 1976, p. 119).

According to Schafer, it is Hartmann's dedication to the Freudian ethos which prevented this critically minded theoretician from competely emanicipating his ego oriented psychology from the metapsychological assumptions of the Freudian paradigm.

> Hartmann's treatment of this central problem of meaning may be interpreted in the following manner. He wrote as if he had seen, correctly, that a full, direct consideration of meaning would require a theoretical model radically different from the traditional natural science model, and as if he had concluded that, for the sake of consistency in his own (and Freud's) systematizing efforts, it was best never to get deeply onto it. He committed himself to Freud's model (Schafer, 1976, p. 109).

Schafer believes that if Hartmann had not been possessed by the intellectual spirit of his day, the "zeitgeist" of the natural sciences, he would have been able to "work through" this intrasystematic conflict of metapsychology versus action psychology, and have cured psycho-analysis of its "scientific self-misunderstanding of metapsychology" (Habermas, 1968). That is, to develop an alternative language for psycho-analysis more in accord with the interpretive disciplines of human understanding than the scientific models of neurobiological explanations.

> I believe that had Hartmann explored the idea of meaning, he would have had to acknowledge more openly than he ever did the fact that mechanistic-organismic theory is merely an option, not a

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necessity, for psychoanalysis; and he might have moved toward the type of mixed economic-experiential conceptualization most recently attempted by Ricoeur (Schafer, 1976, p. 109).

Schafer claims that there are three possible routes a contemporary psychoanalyst can choose to travel to compensate for the existential deficiencies inherent in the Freudian paradigm: 1. to adhere to the outdated language of Freud's metapsychology despite dissatisfaction with its limited explanatory power (e.g., ego psychology) 2. to abandon all interests in systematic explanations and return to the practical realm of everyday experience (e.g., humanistic psychology), or 3. to develop an alternative "language" for psycho-analysis capable of explaining the existential experiences of the agent as person (e.g., action language psychology) (pp. 3-15).

After criticizing the first two alternatives, the first course of action which "entails continuing eclectically to subordinate new ideas and fresh alternatives to old solutions," and the second course of action which "merely opens one up to haphazard and ultimately confused discourse," Schafer (1976) proclaims the third alternative to be the only sensible solution to the problem at hand (p. 7).

It is a curious kind of isolating or splitting to regard one's analysand as an existential person with mechanistic-organismic psychopathology. But that splitting is necessary only so long as we adhere to the metapsychological model of the mind. To be internally consistent, the evolving theory

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of the psychoanalytic process requires a
thoroughly non-mechanistic, non-oganismic
language (Schafer, 1976, p. 120).

By revealing the philosophical inadequacies inherent in
the first two alternative solutions to the "problematics" of
Freudian theory, the eclectic and pragmatic world hypotheses
(Pepper, 1942), Schafer sets the stage for the development
of his "new language for psycho-analysis."

For my part, I have chosen to attempt to develop
an alternative to the eclectic language of
mechanism, force, structure, etc. It is an action
language that I shall describe shortly. I believe
that this alternative satisfies the criteria I
mentioned earlier, such as developmental,
historical, and cultural relevance together with
actual and potential communicative richness
(Schafer, 1976, p. 7).

It is not the purpose of this exegesis to judge whether
Schafer's action psychology fufills the minimal criteria of
a "normal paradigm," "world hypothesis," or "structural
system," (Kuhn, 1970; Pepper, 1942; Wilden, 1977), but
rather, to determine whether this alternative language for
the psychotherapeutic has the right to be identified as a
psycho-analytic theory. In essence, is Schafer's action
psychology a "new language for psycho-analysis" or merely an
old language of existentialism, and if it is determined to
be the latter would this necessarily suggest that action
psychology is an inappropriate language for the Freudian
worldview?

Action Language Is Not Psycho-analysis

Schafer does not deny the similarities between his theoretical orientation and the points of view and assumptions advanced by various members of the existential and ordinary language movements. In fact, in the introduction to his book, Schafer acknowledges his indebtedness to the existentially oriented works of Ludwig Binswanger (1936, 1946), Jean-Paul Sartre (1943), Ludwig Wittgenstein (1934-35), and Gilbert Ryle (1949).

> It will be obvious that, in developing it, I have used, as best I could, certain ideas culled from modern philosophical writings on existentialism, phenomenology, mind, and action; e.g., by Binswanger (1936, 1946), Sartre (1943), Wittgenstein (1934-35), Ryle (1949), and others. These writings have all been, in effect if not by design, contributions to the development of some alternative to the premodern language of mind used by Freud (Schafer, 1976, p. 8).

Schafer's indebtedness to the above theorists does not end with the closure of his preliminary remarks. Through out his text, Schafer returns often to the writings of the existentialists and language philosophers for spiritual as well as philosophical support. For example, Schafer (1976) uses Binswanger's (1963) criticisms of Freud's natural science model to defend his own antimetapsychological rebuttals (p. 68), Sartre's (1943) notion of "bad faith" to develop his own theory of "disclaimed action" (p. 235), Wittgenstein's (1934-1935) formulation of "language-games"

to secure the foundation for his reinnovation of Freud's metapsychological propositions (p. 4), and Ryle's (1949) "ghost in the machine" argument to eliminate the anthropomorphic constructions of the Freudian mental apparatus (p. 110).

Not only does Schafer's "fundamental rule of action language" run parallel to the theoretical principles advanced by the members of the existential and ordinary language schools of thought, on several occasions his theory converges with their arguments to the point of identity. For example, compare the similarities between Schafer's idea of "disclaimed action" with Sartres' notion of "bad faith.":

> According to action language, resisting is neither an affliction by some autonomous entity called "the resistance," understood as something one "has," nor an inability based on the strength or weakness of inexorable mechanistic factors...I propose that resisting is engaging in actions contrary to analysis while also engaging in analysis itself; it is the analysand as analysand contradicting himself or herself in action (Schafer, 1976, p. 224).

> If we abandon all the metaphors representing the repression as the impact of blind forces, we are compelled to admit that the censor must choose and in order to choose must be aware of so doing...It is no longer possible to resort to the unconscious to explain bad faith; it is there in full consciousness, with all its contradictions...the patient is disturbed by the daily revelations which the psychoanalyst makes to him and that he seeks to remove himself, at the same time pretending in his own eyes to wish to continue the treatment (Sartre, 1956, pp. 92-93).

With the resemblance between Schafer's (1976) "new

language for psycho-analysis" and the old languages of existentialism (e.g., Binswanger 1936; Sartre, 1943; Wittgenstein, 1934; and Ryle, 1949) established, the second part of the question is ready to be addressed: Is Schafer's (1976) action psychology an appropriate language for the Freudian worldview?

Incorporating new ideas and concepts from different disciplines has always been looked upon, by the members of the psycho-analytic community, as an acceptable activity. As biographers repeatedly remind us, Freud was not only well versed in the arts, the humanities and the sciences, he had also surrounded himself with a rich interdisciplinary circle of teachers, students, colleagues, and friends.

> A man of great scientific and literary culture who stood at the crossroads of the main cultural currents of his time, an omnivorous reader, able to grasp quickly the interest of new ideas in order to adopt them and give them original form, Freud was the author of a powerful synthesis in which it is an almost hopeless task to discern what came from outside and what was his personal contribution...Freud drew from his masters, his colleagues, his rivals, his associates, his patients, and his disciples (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 534).

While Freud often had borrowed theoretical concepts and formulations from a diversity of disciplines, in the hope that these would support, clarify, and enhance his own metapsychological assumptions, it is also well known that he was intolerant of philosophical positions which diametrically opposed his own worldview (Ellenberger, 1970;

Jones, 1963; Roazen, 1971).

> Now Freud had inherently a plastic and mobile
> mind, one given to the freest speculations and
> open to new and even highly inprobable ideas. But
> it worked this way only on condition that the
> ideas came from himself; to those from ouside he
> could be very resistant, and they had little power
> in getting him to change his mind (Jones, 1963, p.
> 369).

An example of Freud's intolerant attitude toward opposing views is evident in his remark to Binswanger in response to his interest in existential philosophy: "What are you going to do about the Ucs. or rather, how will you manage without the Ucs.? Has the philosophical devil got you in his claws after all? Reassure me" (Freud, 1917, cited in Binswanger, 1957, p. 64).

It is interesting to note, that Binswanger did not consider Freud to be either a "tyrant or a dogmatist," but rather, a genius possessed by his own fate.

> Freud walked with me to the door. His last word's,
> accompanied by a shrewd, slightly ironic smile,
> were: "I am sorry I cannot satisfy your religious
> needs." Never was it more difficult for me to take
> leave of my great and revered friend than at this
> moment, when, in full awareness of the "great
> idea" that informed his great struggle and had
> become the fate of his genius, he held out his
> hand to me. [The references to Freud's "great
> idea" allude to the Hofmannsthal quotation which I
> used as a motto: "A great idea fills the man of
> genius and makes him invulnerable to everything,
> except his fate.] (Binswanger, 1957, p. 82).

Binswanger's (1957), book entitled Sigmund Freud: Reminiscences Of A Friendship, records the following

excerpt, from a letter received from Freud dated January, 1929, as "a disproof of Freud's alleged tyranny and dogmatism":

> Quite unlike so many others you have not allowed the fact of your intellectual development moving away more and more from my influence to disturb our personal relationship, and you do not know how agreeable, I find such a decent behavior -- even though you praise by indifference, which is merely a concomitant of old age (Binswanger, 1957, p. 85).

It is a question, however, whether Binswanger's reminiscences of his friendship with Freud carries enough weight to slant the scale in favor of a general characterization of Freud's temperament as one of tolerance and broad-mindedness. Rollo May points to Freud's receptivity toward Binswanger's diverging points of view as a unique and rare instance in the light of Freud's typical attitude toward colleagues who had become rebels. To quote May (1958): "Their relationship was the more remarkable since it was the sole instance of a lasting friendship of Freud with any colleague who differed radically with him" (p. 6). May argues that many factors might have played a part in the development of this unique and lasting friendship -- ranging from Binswanger's "diplomatic attitude" to the large gap that existed between Binswanger's and Freud's respective philosophical orientations (i.e., Freud was invested in developing a particular therapeutic system -- an "ontic-analysis" -- and Binswanger was

occuppied with discovering the universal structures upon
which all therapeutic models of explanation rest -- an
"onto-analysis").

> Whether the friendship survived because the
> intellectual conflict between the two was like the
> proverbial battle between the elephant and the
> walrus, who never met on the same ground, or
> because of some diplomatic attitude on
> Binswanger's part...or because of the depth of
> their respect and affection for each other, we
> cannot of course judge (May, 1958, p. 6).

In the passage following the above quotation, May manages
to shed some light upon what I believe to be the main
factor responsible for the unique constitution of the Freud-
Binswanger relationship. According to May, Binswanger,
unlike many of the other members of the psycho-analytic
circle, who have, over the years, drifted apart from
orthodox Freudianism, was not invested in developing an
alternative paradigm for the psychotherapeutic, based upon
theoretical propositions that by their very nature were
antithetical to the central tenets of the psycho-analytic
doctrine. Rather he was more interested in using what he had
learned from existential philosophy to enhance and
complement the Freudian worldview.

> It would be a mistake, therefore, simply to
> identify the existential movement in psychotherapy
> as another in the lines of schools which have
> broken off from Freudianism...[Existentialism]
> does not purport to found a new school as over
> against other schools...It seeks, rather, to
> analyze the structure of human existence -- an
> enterprise which, if sucessful, should yield an
> understanding of the reality underlying all

situations of human beings in crises...[As] Binswanger writes, "...existential analysis is able to widen and deepen the basic concepts and understandings of psychoanalysis" (May, 1958, p. 7).

If existentialism, as Binswanger (1957) suggests, can be used to deepen and enhance, rather than distort and undercut, the conceptual framework of psycho-analysis, it would seem likely that Schafer's action language, with its existential-like suppositions, can also be qualified as an amiable contribution to the Freudian paradigm. A metatheory more on a par with such influential and proFreudian concepts as Fechner's (1873) "pleasure principle," "Atkinson's (1903) "primal horde," or even Aristophanes' (˜400 B.C.) mythical description of Eros, the god of love and unity, than such deviant and antiFreudian constructs as Adler's (1911) "organ inferiority," Jung's (1913) "archetypes," or even Rank's (1913) "will." This, however, is not the case.

Existentialism is not a delineated school of thought, like the Adlerian, Jungian, or Rankian schools of psychotherapy which were "formed under the impetus of the creative work of one seminal leader." Rather, it is an umbrella term which circumscribes several different philosophical orientations and places a shadow upon "almost all aspects of our culture" (May, 1958, pp. 4-19).

We must now remove a major stumbling block — namely, the confusion surrounding the term, "existentialism." The word is bandied about to mean everything — from the posturing defiant dilettantism of some members of the avant garde on

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the left bank in Paris, to philosophy of despair
advocating suicide, to a system of anti-
rationalist German thought written in a language
so esoteric as to exasperate any empirically
minded reader. Existentialism, rather, is an
expression of profound dimensions of the modern
emotional and spiritual temper and is shown in
almost all aspects of our culture. It is found not
only in psychology and philosophy but in art...and
in literature (May, 1958, p. 11).

To describe all the varying schools of psychology and
psychiatry considered to be part of an existential movement
would require a book in itself, and even then, such a text
would probably be limited to a historical introduction to
the subject matter at hand. For there are as many
existential theories as there are existentialists, and in
many cases these varying theoretical viewpoints are as
philosophically and politically opposed as the antinomy of
freedom and determinism itself (Spiegelberg, 1972).

The works of Martin Heidegger (1926) and Jean-Paul Sartre
(1943) for example represent two existential doctrines which
are ontologically incongruent (Needleman, 1963). Heidegger
who attempted to cut below the cleavage of subject-object
dualism by emanicipating Western thought from the chains of
Cartesian metaphysics, understood man to be a historical
being, determined by the biological and social constraints
of his own facticity.

With Dasein's factical existence, entities within-
the-world are already encountered too. The fact
that such entities are discovered along with
Dasein's own "there" of existence, is not left to
Dasein's discretion. Only what it discovers and
discloses on occasion, in what direction it does

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so -- only these are matters for Dasein's freedom, even if always within the limitations of its throwness...Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities...Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its "generation" goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 417 and 436).

Whereas Sartre (1956) on the contrary attempted to develop the Cartesian worldview to its extreme by deepening the gap between the world of consciousness ("pour-soi") and the world of things ("en-soi"), and understood man to be a radically free and self-determined agent, the sole creator of his or her own universe.

We are taking the word "responsibility" in its ordinary sense as "consciousness [of] being the incontestable author of an event or of an object." In this sense the responsibility of the for-itself is overwhelming since he is the one by whom it happens that there is a world; he is also the one who makes himself be (Sartre, 1956, p. 553).

It is with the clarification of this ontological difference, between Heidegger's vision of man as a historical and biological being determined by the facticity of space and time and Sartre's vision of man as a self-constituted and self-responsible subject condemned to the radical freedom of pure consciousness, that I will be able to demonstrate that action psychology is an inappropriate language for psycho-analysis.

While Binswanger's (1949) "daseinanalyse" and Schafer's (1976) action language are both existential theories, their

philosophical positions, like the ontologies developed by Heidegger and Sartre, are diametrically opposed. This is no coincidence. As Jacob Needleman (1963) and Alan Spiro (1979) respectively point out, Binswanger's "daseinanalyse" represents "ideally the most complete or only possible extension of Heidegger's thinking" (Needleman, 1963, p. 125) and Schafer's action language "often comes close to the precise language of Sartre's attack on psychoanalytic theorizing...[and], explicitly in the tradition of Sartre identified important ways of evading responsibility" (Spiro, 1979, pp. 280-281). In short, Binswanger (1963), following the Heideggerian line of thought, views man as being, "both a creature of nature and a socially determined or historical being...thrown, determined, i.e. enclosed, possessed, and compelled...because of its facticity" (p. 212) and Schafer (1976), following the Sartreian position, views man as being "active, goal-directed, choice-making, meaning-creating, fantasying, and responsible...a person who chooses what to do and does it...the one who invented the machine, turns it on and off, and tinkers with it" (pp. 145 and 120).

Whereas Binswanger's "daseinanalyse" with its emphasis on the historical and social determinants of the unconscious can be viewed as an amiable contribution to psycho-analytic theory (May, 1958; Needleman, 1963), Schafer's action language with its emphasis on the person as a self-responsible and self-conscious agent does not share a similar fate (Anscombe, 1981; Barratt, 1978; Frank;

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1979; Kovel, 1978; Meissner, 1978; and Spiro, 1979).

Henri Ellenberger (1970), in the <u>Discovery Of The</u>
<u>Unconscious</u>, argues that there exists an uncanny
resembalance between Jean-Paul Sartre's (1956) existential
psycho-analysis and Alfred Adler's (1911) individual
psychology. According to Ellenberger, both theorists reject
Freud's notion of the unconscious mind and choose to develop
alternative worldviews, based upon the free and conscious
intentions of the individual.

> When Jean-Paul Sartre sketched his existential
> psychoanalysis as a part of his philosophical
> existentialism, there was a unanimous rejoinder
> from psychoanalysts that this had nothing in
> common with psychoanalysis...Sartre's existential
> psychoanalysis rejects the unconscious mind. It
> does not seek to find out complexes, but strives
> to define the original choice of the individual.
> This choice is at first a free and conscious
> decision of the individual and as such it is fully
> lived by him, although he is not necessarily aware
> of it. The aim of the therapy is to bring the
> subject to an awareness of his fundamental
> project...Sartre concludes with this suprising
> statement: "This psychoanalysis has not yet found
> its Freud!" How could Sartre be unaware that this
> method already existed and had Alfred Adler for
> its author? (Ellenberger, 1976, p. 642)

If Schafer's action language resembles Sartre's
existential psycho-analysis (Spiro, 1979) and Sartre's
existential psycho-analysis resembles Adler's individual
psychology (Ellenberger, 1970), it does not take a doctorate
in logic to deduce: Schafer's action language must then
resembles Adler's individual psychology. Upon reviewing the
basic tenets of Adler's individual psychology, this line of

deductive reasoning appears to be accurate. As the reader will agree, the following quotation could have been written by either Jean-Paul Sartre (1956) or Roy Schafer (1976).

> We are self-determined by the meaning we give to our experiences, and there is probably always something of a mistake involved when we take particular experiences as the basis for our future life. Meanings are not determined by situations, but we determine ourselves by the meanings we give to situations...This teleology is self-imposed. It arises in the psychological organ and must be understood as a device and as the individual's own construction (Adler, 1911, pp. 208 and 93).

The resemblance between Schafer's (1976) action language theory and Adler's (1911) individual psychology will serve as the final piece of evidence against Schafer's (1976) claim that action language is the "native tongue of psychoanalysis" (p. 362). If Schafer's (1976) action language resembles the viewpoints developed by Adler's (1911) individual psychology (as I maintain) then it can be concluded that a critical argument waged against individual psychology can also be used as a sufficient rebuttal against the theories of action language. As it so happens, such a critique has already been made, by no other than the author of psycho-analysis Sigmund Freud.

Though Freud did not confront Schafer's action language theory (Schafer developed his theory in 1976 and Freud died in 1939) Freud, on several occassions, made the effort to place Adler's individual psychology in perspective and reveal the premises upon which its ego oriented language

rests (premises that are similar to the basic assumptions upon which Schafer's (1976) action language theory is founded). According to Freud (1914), it was a mix of Adler's desire for omnipotence -- "Do you think it gives me such great pleasure to stand in your shadow my whole life long"? -- and his poor psycho-analytic talents --"I perceived how little gift Adler had precisely for judging unconscious material" -- that resulted in Adler's denial of the fundamental principles of the psycho-analytic theory -- i.e., "the resistance, the transference, the theories of repression, the sexual motive forces in neurosis and the unconscious" -- and his naive return to psychological principles based upon the secondary processes of consciousness -- "the actions of waking thought...viewed purely from the standpoint of the ego, reduced to the categories with which the ego is familiar" (S.E., XIV, pp 50-58).

> The Adlerian [Schaferian] theory was from the very beginning a "system" -- which psycho-analysis was careful to avoid becoming. It is also a remarkably good example of "secondary revision," such as ocurs, for instance, in the process to which dream-material is submitted by the action of waking thought...viewed purely from the standpoint of the ego, reduced to the categories with which the ego is familiar, translated, twisted and -- exactly as happens in dream-formation -- is misunderstood ...In the Adlerian doctrine the main emphasis falls on these easily verifiable and clearly intelligent connections, while the fact is altogether overlooked that on countless occasions the ego is merely making a virtue of necessity in submitting, because of its usefulness, to the very disagreeable symptom which is forced upon it -- for instance, in accepting anxiety as a means to

security. The ego is here playing the ludicrous
part of the clown in a circus who by his gesture
tries to convince the audience that every change
in the circus ring is being carried out under his
orders. But only the youngest of the spectators
are deceived by him (Freud, S.E. XIV, 1914, p.
53).

To the question, Is Schafer's action psychology a "new language for psycho-analysis" or merely an old language of existentialism, and if it is determined to be the latter would this necessarily suggest that action language is an inappropriate language for the Freudian worldview?, it is only proper to let the master himself have the final say.

Then Adler took a step for which we are thankful;
he severed all connections with psycho-analysis,
and gave his theory the name of "Individual
Psychology." There is room enough on God's earth,
and anyone who can has a perfect right to potter
about on it without being prevented; but it is not
a desirable thing for people who have ceased to
understand one another and have grown incompatible
with one another to remain under the same roof.
Adler's "Individual Psychology" is now one of the
many schools of psychology which are adverse to
psycho-analysis and its further development is no
concern of ours (Freud, S.E. XIV, 1914, p. 52).

CHAPTER THREE

GRUNBAUM AND THE WORLD OF THINGS

> "Clinical observations," like all observations,
> are interpretations in the light of theories...and
> for this reason alone they are apt to seem to
> support those theories in the light of which they
> are interpreted. But real support can be obtained
> only from observations undertaken as tests...and
> for this purpose criteria of refutation have to be
> laid down beforehand...But what kind of clinical
> responses would refute to the satisfaction of the
> analyst not merely a particular analytic diagnosis
> but psycho-analysis itself?
>
>   Karl Popper
>   1962

Is Clinical Theory A Science?

In his 1985 article, "The Current Status Of
Psychoanalytic Theory," Robert Holt extends his earlier
dissatisfaction with metapsychology to clinical issues and
claims that scientific progress in the area of clinical
psycho-analysis has been discouraging. While Klein (1976)
and Schafer (1976) were right in claiming metapsychology to
be bankrupt, their respective efforts to simply extract the
clinical theory from the metapsychological garb were
insufficient solution to the problem at hand. First, the two
theories are not as mutually exclusive as Klein and
Schafer assumed, and no simple method of deciphering appears

to be in sight. And second, a "controlled language for discussing clinical phenomena," such as Schafer's (1976) action language, does not qualify as an adequate model of scientific explanation.

> A number of theorists, including my late friend George Klein (1976), reacted to the realization that metapsychology was bankrupted by counseling that we simply discard it and concentrate on systematizing and developing the clinical theory, claiming that it is capable of becoming a self-sufficient discipline on its own. Schafer (1976) mean while went a similar route, but produced his alternative, action language, which is not so much a theory in the usual sense as it is a controlled language for discussing clinical phenomena without falling into the fallacies of reification and personification that bedevil Freud's writings. After making a preliminary effort to extract the clinical theory from metapsychology, I withdrew in some discouragement, reporting (Holt, 1975) that the two were much more closely intertwined than Rappaport had suggested, and that there was no simple or obvious way to produce a set of excerpts from Freud's writings that would give the clinical theory definitive exposition (Holt, 1985, pp. 292-293).

Robert Holt's (1985) faith in psycho-analysis as a legitimate science has once again been restored, thanks to the writings of Adolf Grunbaum, a leading philosopher of science, who has, in recent years, become interested in the problem of the scientific status of psycho-analytic theory (Grunbaum, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1980a, 1980b, 1981, 1983a, 1983b, 1983c, 1983d, 1984). Psycho-analysis, argues Holt (1985), is finally being reviewed by a philosopher who has "done his homework" -- a theoretician who has "fortunately" chosen to critically evaluate the scientific status of the clinical theory and not Freud's metapsychological

speculations.

> When Freud unswervingly claimed natural science
> status for his theoretical constructions..., he
> did so first and foremost fr his evolving clinical
> theory of personality and therapy, rather than for
> the metapsychology...[He claimed] the scientificty
> of his clinical theory entirely on the strength of
> a secure and direct epistemic warrant from the
> observations he made of his patients and of
> himself (Grunbaum, 1984, Cited in Holt, 1985, p.
> 293)

Holt salutes Grunbaum for having the courage to stand up

against Popper's (1963) claim that psycho-analysis is

unfalsifiable and therefore no better than a pseudoscience.

> Grunbaum (1976, 1977, 1979) has earned the
> gratitude of all of us by taking Popper down a
> peg, showing that his arguments not only are based
> on ignorance of what Freud actually said, but have
> logical flaws as well. Citing several of Freud's
> propositions that can clearly be tested
> empirically and several passages in which Freud
> explicitly said that a single case running counter
> to one of his theories (e.g., that of paranoia)
> would refute it, Grunbaum has unanswerably
> established the claim of psychoanalysis to a place
> amongst the sciences by Popper's own scientific
> criteria, as well as demonstrating that the
> serious challenge to the scientific credibility of
> psychoanalysis comes instead from the so-called
> eliminative inductivism (Holt, 1985, p. 293).

Is Clinical Theory Empirically Testable?

With the publication of The Foundations Of

Psychoanalysis, Adolf Grunbaum (1984) has achieved public

attention unusual for a philosopher of science. Not since

the writings of Karl Popper (1957) and Ernest Nagel (1959)

has a technical work, on the scientific status of psycho-analysis, won so much acclaim from the general media as well as the professional journals. To quote a passage from a recent article in the New York Times Review:

> Few philosophers have concentrated systematically on psychoanalysis, although there have been some distinguished exceptions, such as Sartre and, lately, Richard Wolheim. Karl Popper sought, some thirty years ago, to illustrate his model of science by showing psychoanalysis to be what he called a "nonscientific" theory...Grunbaum stands apart from this critical tradition. He wishes both to acknowledge Freud's accomplishments as a scientific methodologist and to rebut Popper's charges (Lieberson, January 15, 1985).

Why has Grunbaum's (1984) densely written book become so popular? Grunbaum (1984) offers to the members of the psycho-analytic community something they have long desired: a testimonial that psycho-analysis is a respectable theory capable of scientific verification.

Since Popper (1957) proclaimed psycho-analysis to be a pseudoscience, some thirty years ago, the American psycho-analytic community has felt besieged by academic methodologist. Unwilling to accept second class status as a hermeneutical discipline, American psychoanalysts have patiently awaited a solution to the "crisis" -- i.e., a philosphical argument or a statistical analysis which would reestablish psycho-analysis as a legitimate and credentialed science.

> Perhaps I can clarify the reasons for my sense of
> crisis of if I go back to the clinical theory and
> sum up its present status...The clinical theory is
> full of mutually contradictory hypotheses.
> Analysts keep making new observations, which clash
> with existing formulations. Instead of trying to
> figure out what sampling or situational parameters
> make the difference, the tradition has been merely
> to say, in effect, "No, this is how it is." And
> the resulting contradiction is never
> resolved...Fortunately, a leading philosopher of
> science, Adolf Grunbaum, became interested in the
> problem of the scienific status of psychoanalysis
> ...Here at last is a philosopher who has done his
> homework before criticizing Freud. Happily,
> Grunbaum has concentrated his efforts on the
> clinical theory...Grunbaum has unanswerably
> established the claim of psychoanlaysis to a place
> among the sciences by Popper's own criteria (Holt,
> 1985, pp. 305 and 293).

Grunbaum's (1984) claim, that Freud's clinical theory is
scientifically testable, may be re-assuring to practicing
analysts desiring the authentication of the scientific
community. To a philosopher, however, it is apparent that
beneath the surface of Grunbaum's (1984) obscure and
frustrating language, lies an ill founded argument, based
upon a misunderstanding of the Freudian text.

In this chapter, Grunbaum's (1984) appraisal of the
scientific status of psycho-analysis will be critically
evaluated. It will be demonstrated that Grunbaum, for the
sake of his argument, has misconstrued psycho-analytic
theory, first, by quoting Freud out of context and second,
by reading his own ideas into the body of psycho-analytic
literature.

Adolf Grunbaum (1984), in the chapters on the scientific
status of psycho-analysis, wishes to make four points: 1.

Freud was an accomplished scientific methodologist, 2. Karl Popper (1962), misunderstood Freud's intentions and investigated the scientific status of the metapsychology and not the clincal theory, 3. Freud's clinical theories, in spiteof Popper's (1962) findings, can be empirically verified by the falsification criteria of demarcation, and 4. the falisifcation criteria of demarcation is a less credible theory of scientific verification than the eliminative inductive approach (Grunbaum, 1984, pp.1-7, 103-107, 112-117, 279-285).

To discuss the philosophical differences between Popper's (1962) and Grunbaum's (1984) theories of verification requires a detour that is beyond the scope of this inquiry. It is important, however, to critically evaluate Grunbaum's (1984) specific claim, that psycho-analytic clinical theories are empirically testable by a method of verification similar to Popper's (1962) falsification model.

According to Grunbaum (1984), Freud, accomplished scientific methodologist that he was, did not accept his clinical theories on faith, as Popper (1962) would like us to believe, but in fact, empirically did test his hypotheses, employing the logical empirical method of verification. To support this claim, Grunbaum (1984) refers to Freud's (1915) paper, "A Case of Paranoia Running Counter to the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Disease," as documented proof of Freud's logical empirical occupation (S.E. XIV, pp. 263-272). According to Grunbaum (1984), Freud, in this 1915

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paper, empirically tested his psycho-analytic theory of paranoia by a method of verification resembling Popper's (1962) falsification model.

> The point is that the psychoanalytic etiology of paranoia is empirically falsifiable...and that Freud recognized it. For, as we saw, this hypothesis states that a homosexual psychic conflict is causally necessary for the affliction. Empirical indicators can bespeak the absence of homosexual conflict as well as the presence of paranoid delusions so as to discredit the stated etiology (Grunbaum, 1984, p. 109).

To develop a precise and concrete rebuttal of Grunbaum's (1984) controversial claim, this critique will focus upon the clinical "evidence" Grunbaum uses to support his position -- Freud's 1915 case of paranoia. In this critique, it will be shown, that Grunbaum, to support his argument, has not only distorted the psycho-analytic theory and the psycho-analytic method of investigation, but has also misconstrued the clinical data of Freud's 1915 case history as well.

The Narrative Of The First Session

Freud's 1915 paper on a case of paranoia, is about a woman who sought out a lawyer for protection from the molestations of a man with whom she had been having a love-affair. The lawyer, whom she consulted, suspected the woman to be suffering from paranoia, when she accused her ex-lover

of hiring two unseen witnesses to photograph them while they were "in a particularly compromising position." The woman believed the lover would use these photographs to disgrace her and compel her to resign her job. Moreover, the letters which she turned over to the lawyer as proof of the lover's sinister intentions, revealed the morbid ideations not only to be bizarre, but that in fact, they were destroying a tender and caring relationship.

Experienced enough to recognize the signs of pathology, yet knowing that reality can sometimes be even more bizarre than a psychotic delusion, the legal advisor decided to consult Dr. Freud. After comparing the patient's bizarre narration with the innocent contents of the lover's letters, Freud concluded that the young woman was most likely suffering from a paranoid disposition.

The Evaluation Of The First Session

This case had a special importance for Freud. New data contradicted the established psycho-analytic theory of paranoia, which had postulated that such patients struggle against intense homosexual conflicts. According to Freud (1915), this woman, counter to expectation, showed no signs of a homosexual psychic conflict. Rather, she appeared to be defending herself against the love of a man.

The view had already been put forward in psycho-analytic literature that patients suffering from

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paranoia are struggling against an intensification
of their homosexual trend -- a fact pointing back
to a narcissistic object-choice. And a further
interpretation had been made: the persecutor is at
bottom someone whom the patient loves or had loved
in the past...[but this present case]
emphatically contradicted [this position]...there
was no sign of the influence of a woman, no trace
of a struggle against a homosexual attachment
(Freud, S.E. XIV, 1915, p. 265).

Upon being confronted with this "case of paranoia running

counter to the psycho-analytic theory of the disease," Freud

(1915), concluded, either the woman had been misdiagnosed as

a paranoid, or else the psycho-analytic theory of paranoia,

which postulated that the etiology of the disease is related

to a homosexual psychic conflict, has been refuted by

clinical evidence.

Either the theory must be given up or else, in
view of this departure from our expectations, we
must side with the lawyer and assume that this was
no paranoic combination but an actual experience
which had been correctly interpreted (Freud, S.E.
XIV, 1915, p. 266).

Quoting the above passage out of context -- as Grunbaum

(1984) does --can make it appear as if Freud (1915) was

employing a logical empirical method of verification to test

his theory of paranoia. This, however, is not the case.

In the 1915 paper, Freud (1915) employs the "either/or

equation" as a literary device; a straw man to build up and

then destroy in order to make a point about the psycho-

analytic method of investigation. Ironically, the point

which Freud (1915) desires to make is opposed to Grunbaum's

(1984) argument. In fact, Grunbaum's (1984) philosophical position resembles the straw man which Freud, in this 1915 paper, desires to unweave. To quote Grunbaum's (1984) (mis)interpretation of the text.

> Thus, he reasoned: "either the the theory must be given up or else, in view of this departure from our [theoretical] expectations, we must side with the lawyer and assume that this was no paranoic combination but an actual experience which had been correctly interpreted" (S.E. 1915, 14: 266). ...In short, Freud explicitly allowed that if the young woman was paranoid, then her case was a refuting instance of the etiology he had postulated for that disorder. Alternately, he reckoned with the possibility that she was not paranoid...But the point is that the psychoanalytic etiology of paranoia is empirically falsifiable (Grunbaum, 1984, p. 109).

In the passage, following the "either/or" equation, Freud (1915) undercuts the black and white criteria of the logical empirical method of verification by revealing a third possible solution to the problem in question -- a postponement of the verdict until a more semiotic analysis of the woman's narrative has been completed.

Counter to Grunbaum's (1984) claim, it was Freud's (1915) intention, in this paper, to point out how psycho-analytic investigation differs from a logical empirical investigation. A psycho-analytic investigation is more like a literary analysis, concerned with the emplotment and structural configurations of the patient's "psychic reality," whereas, a logical empirical investigation is more like a behavioral analysis, concerned with the

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observable events and actions of the patient's "material
reality." In essence, the moral of this 1915 paper is: "you
cannot judge a book by its cover." Especially if the book
in question is a patient's narrative. For it is only by
semiotic analysis rather than behavioral analysis, that a
psychoanalyst can uncover the themes and tropological
structures of the unconscious psychic complexes which
constitute the patient's "transferential reality." To Freud
(1915):

> But I saw another way out, by which a final
> verdict could for the moment be postponed. I
> recollected how often wrong views have been taken
> about people who are ill psychically, simply
> because the physician has not studied them
> thoroughly enough and has thus not learned enough
> about them. I therefore said that I could not form
> an immediate opinion, and asked the patient to
> call on me a second time, when she could relate
> her story again at greater length and add any
> subsidiary details that might have been omitted
> (Freud, S.E. XIV, 1915, p. 266).

Following Freud's (1915) advice, I will postpone the
critique of Grunbaum's (1984) philosophical position until
the sketch of the woman's second session with Dr. Freud is
completed.

The Narrative Of The Second Session

During the second appointment, the woman revealed to
Freud that she had visited her lover not once but twice; and
that it was during the latter visit that she was disturbed

by the suspicious noise. Freud discovered that while nothing noteworthy had happened during the first visit to her lover's room, the day after the event had much significance in relation to the outbreak of her psychopathology.

The woman's superior at work was an elderly lady whom she described as saying: "She has white hair like my mother." She esteemed herself to be her superior's favorite worker. On the day after her first visit to the young man's room, the lover appeared in the elderly supervisor's office to discuss some business matters. The woman became suspicious of the meeting for two reasons. First, she suddenly felt convinced that her lover was telling the elderly lady about their adventure of the previous day. Second, she began to "realize" that the elderly woman and her lover had been having a love-affair for some time, which she had previously overlooked.

The lover protested the accusations and in time, succeeded temporarily in freeing the woman from her delusional state, regaining her confidence and achieving a second encounter. It was during this second occasion that she experienced the paranoid delusion.

With this additional imformation, Freud (1915) believed he had uncovered sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the woman's paranoid disposition was, in fact, derived from "an over-powerful homosexual attachment," and that his theory of paranoia remained valid.

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Moreover, this disposes of the apparent
contradiction to the expectation, based on psycho-
analytic theory, that the development of a
delusion of persecution will turn out to be
determined by an over-powerful homosexual
attachment. The original persecutor -- the agency
whose influence the patient wishes to escape -- is
here again not a man but a woman (Freud, S.E. XIV,
1915, p. 267).

The Interpretation Of The Second Session

According to Freud (1915), the two paranoid delusions

centered around the patient's pathological representation of

the oedipal triangle: the elderly supervisor was a

substitute for her mother, the lover, in spite of his youth,

was put in the place of her father, and due to the strength

of the woman's "mother-complex" she was driven to believe

the "ill-matched partners" were having a love-affair. In

both delusions, Freud claimed, it was the woman's love for

her mother which prevented the patient from achieving normal

sexual satisfaction with a love-object of the opposite sex.

Her love for her mother had become the spokesman
of all those tendencies which, playing the part of
`conscience,' seek to arrest a girl's first step
along the new road to normal sexual satisfaction
-- in many respects a dangerous one; and indeed it
succeeded in disturbing her relations with men
(Freud, S.E. XIV, 1915, p. 267).

In the first delusion, the elderly supervisor, as the

subsitute mother, became the "hostile and malevolent watcher

and persecutor" -- the arresting conscience which kept the

woman at a distance from men. Over and against the lover's

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efforts at seduction, the sight of the elderly supervisor, "showing her disapproval by mysterious hints," was enough external stimulation to bring on the paranoid delusion -- the phantasy that the supervisor and the lover were, as a couple, plotting against her.

> This support became a heavy yoke when her libido began to turn to a man in response to his insistent wooing. She tried to free herself, to throw off her homosexual attachment; and her disposition, which need not be discussed here, enabled this to occur in the form of a paranoic delusion. The mother thus became the hostile and malevolent watcher and persecutor. As such she could have been overcome, had it not been that the mother-complex retained power enough to carry out its purpose of keeping the patient at a distance from men. Thus, at the end of the first phase of the conflict the patient had become estranged from her mother without having definitely gone over to the man (Freud, S.E. XIV, 1915, p. 268).

The second delusion, argues Freud (1915), is of a more primitive nature, and must be viewed as a pathological representation of the the primal scene phantasy: "among...unconscious phantasies ...there is one which is seldom absent...this is the phantasy of the observation of sexual intercourse between parents, of seduction, of castration, and others -- primal phantasies" (p. 269).

In the primal scene phantasies of neurotics, the patient typically recalls childhood memory traces of seeing or hearing the parents engaging in the act of sexual intercourse, in the primal scene phantasies of paranoids, however, the scenarios tend to be more perverted with

delusional-like themes (Freud, S.E. XVII, 1916-17).

The woman's second delusion is an example of a pathological representation of a primal scene phantasy. By "means of a small piece of regression," the woman herself became the mother, the lover, who in the first delusion was her father, was now also her husband, and the child, who heard her parents engaging in sexual intercourse, was allotted to a third party -- the two men accused, by the woman, of taking photographs during their intimate "tete-a tete."

> The patient's lover was still her father, but she herself had taken her mother's place. The part of the listener had then to be allotted to a third person. We can see by what means the girl had freed herself from her homosexual dependence on her mother. It was by means of a small piece of regression: instead of choosing her mother as a love-object, she identified herself with her -- she herself became her mother. The possibility of this regression points to the narcissistic origin of her homosexual object-choice and thus to the paranoic disposition in her (Freud, S.E. XIV, 1915, pp. 269-270).

The Misinterpretation Of The Text

Grunbaum (1984) claims that it was the clinical data, gathered during the second session, which permitted Freud (1915) to empirically verify his theory of paranoia. According to Grunbaum (1984), Freud (1915), by employing the logical empirical method of investigation, was able to empirically "bespeak" the presence of the woman's homosexual

psychic conflict, as well as to logically affirm her paranoia diagnosis.

> As it turned out, during a second session the patient's report on episodes at her place of employment not only greatly enhanced the likelihood of her being afflicted by delusions but also accorded with the postulated etiology by revealing a conflict-ridden homosexual attachment to an elderly woman there. But the point is that the psychoanalytic etiology of paranoia is empirically falsifiable (disconfirmable) and that Freud explicitly recognized it. For, as we saw, this hypothesis states that a homosexual psychic conflict is causally necessary for the affliction. Empirical indicators can bespeak the absence of homosexual conflict as well as the presence of paranoid delusions so as to discredit the stated etiology (Grunbaum, 1984, p. 109).

While Grunbaum is quick to point out that Freud empirically verified his psycho-analytic theory of paranoia, he is slow to supply the reader with the sufficient evidence required to adequately justify this claim. In short, Grunbaum tells us that Freud empirically verified his theory of paranoia, he fails to show us the "proof."

In the following section, I will demonstrate to the reader how Grunbaum (1984) has quoted Freud (1915) out of context, ignored the content of the 1915 paper, and misconstrued the psycho-analytic theory and method of investigation, in order to defend his own philosophical point of view, a position which maintains a false premise: unconscious psychic complexes, as defined by Sigmund Freud, are behavioral facts which can be clinically observed and empirically verified by the methods of the exact sciences.

Are Unconscious Complexes Empirical Facts?

Despite his dedication to the natural sciences, Freud often acknowledges that the subject matter of psycho-analysis lends itself more to the art of exegetical interpretation, than to the experimental models of the positive sciences.

> Everybody thinks, [Freud] went on, that I stand by the scientific character of my work and that my principal scope lies in curing mental maladies. This is a terrible error that has prevailed for years and that I have been unable to set right. I am a scientist by necessity, and not by vocation. I am really by nature an artist...And of this there lies an irrefutable proof: which is that in all countries into which psycho-analysis has penetrated it has been better understood and applied by writers and artists than by doctors. My books, in fact, more resemble works of imagination than treatises of pathology...I have been able to win my destiny in an indirect way, and have attained my dream: to remain a man of letters, though still in appearance a doctor. In all great men of science there is a leaven of fantasy, but no one proposes like me to translate the inspirations offered by the currents of modern literature in scientific theories. In psycho-analysis you may find fused together though changed into scientific jargon, the three greatest literary schools of the nineteenth century: Heine, Zola, and Mallarme are united in me under the partronage of my old master, Goethe (Freud, 1934, Cited in Hillman, 1983, p. 3).

As the reader can attest, the clinical data of Freud's 1915 case history is no exception. The 1915 case of paranoia reads more like a short story than a scientific experiment; and the psycho-analytic technique, employed by Freud to analyze the patient's narrative, bears a closer affinity to

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the interpretive methods of literary criticism, than to the quantitative methods of logical empiricism.

As Paul Ricoeur (1981) points out, unlike the behavioral sciences, what is relevant in psycho-analysis is not the observable "facts" per se, but rather, what these observable "facts" symbolically signify for the subject, as a meaning constituting and interpreting being.

> It follows that what is relevant for the analyst is not observable facts or observable reactions to environmental variables, but the meaning which the same events that the behavioral psychologist considers as an observer assume for a subject. I shall venture to say, in summation, that what is psychoanalyically relevant is what a subject makes of his fantasies (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 253).

Or, as Freud (1916-1917) himself reminds us, psychoanalysts, unlike academic psychologists, are less interested in "empirical facts," and are more interested in the patient's phantasies and subjective reconstructions of these "empirical facts."

> We are tempted to feel offended at the patient's having taken up our time with invented stories...When he brings up the material which leads from behind his symptoms to the wishful situations modelled on his infantile experiences, we are in doubt to begin with whether we are dealing with reality or phantasies...The phantasies possess `psychical' as contrasted with `material' reality, and we gradually learn to understand that in the world of the neuroses it is psychical reality which is the decisive kind (Freud, S.E. XVI, 1916-1917, p. 368).

Freud's 1915 case history is a prime example of a psycho-

analytic investigation where the study of the structural

constitution of the patient's "psychic reality" took

precedence over the empirical evaluation of the patient's

"material reality." In the 1915 case, it was only after

Freud (1915) moved from a behavioral analysis of the case

material -- an empirical description of the woman's

"material reality" -- to the level of a psycho-analysis --

a semiotic interpretation of the woman's "psychic reality"

-- that he was able to explain the woman's symptoms in terms

of his theory of paranoia.

Contrary to Grunbaum's claim, it was not the "observable

behaviors" which revealed the woman's homosexual psychic

conflict, but rather, it was the regressive themes and

semiotic configurations of the two delusions which suggested

that she was enmeshed in an intense mother-complex. On the

level of a behavioral analysis there were no visible signs

of the woman's latent homosexual psychic conflict. To quote

Freud: there was "no sign of the influence of a woman, no

struggle against a homosexual attachment...the girl seemed

to be defending herself against love for a man by directly

transforming the lover into a persecutor" (S.E. XIV, 1915,

p. 265). Whereas on the level of a psycho-analysis, Freud

discovered the woman's intense infantile attachment to the

maternal object. To quote Freud: "the manifestation of the

neurotic reaction will always be determined, however, not by

her present-day relation to her actual mother but by her

infantile relations to her earliest image of her mother"

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(S.E. XIV, 1915, p. 268).

By the term "homosexuality," Freud was not referring to an observable behavior; an independent variable which can be operationally defined in the language of the exact sciences. For example, a subject who touches a person of the same sex on more than one occasion. But rather, he was referring to a psychic complex; an unconscious wishful phantasy, capable of being represented in a variety of indirect and distorted symbolic manifestations. For example, a subject's revulsion to touch a person of the same sex, or a subject's driven promiscuity with the opposite sex, or a subject's obsessive jealousy of a person of the same sex, or a subject repelled by the thought of touching person's of either sex, to name four possible variations upon a theme.

According to Freud.(1911), the latent homosexual wish, signified by the single proposition: "I (a man) love him (a man)," can be distorted and represented to consciousness in four principle forms of paranoia. The four grammatical modalities, which structurally constitute the possible "object-relations" of the paranoid's "lived-world," respectively are: 1. delusions of persecution ("I do not love him -- I hate him"), 2. erotomania ("I do not love him -- I love her"), 3. delusion of jealousy ("It is not I who love the women -- he loves them"), and 4. sexual overevaluation of the ego ("I do not love at all -- I do not love any one") (Freud, S.E. XII, p. 1911, pp. 59-79). To

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quote Freud on the four principle grammatical distortion of

the latent homosexual wish:

> Nevertheless, it is a remarkable fact that the familiar principle forms of paranoia can all be represented as contradictions of the single propositions: "I (a man) love him (a man)," and indeed that they exhaust all the possible ways in which such contradictions could be formulated...Now it might be supposed that a proposition consisting of three terms, such as "I love him," could only be contradicted in three different ways. Delusions of jealousy contradict the subject, delusions of persecution contradict the verb, and erotomania contradicts the object. But in fact a fourth kind of contradiction is possible -- namely, one which rejects the proposition as a whole (S.E. XII, 1911, pp. 63-65).

In the above passage, Freud does not infer that there are

only four possible scenarios a paranoid person could act

out. In the Freudian context, the term "form," does not

signify a specific content, like a Platonic "idea" or a

Jungian "archetype," but rather, implies structural

mechanisms, which, like a language and its play of

signifiers, constitute the many possible derivations upon a

theme -- i.e., the semantics of a person's personal

narrative (Lacan, 1977). In short, while Freud believed the

structural mechanisms of the psyche to be finite in number,

the arrangement of these forms, and their respective

scenarios, were infinite in possibilities. In fact, if one

reflects upon the four possible forms of paranoia, which

Freud claimed (1911) are symptomatic defensive reactions to

unconscious homosexual currents -- i.e., 1. "I hate him," 2.

"I love her," 3. "he loves them," and 4. "I do not love any one" -- one would come to the realization that every action or idea imaginable -- with the exception of "I love him" -- can be interpreted as a sign of a "latent" homosexual current.

If different observable behaviors and actions can be invoked, by the grammatical mechanisms of the psyche, to represent symbolically a latent homosexual conflict, how can a psychoanalyst, by listening to a patient's narrative, determine which network of signifers psychodynamically symbolize the subject's latent homosexual disposition? In other words, what if not empirical data constitutes the "fact" in psycho-analysis?

In psycho-analysis, the manifest content of the patient's narrative is not viewed as an end in itself, but rather, as a stepping-stone on the "royal road to the unconscious." From the patient's free associations, the analyst attempts to infer beyond the manifest content of the narrative, to uncover the latent and unconscious referents, and to expose the deep rooted structural configurations of these unconscious motives.

For psycho-analysis, unlike the philological sciences, there does not exist a univocal relationship between the signified and the observable representation of the psychic complex -- the signifer. Due to the mechanisms of the ego mechanisms, the latent meaning of the psychic complex can be represented to consciousness in a diversity of distorted and

disguised formulations. As Lacan (1977) reminds us, the psycho-analytic symbol, unlike the philological sign, participates in a complicated network of symbolic exchange -- an "incessant sliding of the signifed under the signifer" (p. 154).

In psycho-analysis, the patient's communications and actions are not to be taken at face value. Before an interpretation canbe made, the psychoanalyst must assess and work through the patient's resistance. Like an intelligence agent, who has intercepted a coded message, the psychoanalyst must decipher the message first before understanding its referent. This requires the breaking of the code and identifying the grammatical rules by which the patient's resistance systematically disguises the unconscious wish and the phantasmal derivations in which this wish is embodied.

One of Freud's (1900) greatest achievements, the discovery of the "dream work" (S.E. IV-V), delineates the systematic rules by which the secret messages of the unconscious are distorted and disguised. Once Freud (1900) demonstrated the grammatical rules and the tropic structures of the dream work -- condensation, displacement, symbolization, dramatization, etc. -- he was able to decipher the manifest content of the patient's symptom-formations and reveal the hidden meanings and deep rooted structural configurations of the patient's unconscious

complexes.

As early as 1895, Freud began to identify the specific relationships that existed between the various psychopathological disorders and the different structural and semantical derivations of the "clinical pictures." By correlating the various disorders and their symbolic forms, Freud devised general laws to predict pathological disorder on the basis of the semiotic analysis of the patient's narrative.

> There followed the discovery that different sexual factors, in the most general sense, produce different pictures of neurotic disorders. And it then became possible, in the degree to which this relation was confirmed, to venture on using aetiology for the purpose of characterizing the neuroses and of making sharp distinction between the clinical pictures of the various neuroses. Where the aetiological characteristics coincided regularly with the clinical ones, this was of course justified (Freud, S.E. II, 1895, p. 257).

To return to the 1915 case history, it was not the empirical facts which confirmed the woman's paranoid disorder, but rather, the symbolic meaning and deep rooted structural configurations of the patient's narrative which became the ground of the diagnosis. By penetrating beneath the mechanisms of defense -- which rendered the manifest content of the patient's two delusions unrecognizable -- Freud (1915) was able to uncover the hidden meaning and tropological structures of the patient's mother-complex. A psychic complex which pointed "to the narcissistic origin of her homosexual object-choice and thus to the paranoic

disposition in her."

> Let us consider again the outstanding fact that
> the patient protected herself against her love for
> a man by means of a paranoic delusion. The key to
> the understanding of this is to be found in the
> history of the development of the delusion. As we
> might have expected, the latter was at first aimed
> against woman. But now, on this paranoic basis,
> the advance from a female to a male object was
> accomplished...It was by means of a small piece of
> regression; instead of choosing her mother as a
> love-object, she identified herself with her --
> she became her mother. The possibility of this
> regression points to the narcissistic origin of
> her homosexual object-choice and thus to the
> paranoic disposition in her. One might sketch a
> train of thought which would bring about the same
> result as this identification: "If my mother does
> it,I may do it too; I've just as good a right as
> she has" (Freud, S.E. XIV, 1915, pp. 270-271).

CHAPTER FOUR

WHAT DID FREUD MEAN BY THE TERM METAPSYCHOLOGY?

If Freud's metapsychology has been turned into a
fetish by some and scorned as marginal by others,
it is because it was treated as an independent
construction. Too many epistemological works
examine the great theoretical texts outside the
total context of experience and practice. Isolated
in this way, the body of doctrine can only lead to
premature and truncated evaluations. The theory
must therefore be relativized, by which I mean it
must be placed back into the complex network of
relations that encompass it.

Paul Ricoeur
1981

An Introduction To Metapsychology

We become aquainted with the term "metapsychology", for

the first time, in the letters that Freud wrote to Fliess

(Masson, 1985). In the first letter Freud writes:

I am continually occupied with psychology -- it is
really metapsychology; Taine's book L'
Intelligence gives me especial satisfaction. I
hope something will come of it. It is the oldest
ideas which are the most useful, as I am belatedly
finding out. I hope to be occupied with scientific
interests to the end of my life (Feburary 13,
1896).

In the second letter, Freud tells Fliess that the study of

metapsychology will at last allow him to bridge the gap

between his philosophical and medical interests:

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I hope you will lend me your ear for a few
metapsychological questions... As a young man I
knew no longing other than for philosophical
knowledge, and now I am about to fulfill it as I
move from medicine to psychology (April 16, 1986).

In the third letter, Freud shares with Fliess his
preoccupation with the difficult subject matter of his
metapsychological project: "Hidden deep within this is my
ideal and woebegone child -- metapsychology" (December, 17,
1896). In the fourth letter, Freud remarks that he believes
the metapsychology is still developing in spite of the
collapse of the seduction theory:

In this collapse of everything valuable the
psychological alone has remained untouched. The
dream (book) stands entirely secure and my
beginning of the metapsychological work has grown
in my estimation. Its a pity that one cannot make
a living, for instance, on dream interpretation!
(September 21, 1897).

In the fifth letter, Freud requests Fliess's permission to
call his psychological theory, that leads behind
consciousness, metapsychology:

It seems to me as though the theory of wish-
fulfillment has brought only the psychological
solution and not the biological or rather,
metapsychical one. [I am going to ask you
seriously, by the way, whether I may use the name
metapsychology for my psychology that leads behind
consciousness] (March 10, 1898).

In the sixth letter, Freud states that his psycho-analytic
science is grounded upon three different psychological
theories, the genetic, the empirical, and the

metapsychological: "... placing the neuroses and psychoses

in the (sphere of) science by means of the theory of

repression and wish fulfillment. 1. the organic-sexual; 2.

the factual-clinical; 3. the metapsycholgical in it" (July

22, 1899).

It is apparent, in these letters, that Freud had chosen

to employ the Greek prefix "meta" to differentiate his

psychology of the unconscious from the traditional

"descriptive" and "rational" psychologies of his day.

Traditional psychologies were more concerned with the study

of the content of consciousness -- perception, motivation,

sensation, learning and memory (Boring, 1950) -- than with

the unconscious structures and forces which constitute the

symbolic forms of our everyday experiences -- archaic

impulses, wishful phantasies, and infantile sexuality

(E.B. Holt, 1915). By calling his theory a metapsychology

Freud wanted to emphasize that he was developing a depth

psychology -- a science of the unconscious.

> By accepting the existence of these two (or three)
> psychical systems, psycho-analysis has departed a
> step further from the descriptive "psychology of
> consciousness" and has raised new problems and
> acquired a new content ... On the account of this
> attempt... it has been give the name "depth-
> psychology" (Freud, S.E. XIV, 1915, p. 173).

The letters, reveal Freud's familiarity with philosophy

and suggests that the resemblance between his construct

"metapsychology" and the philosophical term "metaphysics"

must have been more than a coincidence (Laplanche and

Pontalis, 1973, p. 249). Freud had an ambivalent relationship to the study of philosophy. An attraction on the one hand -- due to what Jones calls his "passion for knowledge" -- but at the same time a fear and mistrust on the other hand -- due to its speculative nature and lack of "scientific discipline" (1957, pp. 294 - 295). "Even when I have moved away from observation, I have carefully avoided any contact with philosophy proper" (Freud, 1925, p. 58). At one point, Freud (1914) even suggests that there exist a psychical relationship between philosophical speculations and paranoid delusions: "This may have some bearing on the characteristic tendency of paranoics to construct speculative system... (p. 96). However, in a letter to Fliess, dated January 1, 1896, Freud confesses his deepest love for knowledge:

> I see how, via the detour of medical practice, you are reaching your first ideal of understanding human beings as a physiologist just as I most secretly nourish the hope of arriving via these same paths, at my initial goal of philosophy. For that is what I wanted originally when it was not yet at all clear to me to what end I was in the world (Masson, 1895, p. 159).

The term "metapsychology" appears in print, for the first time, in 1901 (approximately five years after the first Fliess letter had been written), in the Psychopathology Of Everyday Life. The term is mentioned in the context of a discussion about the relationship between metapsychology and metaphysics. According to this text, metaphysics is nothing

more than the projection of unconscious fantasies and wishes into the external world. And that the purpose of psychoanalysis, unlike the motives of its pre-scientific ancestors, is to develop a "science of the unconscious"; one that would finally make a clear break from the confabulations of mythology and religion. Such a scientific endeavor that will work through these paranoid ideations, and transform metaphysics back into metapsychology: "One could venture to explain in this way the myths...the supernatural reality, which is destined to be changed back once more by science into the psychology of the unconscious...to transform metaphysics into metapsychology" (Freud, S.E. VI, 1901, pp. 258 -259).

The early history of the development of metapsychology is of interest, a clarification of the construct and its uses is even more necessary. What did Freud, at the turn of the century, mean by the term "metapsychology"? Did it refer to the mechanistic model of the mind which he had just finished constructing in the unpublished manuscript, "The Project For A Scientific Psychology" (1895), an essay where he attempts to explain the psyche in terms of a quasi-physical model that was the popular scientific explanation of his day? Or did it refer to the the psychological theories employed by Freud and Breuer in the the Studies On Hysteria (1895), a collection of case studies where Freud and Breuer tried to cure patients by listening to their life histories and interpreting the symbolic meanings of their

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symptoms and actions?

Before these questions can be answered, a brief sketch of Freud's pre-psycho-analytic background must be presented. The purpose of this biographical detour is to demonstrate to the reader that Freud's metapsychology is a historic construct and as such it must be understood within the context of the history of ideas.

The late nineteenth century was a crucial turning point in Western thought. It marked the culmination as well as the beginning phases of the revolt against Cartesian dualism -- the metaphysical assumption that there exists two independent universes: the world of consciousness ("pour-soi") and the world of things ("en-soi") (Lovejoy, 1929). Psycho-analysis was more than a relic of this transition period, it was a major catalyst in the revolt against psychophysical dualism and the progressive movement toward the existentialization of the human sciences (Ricoeur, 1974). In this light, Freud's metapsychology must be viewed as being situated on the cusp between two different visions of reality -- the Cartesian tradition of the nineteenth century with its emphasis on psychophysical dualism and the existential tradition of the twentieth century with its emphasis on viewing man as a historical being.

The Historic Conception Of Metapsychology

After his medical training, Freud worked as an assistant

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in Brucke's physiological institute for six years (1876-82). It was through Brucke, that Freud first became aquainted with the theories of Helmholtz, Herbart, and Fechner (Jones, 1963).

The principle of the conservation of energy was discovered by Robert Meyer in 1842, made prominent by Helmholtz around 1847, and proclaimed the manifesto of the Hemholtz school by the later decades of the nineteenth century. The Hemholtzian doctrine attempted to explain the different aspects of the physical world in terms of a mechanistic paradigm -- living and non-living matter reduced to an interplay of forces (the attaction and repulsion of an energy like substrate) -- and these dynamic forces were further explained by the principle of the conservation of energy -- the total sum of these forces (motive forces and potential forces) remain constant in every isolated system.

> They are all phenomena of the physical world;
> systems of atoms, moved by forces, according to
> the principle of the conservation of energy ...
> The sum· of forces (motive forces and potential
> forces) remains constant in every isolated system.
> The real causes are symbolized in science by the
> word "force." ... Progress in knowledge reduces
> them to two -- attraction and repulsion. All this
> applies as well to the organism man (Brucke, 1874,
> cited in Jones, 1963, p. 29).

Throughout his writings, Freud aspired to explain his research findings in terms of Helmholtz's physicalistic theories. The economic and dynamic metapsychological points of view are prime examples of how Freud viewed the psyche in

terms of mechanistic metaphors.

> That among the psychic functions there is
> something which should be differentiated (an
> amount of affect, a sum of excitation), something
> having all the atributes of a quantity -- although
> we possess no means of measuring it -- a something
> which is capable of increase, decrease,
> displacement and discharge, and which extends
> itself over memory traces of an idea like an
> electric charge over the surface of the body. We
> can apply this hypothesis which, by the way,
> already underlies our [i.e., Breuer-Freud] theory
> of "abreaction", in the same sense as the
> physicist employs the conception of a fluid
> electrical current (Freud, S.E. XVII, 1918, p.
> 75).

Freud's attempt to explain the psyche in terms of a psychophysical model is not far fetched, when one considers the materialistic "Weltanschauung" of the nineteenth century. Far from confining their research to the natural sciences, these ardent physicalists applied their theories to a wide array of philosophic concerns. For example, Brucke attempted to develop physiological explanations for "A Theory of the Formative Arts", "A Physiological Basis for German Poetry", and "Action in Painting and Sculpture", and Fechner, being more interested in the problems of spirituality, constructed physiological explanations of cosmology [Zend-Avista] and ethics [On the Highest Good] (Bernfeld, 1944; Ellenberger, 1970).

In 1824, Herbart, in opposition to the notion of free will, used the principles of physics to construct a deterministic theory of the psyche based upon unconscious motivating forces and the dynamic interplay between ideas

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and affects. The Herbartian "psychology of ideas" played an important role in Freud's metapsychological papers. Freud's theory of repression is the most important concept that can be traced back to Herbart's psychology (MacIntyre,1958).

In 1860, after several years of being preoccupied with the relationship between the physical and spirtual worlds, Fechner constructed his famous psychophysical law and principle of stability. It was Fechner's intention to develop a complete cosmology based solely upon physicalistic explanations. In a book on aesthetics, Fechner attempts to explain the psychological experience of pleasure and unpleasure by the mechanistic principles of constancy and stability.

Fechner's influence on psycho-analysis is evidenced by the fact that Freud quotes him throughout his writings (Freud, 1900, 1905, 1920, 1925). Many of Freud's most basic metapsychological points of view were borrowed from Fechner's psychophysical principles and laws.

> Freud took from Fechner the concept of mental
> energy, the "topographical" concept of the mind,
> the principle of pleasure-unpleasure, the
> principle of constancy, and the principle of
> repetition. A large part of the theoretical
> framework of psychoanalysis wold hardly have come
> into being without the speculations of the man
> whom Freud called the great Fechner (Ellenberger,
> 1970, P. 218).

The most important idea that Freud borrowed from the "great Fechner" was the pleasure principle.

An investigator of such penetration as G. T.
Fechner held a view on the subject of pleasure and
unpleasure which coincides in all essential with
the one that has been forced us by psycho-analytic
work (Freud, S.E., XVIII, 1920, p. 8).

The theoretical assumptions, advanced by the school of
Helmholtz constituted a radical shift in the theoretical
foundation of the natural sciences. By the middle of the
nineteenth century, the philosophy of nature, with its
Romantic beliefs in vitalistic biology and speculative
physics, was overthrown by the physico-physiological
theories of the school of Helmholtz, with its reductionistic
beliefs and materialistic assumptions.

In Vienna, as in Berlin, "naturphilosophie" and
its scientific counterpart, vitalism, gave way in
biology to a physico-physiological theory based on
the ideas of force, attraction, and repulsion, all
three being governed by the principle of the
conservation of energy [discovered by Robert Mayer
in 1842 and made prominent by Helmholtz] (Ricoeur,
1970, p 42.).

The spirit of this positivistic crusade is reflected in
a letter written in 1842 by Emil du Bois-Reymond, a member
of the Helmholtz institute. In this letter, du Bois -Reymond
proclaims that the mission of the school of Helmholtz is to
understand the world in terms of a minimum number of
physical forces.

Brucke and I pledge a solemn oath to put in power
this truth: No other forces than the common
physical chemical ones are active within the
organism. In those cases which cannot at the time
be explained by these forces one has either to
find the specific way or form of their action by

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means of the physical mathematical method, or to
assume new forces equal in dignity to the chemical
forces inherent in matter reducible to the force
of attraction and repulsion (Bois-Reymond, 1843,
cited in Bernfeld, 1944, p. 348).

Freud idealized Brucke and found his laboratory to be a
congenial place to work (Jones, 1953). Upon reflection,
Freud notes the important role Brucke's teachings played in
the formations of his own scientific theories: Brucke has
"carried more weight with me than any one else in my whole
life" (Freud, S.E. XX, 1927a, p. 253).

Freud's admiration and dedication to the Helmholtzian
ideology was not unusual for a medical student who was
trained in the middle 1800's.

In the sixties, that part of German university
teaching which was held to be the most
interesting, the most far reaching, and the most
modern, was the physiology of the Helmholtz
school. It fascinated the student of that time in
somewhat the same way as atom smashing appeals to
the imagination of the students of today... Within
twenty-five or thiry years they achieved complete
domination over the thinking of the German
Physiologists and medical teachers, gave intensive
stimulus to science everywhere, and solved some of
the old puzzles forever (Bernfeld, 1944, p. 248).

In 1882, Freud left Brucke's institute to begin his
medical career as a practicing physician. There are many
explanations for this sudden break with Brucke, ranging from
the lack of professional opportunities at the institute to
Freud's desire to get married and have a family (Sulloway,
1979; Ellenberger, 1970; Jones, 1957; Bernfeld, 1944).

As a resident at the old Viennese General hospital, Freud

acquired a fair amount of clinical experience with neurological patients, while still having the opportunity to continue his histological and anatomical research in the laboratories of Theodor Meynert, the famous "brain mythologist" (Ellenberger, 1970).

Between 1880 and 1895 Freud achieved the status of a prominent Viennese neurologist and published several papers on a variety of subjects.

> For Freud, the fifteen-year period from 1880 to 1895 was one of exceptionally eclectic scientific achievement. He worked simultaneously on the study of brain anatomy (1884f, 1886b, 1886c, 1888b), cocaine (1884e, 1887d), hypnosis (1889a, 1892-3), aphasia (1891b), cathartic psychotherapy, childhood cerebral paralyses (1888a, 1891a, 1891c, 1893b), and the translation of two books each by Charcot and Bernheim -- to give just a partial listing (Sulloway, 1979, p. 69).

It was during this period of "eclectic scientific achievement" (Sulloway, 1970) that Freud began to develop an interest in psychology. Under the influence of Jean-Martin Charcot, with whom he studied in Paris in 1885, and Josef Breuer, an older colleague and friend in Vienna, Freud turned his attention to the psychological aspects of neurology. Both Charcot and Breuer played an important role in early development of Freud's psycho-analytic formulations.

In 1885, with the help of Brucke, Freud won a government-sponsored traveling fellowship and went to Paris to study with the famous Charcot. During the twenty weeks at the

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Salpetriere school, Freud was impressed by Charcot's

theoretical explanations of hysteria (symptoms follow lawful

principles) and by his use of hypnosis as a method of

treatment for all sorts of psychopathology (since the days

of Mesmer, hypnosis was rarely used as a "scientific" method

of intervention) (Ellenberger, 1970). Perhaps it was

Charcot's boldness and courage to be radical -- his research

into the non-organic origins of hysteria and the application

of hypnosis -- that impressed Freud.

> At the same time, Freud encountered in Charcot's
> clinical emphasis a refeshing subordination of
> theory to medical facts. In one of his favorite
> anecdotes about Charcot, Freud tells how he once
> dared to contradict the master on some medical
> point with the remark: "But that can't be true, it
> contradicts the Young-Helmholtz theory" -- to
> which Charcot unhesitatingly replied, "Theory is
> good; but it doesn't prevent things from existing"
> [Freud, 1893, p. 13] (Sulloway, 1979, p. 34).

Upon his return to·Vienna, Freud presented a paper on

hysteria before the Society of Physicians. The paper was not

received well, which resulted in Freud's "life-long feud

with the Viennese medical world" (Ellenberger, 1970, p.

437). It was during this period, that Freud developed a

professional tie with Josef Breuer, a fellow clinical

neurologist, who also studied under Brucke in the late

1870's and was interested in applying the biophysical

theories of the Helmholtz school to the realm of the

psychotherapeutic (Freud, S.E. XX 1925d).

Breuer, played an important role in Freud's theoretical

development. To quote Sulloway (1979): "If Jean-Martin Charcot was the first of the two momentuous personal influences that started Freud on the pathway to psychoanalytic theory, the second was Josef Breuer" (P. 51). His respect for Breuer was illustrated by the fact that in 1891, Freud published a book on aphasia and dedicated it to his colleague and mentor-like friend.* According to Ellenberger, in 1892 and 1893, Freud seemed to oscillate between his old allegiance to Charcot's hypnotic treatment and the adoption of Breuer's cathartic method. (1970, p. 485).

When Freud returned to Vienna from Paris, Breuer was already working on his reminiscence theory of hysteria and was practicing the carthartic treatment process. Breuer believed hysterics suffered from "reminiscences" -- unconscious traumatic memories that inflicted psychological disturbances. And that the proper treatment for these psychological disorders was his "cathartic method" -- the freeing up of strangulated affects by recalling in reverse chronological order the original circumstances under which the symptoms had appeared for the first time.

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* In this book, Freud critiques Wernicke's "brain mythology", which was the popular explanation for aphasia amongst the Viennese's medical community. Wernicke's theory attempted to correlate the different aphasic symptoms with specific topographical brain lessions (see Forrester, 1980, for a detailed analysis of Freud's book on aphasia).

> Each individual hysterical symptom immediately and
> permanently disappeared when we had succeeded in
> bringing clearly to light the memory of the event
> by which it was provoked and in arousing its
> accompanying affect, and when the patient had
> described that event in the greatest possible
> detail and had put the affect into words (Breuer
> and Freud, S.E. II, 1893a, p. 4).

Whereas Charcot was interested in being able to identify, and differentially diagnose the different nervous diseases, Breuer was more concerned with listening to the patient's narratives and trying to understand the symbolic meanings of their symptoms and related actions.

> In other cases [of hysteria] the connection
> [between the precipitating event and the symptom]
> was not so simple. It consists only in what might
> be called a "symbolic" relation between the
> precipitating cause and the pathological
> phenomenon -- a relation such as healthy people
> form in dreams (Breuer and Freud, S.E. II, 1893a,
> p. 5).

It is no wonder, that Breuer's most famous patient, Anna O., referred to this therapeutic procedure -- which in actuality was more concerned with gaps in ideas than lesions in the brain -- as "chimney sweeping" or the "talking cure" (Jones, 1963).

Impressed with Breuer's theories of reminiscence, the cathartic method of treatment, and his psychophysicalistic explanations of psychopathology, Freud decided to persuade Breuer into jointly publishing their common scientific findings in a book entitled <u>Studies On Hysteria</u> (Breuer and Freud, 1895). The book consisted of five case histories (the

Anna O. case being the most famous), a chapter by Breuer on

the theory of hysteria, and a final chapter by Freud on the

psychotherapy of hysterics.

The Breuer-Freud theory of hysteria was a natural out

growth of the common scientific background of the two men

and their mutual interests in psychology. Both men shared a

strong interest in understanding the psychological processes

of their patients as well as developing a psychophysical

model to explain their findings.

> Their strong mutual interest in psychological as
> well as physiological processes underlay the
> implicit dualism of their theory of hysteria, with
> its respect for the language of psychology and its
> simultaneous positing of a bold psychophysicalist
> model to account for the key phenomena of
> strangulated affect, abreaction, and catharsis
> (Sulloway, 1979, p. 68).

The psychophysical explanations, however, did not mesh

well with their psychological discoveries. In fact it was

the failure of the neurological explanations to account for

hysterical paralyses that led Breuer and Freud to advance an

alternative explanation. Although Freud and Breuer had

hoped to create a psychological paradigm on the same meta-

scientific footing as the positivistic sciences, their

psychotherapeutic research lead them to an alternative meta-

theory based upon clinical observation. The psychological

theories, having a closer affinity to the descriptive

analyses of imaginary writers than to the mechanistic

theorems of the neuropathologists, created an ontological

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rift in their theoretical formulations. In <u>Studies On Hysteria</u>, Freud (1895) discusses the contraposition between his neurological background and the psychotherapeutic discoveries and "consoles" himself about the uncanny lack of scientific rigor in the later occupation.

> I have not always been a psychotherapist. Like
> other neuropathologist, I was trained to employ
> local diagnoses and electro-prognosis, and it
> still strikes me myself as strange that the case
> history I write should read like short stories and
> that, as one might say, they lack the serious
> stamp of science. I must console myself with the
> reflection that the nature of the subject is
> evidently responsible for this, rather than any
> preference of my own, The fact is that local
> diagnosis and electrical reactions lead nowhere in
> the study of hysteria, whereas a detailed
> description of mental processes such as we are
> accustomed to find in the works of imaginative
> writers enables me, with the use of a few
> psychological fomulas, to obtain at least some
> kind of insight into the course of affection
> (Freud, S.E. II, 1895, pp. 160 -161).

While both men treated hysterical symptoms by listening for the gaps and incongruencies in the patient's stories, neither Breuer or Freud had ever doubted that nervous disorders had a neurological basis and that neurophysiological explanations would one day be discovered. Until the appropriate neurological explanations of the psyche are discovered, Freud believed that it was best to explain psychical processes in terms of the language of psychology.

> To the end of his life, however, Freud continued
> to adhere to the chemical aetiology of the
> "actual" neuroses and to believe that a physical

basis for all mental phenomena might ultimately be found. But in the meantime he gradually came round to the view expressed by Breuer that psychical proceses can only be dealt with in the language of psychology (Strachey, S.E. II, 1955, p. xxiv).

In the Breuer-Freud theories of 1895, the construct "unconscious" was used in a purely descriptive manner. By listening to their patient's narratives, Freud and Breuer discovered that there existed lacunae and gaps in the stories that their patients told them. And that these gaps were not random, but rather, were situated in the places where ideas must have once been. Breuer and Freud concluded that these gaps were due to a specific traumatic event which the patient repressed. By the process of repression the psyche is said to be split into an unconscious and conscious realm. The memory of the traumatic event is said to be dissociated into an ideational and affective component. It is this dissociation that allows the affect to continue to effect the individual while the ideational component assumes a paradoxical status of absence from consciousness while still being present in the psyche of the individual. In other words, the traumatic idea is repressed and forced into the back of the person's mind -- the unconscious -- while the affect which was attached to the traumatic ideas find another root of expression -- i.e., the bodily symptom. It is this affective presence in the absence of its corresponding ideation that gave rise the unconscious dimension of the psyche. In short, according to the Breuer -

Freud theory of the unconscious, ideas are never lost, they are just displaced outside the field of consciousness.

The completion of the Studies Of Hysteria marked the termination of the professional alliance between Breuer and Freud (Freud, S.E. 14, 1914d) . In an 1892 communication to Fliess, Freud writes about the theoretical disputes between Breuer and himself: "It has meant a long battle with my collaborator" (Origins, 1954, p. 64). By 1894, the Breuer-Freud collaboration deteriorated, and as a result Freud personally felt compelled to write a preface to the Studies On Hysteria proclaiming the divergence between their points of view.

> It arises from the natural and justifiable differences between the opinions of two observers who are agreed upon the facts and their basic reading of them, but who are invariably at one in their interpretations and conjectures (Freud, S.E. II, 1895, pp. xxix-xxx).

In the chapter on psychotherapy, Freud not only discusses the application and limitation of the cathartic method, but openly states his theoretical divergence with Breuer's psychological explanations (1895, pp. 253 -310). According to Freud, Breuer and he theoretically diverge on two major points. First, the emphasis on the fundamental importance of the role of sexuality in the etiology of hysteria. Breuer, like Freud, believed sexuality played an important role in the constitution of hysterical symptoms.

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> We are already recognizing sexuality as one of
> the major components of hysteria. We shall see
> that the part it plays in it is very much greater
> still and that it contributes in the most various
> ways to the constitution of the illness (Breuer,
> S.E. II, 1895, p. 200).

However, Breuer did not share Freud's belief that sexuality

was the essential cause of every form of neuroses.

> Thus, starting out from Breuer's method, I found
> myself engaged in a consideration of the aetiology
> and mechanism of the neuroses in general. I was
> fortunate enough to arrive at some serviceable
> finding in a relatively short time. In the first
> place I was obliged to recognize that, in so far
> as one can speak of determining causes which lead
> to the acquisition of neuroses, their aetiology is
> to be looked for in sexual factors. There followed
> the discovery that different sexual factors, in
> the most general sense, produce different pictures
> of neurotic disorders (Freud, S.E. II, 1895, p.
> 257).

Second, Breuer did not agree with Freud's theory of defense.

According to Freud, the patient's resistance not only plays

an important role in the formation of symptoms, but, for a

psychotherapy to be successful, it must also play an

important role in the treatment of the symptom as well.

> A new understanding seemed to open before my eyes
> when it occurred to me that resistance must no
> doubt be the same psychical force that had played
> a part in the generating of the hysterical symptom
> and had at that time prevented the pathogenic idea
> from becoming conscious...The idea had become
> pathogenic precisely as a result of its expulsion
> and repression...The task of the therapist,
> therefore, lies in overcoming by his psychical
> work this resistance to association (Freud, S.E.
> II, 1895, pp. 268-269).

Upon reflection, Freud recollects that it was Breuer's

failure to appreciate the therapeutic value of the patient's resistance, which was the central reason for their professional break. For Freud, it was more the phenomenon of resistance, than the discovery that symptoms have meaning, which was at the heart of the psychotherapeutic praxis.

> I have another reproach to make against this method, namely, that it conceals from us all insight into the play of mental forces; it does not permit us, for example, to recognize the resistance with which the patient clings to his disease and thus even fights against his own recoverly; yet it is this phenomenon of resistance which alone makes it possible to understand his behavior in daily life (Freud, S.E. VII, 1905, p. 261).

Without a proper explanation of the resistance, Freud argued, it would be impossible for the psychotherapist, to explain the occurence of symptomatic activities which are ostensibly unintentional and interfere with the performance of the patient's ordinary actions. That is, behaviors and thoughts, such as obsessions and compulsions, which are for the most part distressing and do not appear, at least on the surface, to serve the patient in any rational way.

> For I already had at my disposal a few completed analyses in which I had come to know examples of ideas that were pathogenic, and had been forgotten and put out of consciousness. From these I recognized a universal characteristic of such ideas: they were all a of a distressing nature, calculated to arouse the affects of shame, of self-reproach and of psychic pain, and the feeling of being harmed; they were all of a kind that one would prefer not to have experienced, that one would rather forget. From all this there arose, as it were automatically, the though of defence (Freud, S.E. II, 1895, p. 269).

From clinical experience, Freud began to discover that resistance played an important role in the formation, as well as the treatment of symptoms. If there is a hidden meaning to be deciphered, the reason is that there is a distorted wish that is unacceptable to consciousness. And, if there is a distortion of a wish, its is because the patient embodies a resistance to the emergence of the wish into consciousness. In sum, Freud believed that the therapist must do more than elucidate the meaning of the symptom, he must also interpret the patient's resistance to the treatment -- the psychological defenses which prevent the latent meaning of the symptom from reaching consciousness.

> Thus a psychical force, aversion on the part of the ego, had originally driven the pathogenic idea out of association and was now opposing its return to memory. The hysterical patient's "not knowing" was in fact a "not wanting to know" -- a not wanting which might be to a greater or less extent conscious. The task of the therapist, therefore, lies in overcoming by his psychical work this resistance to association (Freud, S.E. II, 1895, pp. 269-270).

While Freud, as early as 1895, had the premonition that sexuality and resistance were essential determinants in the etiology of neuroses, he was, as of yet, unsure of their exact relationship to each other and to the different forms of the disease.

> I am pretty well alone here in tackling the neuroses. They regard me rather as a monomaniac, while I have the distinct feeling that I have

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touched on one of the greatest secrets of nature...There are a hundred gaps, large and small, in my ideas about the neuroses; but I am getting nearer to a comprehensive picture and some general points of view...In all these cases what seems to undergo the change is sexual excitment...that is to say, whatever neuroses are acquired, they are acquired owing to disturbances of sexual life (Freud, 1894, Kris 1954, p. 84).

The estrangement from Breuer led to a difficult and lonely period for Freud. Not only was he alienated from the Viennese medical community -- the neuropathologists -- because of his psychological interests, but he was now also on bad terms with Breuer -- the psychotherapist -- because of his investment in the sexual theories.

This was brought about by Breuer's unwillingness to follow Freud in his investigation of his patient's sexual life, or rather, in the far-reaching conclusions Freud was drawing from it. That disturbance in the sexual life were the essential factors in the etiology of both neuroses and psychoneuroses was a doctrine Breuer could not easily stomach. Nor was he alone in that! (Jones, 1963, p. 161).

In a letter to Fliess, dated June 22, 1884, Freud confesses his feelings of loneliness and alienation.

I actually spend the whole day thinking about nothing but the neuroses, but since my scientific contact with Breuer has ended I have been thrown back on myself alone, which is why it goes so slowly (Kris, 1954, pp. 94-95).

In 1887, Fliess, a prominent ear, nose and throat doctor from Berlin, attended Freud's lectures in neuropathology at the University of Vienna. It was through Breuer, a mutual

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friend and colleage, that Fliess learned of Freud's

theoretical interests. Fliess and Freud had similiar

scientific backgrounds; they were both trained in the

physiological tradition of Helmholtz, studied clinical

neurology under Charcot and Breuer and were interested in

biological research (Jones, 1963, pp. 182-203).

In the beginnning stages of their friendship the two men

had much in common. Both were sons of Jewish middle-class

buisness men, both struggled to develop their practices in

order to support new families, and both were specialists in

nontraditional areas of biological research (Kris, 1954).

Fliess, like Freud, was convinced that many different

clinical syndromes had a sexual etiology. He differed from

Freud, however, in that he believed that there existed: 1. a

relationship between the mucous membrane of the nose,

genital activities, and the etiology of different clinical

syndromes and 2. that the cosmos was predermined by periodic

laws which could be defined in terms of mathematical

equation. *

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* Early in his career, Fliess discovered that he was able
to clear up a number of his patient's symptoms by the
administration of cocaine to the nasal mucous membrane.
From his findings, Fliess was convinced that he discovered a
new clinical entity -- the "nasal reflex neuroses".
According to this theory, infectious traumas to the nasal
cavity or some sort of vasomotor disturbance of sexual
origin was the reason for many of the the psychological and
physical ailments of his patients. In addition to his
research on the nasal reflex neuroses, Fliess developed
theories about periodicity and human bisexuality. The sexual
period theory argues that there exist cosmic-like patterns

In spite of Fliess's speculative constructions, Freud
found in Fliess a confidant and a trusting friend to whom he
could openly reveal his personal and professional concerns
with. In a letter to his sister-in-law, dated April 7, 1893,
Freud describes his admiration for Fliess with a Platonic-
like reverence: "He is a most unusual person, good nature
personified: and I believe, if it came to it, he would for
all his genius, be goodness itself" (Masson, 1985, p.2).

A few months after Fliess attended Freud's lectures,
Freud in a letter to Fliess requested permission to continue
their relationship.

> My letter of today admittedly is occasioned by
> business, but I must introduce it by confessing
> that I entertain hopes of continuing the
> relationship with you and that you have left a
> deep impression on me which could easily lead me
> to tell you outright in what category of men I
> place you (November, 24, 1887, Masson, 1985, p.
> 15).

This was the first in a series of letters that would be
written to Fliess for the next seven years (1887-1904).

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of energy that effect the destiny of the universe and its
inhabitants. These waves of energy are genetically passed on
from generation to generation and predetermine a persons
physical and psychological well being. In a Helmholtzian
fashion, Fliess attempted to explain these periodic laws by
complicated mathematical equations and mechanistic
prinicples. According to Fliess,the rhythmic cycle of the
menstrual process is an expression of this universal
periodic law. From his nasal and period hypotheses, Fliess
derived the bisexuality theory. Since all humans were
effected by rhythmic cycles, Fliess concluded that both
males and females must be bisexually constituted (Kris,
1954; Jones, 1957).

With the annulment of the Breuer-Freud collaboration,
Freud's friendship with Fliess deepened and the frequency of
the letters increased. For many years Fliess was Freud's
only audience.

> Freud's relentless probing into the psychological
> consequences of his patient' early sexual
> experiences was not welcomed by his more
> conservative medical colleagues, and the ensuing
> isolation undoubtedly explains the increasing
> frequency of the letters. For many years Fliess
> was Freud's only audience (Masson, 1985, p. 2).

In the early years, Freud supported Fliess's hypotheses.

> Freud did place some credence in Fliess's claims
> about the significance of the nose. Marie
> Bonaparte, in a continuation of her notebook,
> says: " As for a connection between the nose and
> the rest of the organism, there is some truth in
> it. Freud experienced it himself, with respect to
> his heartburn, which would suddenly disappear
> after nasal treatment" (Masson, 1985, p. 4).

With the development of his own theories, however, Freud
became more skeptical of Fliess's speculations, resulting in
the eventual break up of their personal and professional
ties.

> Perhaps his outstanding characteristics were an
> unrestrained fondness for speculation and a
> correspondingly self-confident belief in his
> imaginative ideas with a dogmatic refusal to
> consider any criticsm of them -- a feature that
> ultimately led to the break in his friendship with
> Freud (Jones, 1963, p. 184).

It was in these letters to Fliess, however, that Freud
began to work out, for the first time, the central tenets of

the psycho-analytic theory -- his science of the unconscious with its different metapsychological points of view (Masson, 1985).

> Freud's letters to Fliess give us a picture of him during the years in which he applied himself -- tentatively at first -- to a new field of study, psychopathology, and acquired the insight on which psycho-analysis, both as a theory and a therapy, is based...It shows Freud gradually shaking himself free from the ideas and conceptions with which he started, or at any rate taking the first steps in that direction. This was at first not desired by him, and it remained unintentional for a long time. It was forced on him by "the nature of the material," by his attempt to take the description and understanding of human conflict out of the realm of art and intuition and to put it into the realm of science (Kris, 1954, pp. 3 and 47).

Freud's first understanding of the unconscious was in terms of the lack of coherency in consciousness (Breuer and Freud, 1895). The gaps in patient's narratives were explained in terms of contents that were deleted from consciousness and resituated in the unconscious realm. Thus the contents that compose the unconscious mind are said to be derivative. The idea that the unconscious is a derivative of consciousness posed a problem for Freud's theoretical postulate of man's ultimate determinism. The understanding of the unconscious as derivative allows for the possibility that through therapy man can overcome the unconscious determinants of his behavior and achieve a state of free will. To be consistent with his deterministic framework -- the psychophysical model --Freud makes a turn about and

attempts to explain consciousness as derivative of the unconscious (Sulloway, 1979). Consciousness is now viewed as a secondary process, a surface presentation governed by the rules and regulation of a permanent unconscious system. It is with the transformation of the unconscious, from descriptive contents to a dynamic and structural system, which firmly established psycho-analysis as a depth psychology, a science of the unconscious -- in essence, a metapsychology. To quote passage from a letter Freud wrote to Fliess dated May 25, 1895:

> But the chief reason was this: a man like me cannot live without a hobby-horse, a consuming passion -- in Schiller's words a tyrant. I have found my tyrant, and in his service I know no limits. My tyrant is psychology; it has always been my distant, beckoning goal and now, since I have hit on the neuroses, it has come so much nearer. I am plagued with two ambitions: to see how the theory of mental functioning takes shape if Quantitative considerations, a sort of economics of nerve-force, are introduced into it; and secondly, to extract from psychology what may be of benefit to normal psychology. Actually a satisfactory general theory of neuropsychic disturbances is impossible fit cannot be brought int asociation with clear assumptions about normal mental processes (Kris, 1954, pp. 119-120).

One month after completing the Studies On Hysteria, Freud began the "Project For A Scientific Psychology" (alias the "Psychology For Neurologists") (S.E. I, 1895). The intent of this manuscript was to develop a "quantitative psychology." A psychological paradigm capable of upholding the rigorous requirements of the natural sciences. In

essence, Freud (1895) wished to develop a mechanistic model of the mind based upon Newtonian physics (MacIntyre, 1958). A model which could explain qualitative experiences, such as consciousness and perception, in terms of quantitative mechanisms, such as neurons and energy. To develop a "machine which in a moment would run itself" was Freud's ideological calling. To quote passage from a letter Freud wrote to Fliess dated October 20, 1895:

> One strenuous night last week, when I was in the stage of painful discomfort in which my brain works best, the barriers suddenly lifted, the veils dropped, and it was possible to see from the details of neurosis all the way to the very conditioning of consciousness. Everything fell into place, the cogs meshed, the thing really seemed to be a machine which in a moment would run itself. The three systems of neurones, the "free" and bound" states of quantity, the primary and secondary processes, the main trend and the compromise trend of the nervous system, the two biological rules of attention and defence, the indications of quality, reality, and thought, the state of the psycho-sexual group, the sexual determination of repression, and finally the factors determining consciousness as a perceptual function -- the whole thing held together, and still does. I can naturally hardly contain myself with delight (Kris, 1954, p. 129).

The intention of the "Project" was clearly defined in the first sentence of the manuscript:

> The intention of this project is to furnish us with a psychology which shall be a natural science: its aim, that is, is to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determined states of specifiable material particles and so to make them plain and void of contradictions (Kris, 1954, Freud, 1895, p.355).

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Freud's machine, however, failed to run. The contradictions, which he wanted to avoid, became enmeshed in the cogs and the gears. The "problem of consciousness" became insurmountable. The neurological model of the "Project" could not account for the qualitative aspects of the psyche without postulating a "homuncular ego" (Holt 1981). In short, Freud's attempt to reduce consciousness to a confounded variable -- an incidental by-product of the interplay of forces between neurons -- was not sucessful -- the mechanistic model could not account for the psychological processes which were observed in clinical practice. To quote from a letter Freud wrote to Fliess dated Feburary 29, 1895:

> I no longer understand the state of mind in which
> I concocted the psychology; I cannot concieve how
> I came to inflict it on you. I think you are too
> polite; it seems to me to have been a kind of
> aberration. The clincal explanations of the two
> neuroses will probably stand, after some
> modification (Kris, 1954, p. 134).

The inability to construct a mechanistic model of the mind -- one which could account for qualitative experiences of consciousness in terms of the quantitative forces and vectors -- led Freud away from the speculative realm of Newtonian metaphysics and brought him closer to the psychological realm of clinical praxis.

> Immediately after Freud had written the "Project",
> his interests were diverted to other problems.
> With his return to clinical work during the
> autumn, the theory of neuroses moved into the

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foreground of his thoughts, and his principle
discovery of the autumn of 1895 related to the
distinction between the genetic factors in
obsessional neurosis and hysteria (Kris, 1954, p.
51).

The "Project" was Freud's greatest effort to construct a
psychological paradigm based solely upon the quantitative
postulates of the Helmholtz school of psychophysics. It was
the failure on the part of these mechanistic theories to
contain Freud's clinical discoveries which redirected Freud
away from Newtonian metaphysics and back to the realm of
psychology.

What is most interesting is the manner in which
Freud, by extending this thought, transforms it to
the breaking point. In this regard the "Project"
stands as the greatest effort Freud ever made to
force a mass of psychical facts within the
framework of a quantitative theory, and as the
demonstration by way of the absurd that the
content exceeds the frame...As one enters more
deeply into the "Project," one has the impression
that the quantitative framework and the neuronic
support recede into the background, until they are
no more than a given and convenient language of
reference which supplies the necessary constraints
for the expression of great discoveries (Ricoeur,
1970, p. 73).

The abandonment of the "Project For A Scientific
Psychology" can be viewed as the ash upon which Freud's
metapsychological points of view were soon to be
constructed.

Under the cloak of brain physiology, however, the
"Project" reveal a wealth of concrete
psychological hypotheses, of general theoretical
assumptions and of various suggestive hints. Many
of these thoughts, after the modifications

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necessitated by the abandonment of the abortive physiological attempt, were carried over into Freud's later writings, and some of them are numbered among the permanent stock-in-trade of psycho-analytic hypotheses (Kris, 1954, p 350). *

Metapsychology Is Neither Psychology Nor Neurology

Freud's metapsychology was a reaction against both the mechanistic principles of the natural sciences, which tended to reduce psychological processes to the physical realm of objects, and the idealistic theories of the descriptive psychological disciplines, which tended to reduce psychological processes to the intentional realm of consciousness. It was the failure of the mechanistic principles to account for the qualitative experiences of the person as subject as well as the failure of psychological theories to explain thoughts and actions which were ego-dystonic which lead Freud to the elaboration of psycho-analytic theory (MacIntyre, 1958). Metapsychology was Freud's attempt to develop a science of the unconscious which went beyond the either/or distinction of Cartesian dualism -- mechanistic causes and idealistic intentions.

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* It is interesting to note, Karl Pribram (1976), in Freud's Project Re-Assessed, argues that many aspects of the neurological model of the mind which Freud constructed in the "Project" are still valid and relevant to scientific research.

> The distinction between motive in the sense of
> "reason for" and cause in the sense of a relation
> between observable facts in no way concerns the
> degree of generality of propositions. It is the
> distinction Brentano, Dilthey, and Husserl had in
> mind when they sharply distinguished between
> understanding of the psychical or historical, and
> explanation of nature; in this sense motives are
> on the side of the historical, understood as a
> region of being distinct from the region of nature
> and capable of being considered according to the
> generality or singularity of its temporal
> sequences. On the other hand, the distinction
> between motive and cause does not resolve the
> epistemological problem posed by Freudian
> discouse: such discourse is governed by a unique
> type of being, which I call the semantics of
> desire; it is a mixed discourse that falls outside
> the motive-cause alternative. From the discussion
> it is evident that analytic discourse falls partly
> within the field of motive concepts; that is
> enough to make the split between psycho-analysis
> and the observational sciences operative from the
> beginning (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 363).

In essence, metapsychology is neither a behavioral science nor a descriptive psychology, it is rather a metatheory more on the·level of Kant's transcendental theory of human knowledge. Like Kant's transcendental theory, Freud's metapsychology is interested in explicating the unconscious tropological structures of the mind which constitute, configure, and regulate the phenomenology of everyday experience. Freud's metapsychology, however, differs from Kant's transcendental theory, in that it is more interested in the study of human desire and symbolic action than the study of human understanding and external perception.

The differences in Kant's and Freud's philosophical orientations -- Kant was interested in the study of human

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reason while Freud was interested in the study of human desire -- is understandable from a historical perspective. Kant, as an eighteenth century thinker, was influenced by the ideological climate of the Enlightenment, whereas Freud, as a nineteenth century thinker, was influenced by the ideological climate of the Romantic movement (Whyte, 1960).

The most fundamental characteristic of the Enlightenment period was its emphasis on reason. Reason was viewed as the universal and permanent entity which was the same for all men of all ages and nationalities. Under the guidance of reason it was believed mankind could finally overcome the tyranny of passions, superstitions, ignorance, and blind faith. The Romantic period was a cultural reaction against the Enlightenment's one-sided emphasis on rationality, universality and the supremacy of consciousness. In opposition to the period of the Enlightenment, the Romantic ideology placed more emphasis upon the irrational and emotive forces of human nature, the unique qualities of the individual as a historical, social, and biological being, and the supremacy of the dynamic and vital unconscious will (Lovejoy, 1936; Whyte, 1960; Ellenberger, 1970).

During the second half of the nineteenth century, positivism triumphed over vitalism and remnants of the old Enlightenment philosophies once again began to reappear on the scene. Vehemently opposing metaphysical speculation, the

positivists attempted to restrict scientific research to the study of the physical substrates of nature. While positivism set out to denounce metaphysics, it presumed a metaphysics of its own; a metaphysics which claimed nature to be an intelligible universe -- a universe which followed the laws of Newtonian physics and could be rigorously studied by the methods of logical empiricism. Besides his training at Brucke's physiological laboratory, which was an important center for this newly founded movement, Freud's familiarity with the theories of logical empiricism is evident when one considers: 1. that Freud, as a medical student, translated one of John Stuart Mill's books into German and 2. that it was Ernest Mach who nominated Freud as a candidate for the Vienna Academy of Sciences. John Stuart Mill and Ernest Mach were two of the most outspoken leaders of the logical empiricism movement during the last quarter of the nineteenth century (Jones, 1963, pp. 36 and 142).

The cultural climate of the Romantic period played an important role in Freud's intellectual development. Many of the central tenets of the psycho-analytic theory can be found in the writings of the Romantic philosophers and poets of the nineteenth century (e.g., Schopenhauer, Carus, Von Hartmann, Schelling, Heine, Novalis, Goethe, Nietzsche, Darwin, and Marx) (Whyte, 1960; Ellenberger, 1970). As Freud himself asserted at his seventieth birthday celebration: "The poets and philosophers before me discovered the unconscious. What I discovered was the scientific method by

which the unconscious can be studied" (MacIntyre, 1958, p. 6).

Of the various philosophers and poets of the nineteenth century, it was the writings of Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) and Fredrick Nietzsche (1844-1900) which were most prevalent amongst the intellectual elite of Freud's era (Ellenberger, 1970). In his paper, "On The History Of The Psycho-analytic Movement," Freud argues that while many of his psycho-analytic theories do coincide with the philosophical ideas posited by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, this resembalance is due soley to chance. According to Freud (1914), he did not have the opportunity to read the philosophical works of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche until after his own theory was already formulated.

> The theory of repression quite certainly came to me independently of any other source; I know of no outside impression which might have suggested it to me, and for a long time I imagined it to be entirely original, until Otto Rank (1911a) showed us a passage in Schopenhauer's World as Will and Idea in which the philosopher seeks to give an explanation of insanity. What he says there about the struggle against accepting a distressing piece of reality coincides with my concept of repression so complete that once again I owe the chance of making a discovery to my not being well-read...In later years I have denied myself the very great pleasure of reading the works of Nietzsche, with the deliberate object of not being hampered in working out the impressions received in psycho-analysis by any sort of anticipatory ideas. I had therefore to be prepared -- and I am so gladly -- to forgo all claims to priority in the many instances in which laborious psycho-analytic investigations can merely confirm the truths which the philosopher recognized by intuition (Freud, S.E. XIV, 1914, pp. 15-16).

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, one did not have to study the original works of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in order to know of their philosophical ethos. As Ellenberger (1970) tells us, the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were widely discussed and reviewed in every intellectual circle and in every journal and newspaper (pp. 209 and 277). And as Gregory Zilboorg (1959) points out, if Freud did not read the original writings of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, many of his friends, teachers, and colleagues did (e.g., Hitschmann, Andreas-Salome) (p. 1-14).

By substituting Kant's idea of the thing-in-itself --the intelligible world which is inacessable to our knowledge -- with the concept of the unconscious will -- the dynamic and irrational forces which are unknown to consciousness -- Schopenhauer has transformed Kant's transcendental idealism into an anthropological pessimism based upon Romantic principles (Caponigri, 1971, pp. 110-120).

Many of the central themes of psycho-analysis are to be found in Schopenhauer's (1819) magnum opus, The World As Will and Representation. For example, the importance of the sexual instinct as well as the instinct of conservation, the notion of repression and denial, the irrational and animalistic aspects of human desire, and the radical pessimistic view that man is a conflictual creature destined for a life of suffering and unhappiness.

The similarities between certain essential teachings of Schopenhauer and Freud have been shown by Cassirer, Scheler, and particularly by Thomas Mann. Mann, who during his youh had been deeply immersed in the metaphysics of Schopenhauer, declares that, while becoming acquainted with Freud's psycho-analysis, he "was filled with a sense of recognition and familarity." He felt that Freud's description of the id and the ego was "to heir" Schopenhauer's description of the will and the intellect; translated from metaphysics into psychology. Dream psychology, the great importance given to sexuality and the whole complexus of thought "is a philosophical anticipation of analytic conceptions, to a quite astonishing extent." (Ellenberger, 1970, pp. 208-209).

Nietzsche, who was influenced by the writings of Schopenhauer, was the most important and celebrated philosopher around the turn of the century. Like the writings of Freud, it is difficult to pigeonhole Nietzsche's theoretical formulations into one particular school of thought or philosophical position (Kaufman, 1959); the reason being, that Nietzsche was one of the leaders of a new intellectual movement which became prevalent in the 1880's -- a movement which Paul Ricoeur (1970) rightly refers to as "the school of suspicion." After proclaiming man to be a self deceiving being with deep-seated animalistic characteristics, Nietzsche, in a similar vein to Freud, proceeds to vehemently attack and unmask the ideological assumptions of the social order of his day with its false code of ethics, the metaphysical beliefs of organized religion with its servitude to idols, and the positivistic assumptions of the natural sciences which are

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based upon the false premise that the world follows the principle of causality. According to Nietzsche, while man dreams of happiness, truth, and immortality, in reality he is nothing more than an unconscious complex of conflictual sexual and aggressive instincts.

The similarity between the ideas of Nietzsche and Freud are so apparent that "there can be no question about the former's influence over the later."

> In Freud as in Nietzsche, words and deeds are viewed as manifestations of unconscious motivations, mainly of instincts and conflicts of instincts. For both men the unconscious is the realm of the wild, brutish instincts that cannot find permissible outlets, derive from earlier stages of the individual and of mankind, and find expression in passions, dreams, and mental illness. Even the term "id" (das Es) originates from Nietzsche. The dynamic concept of the mind, with the notions of mental energy, quanta of latent or inhibited energy, or release of energy or transfer from one drive to another, is also to be found in Nietzsche. Before Freud, Nietzsche conceived the mind as a system of drives that can collide or be fused into each other. In contrast to Freud, however, Nietzsche did not give prevalence to the sexual drive (whose importance he duly acknowledged), but to aggressive and self-destructive drives. Nietzsche well understood those processes that have been called the defense mechanisms by Freud, particularly sublimation ...repression...and the turning of instincts toward oneself. The cencepts of the imago of the father and mother is also implicit in Nietzsche. The description of resentment, false conscience, and false morality anticiapted Freud's descriptions of neurotic guilt and of the superego (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 277).

Besides the Romantic philosophers and poets, the logical positivists and mechanistic theorists, the philosophers of suspicion and psychologists of the unconscious, two

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additional predominating trends were prevelant during the later decades of the nineteenth century and played important roles in the early development of Freud's thinking: 1. the evolutionary movement and 2. the human science movement.

The father of the evolutionary movement was Charles Darwin (1809-1882). In his publications, The Origin of Species (1859) and The Descent of Man (1871), Darwin accomplishes two major tasks: 1. in opposition to the traditional conception of the constancy and immutabily of nature, he argues species evolve and transform following the principle of natural selection (i.e., the survival of the fittest) and 2. he argues that man is not distinct from the animal kingdom or from the evolutionary process of natural selection itself.

Darwin's work played an important role in Freud's early intellectual development. As Jones (1963) points out, it was a combination of Goethe's essays on the vitality of nature and Darwin work on the evolutionary process of the species which directed Freud toward the study of medicine. To support this claim, Jones (1963) quotes a passage written by Freud around 1910 in which Freud is reflecting upon his choice of profession:

> The theories of Darwin, which were then of topical interests, strongly attracted me, for they held out hopes of an extraordinary advance in our understanding of the world; and it was hearing Goethe's beautiful essay on Nature read aloud at a popular lecture by Professor Carl Bruhl just before I left school that decided me to become a medical student (Jones, 1963, p. 22).

Many of the central tenets of psycho-analysis can be
traced to the works of Darwin and his students. For example,
the theory of instincts, the irrational and archaic
components of the unconscious, the dynamic theory, the
conflict between sexuality and morality, the genetic
theory, the importance of infantile sexuality and child
psychology, the psychosexual stages of development, the
theories of fixation and regression, the theories of
psychopathology and the theories of historic reductionism
(Haeckel's law of recapitulation: "ontogeny recapitulates
phylogeny," the theory of the primal horde as elaborated by
Atkinson, and the important role history plays in forming
the psychobiolgical consitution of the individual as well as
society.

> By then -- the late 1890's -- Darwin's influence
> upon Freud's scientific generation had become so
> extensive that Freud himself probably never knew
> just how much he really owed to this one
> intellectual source. Darwinian assumptions (1)
> pervaded the whole nascent discipline of child
> psychology from which Freud drew, and to which he
> in turn contributed, so much; (2) reinforced the
> immense importance of sexuality in the
> contemporary understanding of psychopathology; (3)
> alerted Freud and others to the manifold
> potentials of historic reduction (the use of the
> past as a key to the present); (4) underlay
> Freud's fundamental conceptions of infantile
> erotogenic zones, of human psychosexual stages,
> and of the archaic nature of the unconscious; and
> (5) contributed a number of major psychical
> concepts -- like those of fixation and regression
> -- to Freud's overall theory of psychopathology
> (Sulloway, 1979, pp. 275-276).

Freud's dedication to the Darwinian worldview is

reflected in the paper, "A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis." In this paper, Freud (1917) compares his own insights into the unconscious dimensions of the psyche to Darwin's revelation of man's biological predetermination. According to Freud, mankind has suffered three great narcissistic blows from the researches of science: 1. the cosmological blow: Copernicus' discovery that the earth was not the center of the universe, 2. the biological blow: Darwin's discovery that civilized man does not have a dominating position over his fellow creatures, 3. the psychological blow: Freud's own discovery that the "ego is not the master in its own house."

> I propose to describe how the universal narcissism of men, their self-love, has up to the present suffered from three severe blows from the researches of science...Man believed at first... the earth, was the stationary centre of the universe...The destruction of this narcissistic illusion is associated with the name of... Copernicus ...When this discovery achieved general recognition, the self-love of mankind suffered its first blow, the cosmological one...In the course of the development of civilization man acquired a dominating position over his fellow-creatures...the researches of Charles Darwin...put an end to this presumption...Man is not a being different from animals or superior to them...This was the second, the biological blow to human narcissism...The third blow...is probably the most wounding...You go so far as to regard what is "mental" as identical with what is "conscious"...It is thus that psycho-analysis has sought to educate the ego...that the ego is not master in its own house. [This represents] the third blow to man's self-love, what I may call the psychological one (Freud, S.E. XVII, 1917, pp. 138-142).

The human science movement began as a reaction against

the positivist's claim that the methodologies of the natural sciences were the only proper and valid methods of scientific research. The central figures in this "anti-positivist" movement (1890-1920) were Wilhelm Dilthey, Wilhelm Wundt, Franz Brentano, Edmund Husserl, Max Weber, and William James (Polkinghorne, 1983). While the above theorists diverge in their views as to what would constitute an adequate paradigm for the human sciences, they stand united in their struggle to point out that the methodologies of the natural sciences are inappropriate for the study of human experiences ("lifeworld"). In addition to explaining human beings in terms of the reductionistic theories of the natural sciences, these theorist argue that it is important to focus attention upon understanding the existential values and meanings of the subject as a historical and interpretive being. In other words, man is more than the sum of his physiological parts, he is a self-conscious agent with feelings, intentions, and cultural values (Habermas, 1968; Gadamer, 1975; Ricoeur, 1981).

Of the different human scientists, it was Franz Brentano (1838-1917) who exerted the most influence on young Freud. Though the philosophy requirement at the University had been dropped ten years before Freud entered medical school, Freud elected to study under Brentano for four consecutive semesters. Among the course Freud took with Brentano were "readings in Philosophical Writings," a course in "Logic," and "The Philosophy of Aristotle" (Barclay, 1964). As Jones

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(1963) points out, in addition to the traditional required courses of a medical student, Freud "seized every opportunity to dally in those that interested him as well as to forage in neighboring fields" (p. 26). The courses which Freud chose to "dally in" were taught by Claus, Brucke, and Brentano. Interestingly, these three men reflect the different points of view which Freud eventually intergrated into his metapsychological theory. Claus taught classes on Darwin and the biology of the mind, Brucke taught classes on the physico-physiological theories of the school of Helmholtz, and Brentano taught classes in symbolic act psychology and the human sciences.

> With a characteristic overflow ofinterests he also followed a course on "Biology and Darwinism" given by the zoologist Claus, and one by Brucke on "The Physiology of Voice and Speech."...In the following winter semester...he took a glance at philosophy in Brentano's reading seminar. Attendance at a three-years' course in philosophy had been obligatory for medical students in Vienna since 1804, but was no longer so after 1872. In the four semester...we find Freud striking out on a more independent line. He attended the lectures on zoology...he took two physics clases...He continued with the seminars on philosophy and added another course of Brentano's, on Aristotle's logic. Eleven hours a week were given to Brucke's physiology lectures (Jones, 1963, pp. 26-27).

In the article, "Franz Brentano And Sigmund Freud," James Barclay (1964) points out interesting similarities between the philosophical orientations of Brentano and Freud. For example, the two men shared a similar outlook regarding the position of psychology in science, the methodology which

they followed to research psychological phenomena, and their dedication to explaining symbolic actions in terms of intentions and wishes.

> The following statements recapitulate the intellectual similarities: Brentano and Freud both maintained that the knowledge of reality is in part a psychological problem and that in a sense all knowledge and science itself is dependent on psychological factors. They both insisted that psychology is a bona-fide branch of science...that psychology had profound implications not only for men individually, but the progress of civilization...that every cognition of man refers to an object and that the interpretation of the object is based on both external stimulus and the subjectve perception of it...that the focal point of psychic activity was the intentional image...that man is the normative measure of ethical conduct (Barclay, 1964, pp. 31-32).

Upon reading Ernest Jone's biography of Sigmund Freud, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud (1953), one gets the impression that soon after completing the "Project For A Scientific Psychology," Freud (1895-1905) began a heroic journey into the depths of his own psyche and single handly discovers the "divine" secrets of the unconscious -- i.e., the dreamwork and infantile sexuality.

> Freud undertood his most heroic feat -- a psychoanalysis of his own unconscious. It is hard for us nowadays to imagine how momentous this achievement was, that difficulty being the fate of most pioneering exploits. Yet the uniqueness of the feat remains. Once done it is done forever. For no one again can be the first to explore those depths...Freud had no help, no one to assist the undertaking in the slightest degree...It was daring much, and risking much. What indomitable courage, both intellectual and moral, must have been needed!...Two important parts of Freud's researches are intimately connected with his self-

analysis: the interpretation of dreams, and his
growing appreciation of infantile sexuality
(Jones, 1963, pp. 204-205).

The purpose of this archeology of the history of ideas,
was to demonstrate, to the reader, that psycho-analysis --
contrary to what Jones would like us to believe -- did not
miraculously spring from Freud's own mind like "Athena from
the head of Zeus" (Erikson, 1957, p. 80). But rather, many
of the ideas, which Freud intergrated into his psycho-
analytic theory, were already well established and part of
the dominant intellectual climate of the late nineteenth
century. To use Paul Ricoeur's (1970) terminology, Freud is
a symbol of his times and like all symbols he signifies an
archeology of the past as well as a teleology for the
future.

What Is Metapsychology?

With the completion of the archeology of metapsychology
and the history of ideas behind us, it is time to return to
the question: What did Freud mean by the term
metapsychology?

Though the term "metapsychology" does not appear in print
until 1901, we become aquainted with the term for the first
time in the six letters Freud wrote to Fliess between
Feburary 13, 1896 and July 22, 1899 (see pages 84-87 for the
six quotes on metapsychology).

If metapsychology was constructed in 1896, why did Freud wait six years before publishing his theories? After reading the Fliess letters, it becomes apparent that Freud's metapsychological views, as of 1896, had not been fully worked through or sufficiently conceptualized. It is evident that by the term "metapsychology," Freud was referring to the theoretical foundation of his depth psychology -- his newly derived science of the unconscious.* To quote Freud: "May I use the name metapsychology for my psychology that leads behind consciousness (Fliess letter, March 10, 1898). It is also evident, however, that the metapsychological views were not, as of yet, completely formulated or synthesized into a comprehensive theoretical framework. In these early years, there was much ambivalence as to the precise meaning of the term "metapsychology." For example, in the Feburary 13, 1896 letter, Freud identifies metapsychology as the psychological theory: "I am continually occupied with psychology -- it is really metapsychology." Whereas in the March 10, 1898 letter, Freud identifies metapsychology as the biological theory: "It seems to me as though the theory of wish-fulfillment has brought only the psychological solution and not the

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* It is interesting to note, that in 1896 -- the same year metapsychology was first mentioned in the Fliess letters -- the term "psycho-analysis" appeared in print for the first time as the official name of Freud's science of the unconscious (S.E. III, 1986).

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biological, or, rather, metapsychical one." In this letter, biology refers to Freud's genetic point of view; a developmental theory of the psyche that he will develop and fully explicate, seven years later, in his Three Essays on The Theory of Sexuality (1905).

> Biologically, dreamlife seems to me to derive entirely from the residues of the prehistoric period of life (between the ages of one and three) -- the same period which is the source of the unconscious and alone contains the aetiology of all the psychoneuroses (Fliess letter, March 10, 1898).

And in the July 22, 1899 letter, Freud not only makes the distinction between the metapsychology and the psychological theory, but distinguishes the metapsychological theory from the biogenetic theory as well. The psycho-analytic theory is now transformed into a tripartite model: 1. the psychological theory, 2. the biogenetic theory, and 3. the metapsychological theory. It is in this tripartite model of of explanation where the term metapsychology is defined in its most narrow sense -- metapsychology is equated with the economic point of view. To quote Freud: "The large task will have been accomplished, that of placing the neuroses and psychoses in [the sphere of] science by means of the the theory of repression and wish fulfillment. 1. The organic-sexual; 2. the factual-clinical; 3. the metapsychological in it."

In these early years, Freud appears to be struggling to assimilate into his metapsychological theory the two popular

scientific viewpoints of the late nineteenth century -- the mechanistic theories of the school of Helmholtz and the biogenetic theories of the Darwinian school of thought. As Jones (1963) notes, by mechanical Freud meant that "the phenomenon in question is determined directly by contemporary physical events; by biological he means that it is determined genetically -- by its survival value for the species" (p. 305).

Preoccupied with the difficult feat of intergrating these different points of view into his metapsychological theory, it is no wonder that Freud, in the December 17, 1897 letter, refers to the metapsychology as his ideal and woebegone child: "Hidden deep within this is my ideal and woebegone child -- metapsychology."

While many of the metapsychological view were implicit in Freud's early writings (Kris, 1954; Strachey, 1957), it was not until 1897 -- with the collapse of the seduction theory and the construal of the Oedipus complex -- that the metapsychological views began to fall into place as a unified explanatory framework for the psycho-analytic theory. In the September 21, 1897 letter, Freud tells Fliess that with the collapse of the seduction theory he can no longer believe in his theory of the neuroses. As the reader recalls, the seduction theory postulated that all neuroses were in fact symptomatic defenses against actual memories of infantile seductions. In this letter, Freud presents Fliess with four reasons why the 1896 theory of neuroses can no

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longer be taken seriously: 1. the lack of successful

analyses, 2. such wide spread perversions against children

by their fathers is not very probable, 3. the unconscious

cannot distinguish between true memories of seduction and

fictitious constructions of the imagination, and 4. due to

the mechanisms of resistance, the unconscious memories of

early childhood do not seem to be able to break through to

consciousness. With "the collapse of everything valuable,"

Freud does not feel defeated, but rather, has the intuition

that perhaps this episode will represent an advancement

toward further insights into the etiology of the neuroses.

> I no longer believe in my...theory of the
> neuroses... This is probably not intelligible
> without an explanation...So I will begin
> historicially [and tell you] where the reasons for
> disbelief came from. The continual diappointment
> in my efforts to bring a single analysis to a real
> conclusion...the surprise that in all cases, the
> father, not excluding my own, had to be accused of
> being perverse...the certain insight that there
> are no indications of reality in the unconscious,
> so that one cannot distinguish between truth and
> fiction that has been cathected with affect...that
> the secret of childhood experiences is not
> disclosed even in the most confused delirium...I
> was so far influenced [by this] that I was ready
> to give up two things: the complete resolution of
> a neurosis and the certain knowledge of its
> etiology in childhood. Now I have no idea of where
> I stand because I have not succeeded in gaining a
> theoretical understanding of regression and its
> interplay of forces...Can it be that this doubt
> merely represents an episode toward further
> insight?...In your eyes and my own, I have more
> the feeling of a victory than a defeat (which is
> surely not right). (Masson, 1985, Fliess letter,
> September 21, 1897, pp. 264-266).

One month after the collapse of the seduction theory,

Freud's intuition came true. Through his own self-analysis Freud discovered the missing link in the theory of the neuroses -- the universal structure of the Oedipus complex. In essence, the Oedipus complex was the seduction theory in reverse. Freud no longer believed that it was the parent who desired to seduce the child, but rather, it was the child who wished to seduce the parent. To quote Freud from a letter he wrote to Fliess dated October 15, 1897:

> My self-analysis is in fact most essential thing I have at present and promises to become the greatest value to me if it reaches its end...It is by no means easy. Being totally honest with oneself is a good exercise. A single idea of general value dawned on me. I have found, in my own case too, [the phenomena of] being in love with my mother and jealous of my father, and now consider it a universal event in early childhood...If this is so, we can understand the gripping power of Oedipus Rex, in spite of all the objections that reason raises against the presupposition of fate...Everyone in the audience was once a budding Oedipus in fantasy and each recoils in horror from the dream fullfillmenthere transplanted into reality, with the full quantity of repression which seperates his infantile state from his present one (Masson, 1985, pp. 270-273)).

According to the psycho-analytic theory of neuroses, every child was "once a budding Oedipus in phantasy" and dreamed of killing the father and loving the mother. However, because of the demands of reality, each child learned to renounce infantile desires and abide by the rules and regulations of society. If the child fails to resolve this Oedipus complex -- the abandonment of the parents as erotic objects, the period of mourning, the internalization

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and identification with these objects lost, and the entering

of the culture's ideology with its maternal and paternal

ideals -- he or she will be destined for a neurotic

existence at best.

> From this time onwards, the human individual has
> to devote himself to the great task of detaching
> himself from his parents, and not until that task
> is achieved can he cease to be a child and become
> a member of the social community...These tasks are
> set to everyone; and it is remarkable how seldom
> they are dealt with in an ideal manner -- that is,
> in one which is correct both psychologically and
> socially. By neurotics, however, no solution at
> all is arrived at: the son remains all his life
> bowed beneath his father's authority and he is
> unable to transfer his libido to an outside sexual
> object. With the relationship changed around, the
> same fate can await the daughter. In this sense
> the Oedipus complex may justly be regarded as the
> nucleus of the neuroses (Freud, S.E. XVI, 1916-
> 1917, pp. 336-337).

With the discovery of the Oedipus complex, the

"unconscious" finally achieved the status of a substantive

system with rules and regulations independent of

consciousness. The unconscious was no longer viewed as a

derivative of consciousness -- a passive sector of the mind

where repressed memories can be temporarily stored and

hidden from awareness. But rather, the unconscious was now

viewed as the primary process of the psyche and

consciousness was reduced to the status of a secondary

derivative -- an appendage of the unconscious system which

is in complete servitude to the instincts and their

vicissitudes.

With the transformation of the unconscious into a

substantive system, Freud's questions became metapsychological. In the pre-psycho-analytic period, Freud began his theoretical inquiries from the point of consciousness: "How can I explain the gaps and lacunae in the patient's narratives?" Whereas in the psycho-analytic period, Freud began his theoretical inquiries from the point of the unconscious: "How can I explain the taming of the instincts and the shift in mental functioning from the primary to the secondary process?"

It is in the Interpretation of Dreams (S.E. IV and V, 1900) and the The Three Essays On The Theory Of Sexuality (S.E. VII, 1905) where Freud, for the first time, attempts to systematically answer this metapsychological question.

> Not till his self-analysis, when he was able completely to fuse the dynamic and genetic points of view, did Freud succeed in establishing the distance between the physiological and psychological approaches. His first attempt to do so in The Interpretation of Dreams was surprisingly successful; the psychical structure sketched in Chapter seven of that work waas the foundation on which all his subsequent work on the question was built (Kris, 1954, p. 44).

In the Interpretations of Dreams (1900), Freud begins to work out the topographical, dynamic, and economic aspects of his metapsychological theory. He discusses the dynamic relationships between primary and secondary process, the pleasure principle and the reality principle, the instinctual wishes of infantile sexuality and the forceful inhibitory demands of society, and the semantics of desire

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and the grammatical mechanisms of distortion and defense.

In the _Three Essays on The Theory of Sexuality_ (1905), Freud constructs a genetic model of development which attempts to explain how the socialization of impulses determine the structural and dynamic constitution of psychic functioning. According to this theory, the child passes through different stages of libidinal development. The working through of each stage, with its specific conflict, signifies the overcoming of a developmental milestone, and the further progression away from infancy and toward mature adulthood. The last stage of libidinal development is the phallic stage, and the Oedipus complex is its specific conflict. The Oedipus complex is the most important conflict the child must work through and resolve. For it is the outcome of the Oedipus complex which will play a central role in the structuring of personality as well as the orienting of human desire.

> It has been justly said that the Oedipus complex is the nuclear complex of the neuroses, and constitutes the essential part of their content. It represents the peak of infantile sexuality, which through its after-affects, exercises a decisive influence on the sexuality of adults. Every new arrival on this planet is faced by the the task of the Oedipus complex; anyone who fails to do so falls a victim to neurosis. With the progress of psycho-analytic studies the importance of the Oedipus complex has become the shibboleth that distinguishes the adherents of psycho-analysis from its opponents (Freud, S.E. VII, 1905, p. 226).

The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) and the _Three Essays_

on The Theory of sexuality (1905) were two of the most orginal and important books Freud had ever written (Jones, 1963). It is in these texts that Freud begins to systematically work out the theoretical foundation of his psychoanalytic science of the unconscious -- the metapsychological questions which will occupy Freud for the remainder of his career.

> I asked him once which were his favorites among his writings, and he fetched from the shelves The Interpretation of Dreams and the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, saying "I hope this one will soon be out of date through being generally accepted, but that one should last longer." Then, with a quiet smile, he added: "It seems to be my fate to discover only the obvious: that children have sexual feelings, which every nursemaid knows; and that night dreams are just as much wish fulfillment as day dreams." The reasons for the general judgment of the book are not far to seek. It is Freud's most original work. The main conclusions in it were entirely novel and unexpected. This applies both to the theme proper, that of dream structure, and to many themes that appear incidentally. The most important of the latter is the description of the now familiar "Oedipus complex" -- the erotic and the hostile relations of child to parent are frankly exposed. Together with this goes the appreciation of infantile life and its overwhelming importance for all the innumerable developments that make up the adult human being. Above all, not only does it afford a secure basis for the theory of the unconscious in man but it also provides one the best modes of approach to this dark region, so much important in man's actual behavior than his consciousness (Jones, 1963, p. 221).

It was during the period (1897-1905) in which Freud was working on The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) and the Three Essays on The Theory of Sexuality (1905) that the term "metapsychology" appears in print for the first time in the

Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901). In the context of this book -- in the Psychopathology of Everyday Life Freud applies his psycho-analytic theory of the unconscious to the symbolic acts of everyday activities -- the term "metapsychology" signifies the theoretical foundation of the psycho-analytic paradigm. To quote Freud: One could venture to explain in this way the myths...the supernatural reality, which is destined to be changed back one more by science into the psychology of the unconscious...to transform metaphysics into metapsychology" (S.E. VI, 1901, pp. 258-259).

While Freud sporadically worked on his psycho-analytic theories for the next fourteen years, it was not until 1915 that the term "metapsychology" once again appeared in print.

> Apart from occasional short discussions, such as the one in chapter VI of his book on jokes (1905e), ten years passed before he again began to enter deeply into theoretical problems. An exploratory paper on "The Two Principles of Mental Functioning" (1911b) was followed by other more or less tentative approaches -- in Part III of his Schreber analysis (1911c), in his English paper on the unconscious (1912g), and in the long discussion of narcissism (1914c). Finally, in the spring and summer of 1915, he once more undertook a full-length and systematic exposition of his psychological theories (Strachey, S.E. XIV, 1957, pp. 105-107)

In the three month period between March 5, 1915 and August 9, 1915, Freud set out to write a comprehensive book on metapsychology, Preliminaries To A Metapsychology, The intention of these twelve essays was to "clarify and carry

deeper the theoretical assumptions on which a psycho-
analytic system could be founded" (Freud, S.E. XVI, 1915,
p. 222). In 1915, the term "metapsychology" signifies the
tripartite model of explanation: the dynamic, topographical,
and economic aspects of the psycho-analytic paradigm.

> It will not be unreasonable to give a special name
> to this whole way of regarding our subject-matter,
> for it is the consummation of psycho-analytic
> research. I propose that when we have succeeded
> in describing a psychical process in its dynamic,
> topographical and economic aspects, we should
> speak of it as a metapsychological presentation
> (Freud, XIV, 1915, p. 181).

While the various aspects of the "metapsychological
presentation" were discussed in his earlier writings, it
was not until 1915 that Freud developed enough confidence
in his psycho-analytic theories to publicly present his
model of personality in a systematic and comprehensive
fashion (Jahoda, 1977). During this period, Freud became
more sure of himself and believed the theoretical
foundations of his depth psychology was near completion
(Ellenberger, 1970). Freud's optimism is reflected in the
following passage where he compares his metapsychological
presentation to Kant's transcendental philosophy.

> We shall be glad to learn, however, that the
> correction of internal perception will turn out
> not to offer such great difficulties as the
> correction of the external perceptions -- that
> internal objects are less unknowable than the
> external world (Freud, S.E. XIV, 1915, p. 171).

Of the twelve essays which were intented to be published

in the book on metapsychology, only five of the original

papers, however, were actually printed (i.e., "Instincts And

Their Vicissitudes", "Repression", "The Unconscious", "A

Metapsychological Supplement To The Theory Of Dreams", and

"Mourning And Melancholia") (Freud, S.E. XIV, 1915). By

reviewing letters which Freud wrote to Abraham, Ferenczi

and Jones, Strachey claims that the probable topics of the

missing papers can be reconstructed. According to Strachey,

the topics of the seven missing papers were probably:

Consciousness, Anxiety, Conversion Hysteria, obsessional

Neuroses, Sublimation and Projection.

> We are told the subjects with which five of the
> last seven papers dealt: Consciousness, Anxiety,
> Conversion Hysteria, Obsessional Neurosis and the
> Transference Neurosis in General; and we can
> detect possible references to them in the
> surviving papers. We can even guess the subjects
> of the two unspecified papers may have discussed
> -- namely, Sublimation and Projection (or
> Paranoia)-- for there are fairly plain allusions
> to these (Strachey S.E. XIV, 1957, pp. 105-106).

While there is doubt as to whether the seven missing

papers were ever completed, Jones insists they were written,

but destroyed at a later date. Jones speculates that Freud

chose to destroy the seven papers because they were already

outdated and did not account for his latest advancements in

metapsychology.

> Now comes a sad story. None of the last seven
> essays was ever published, nor have the
> manuscripts survived. And the single allusion
> occurs some two years later when he mentions his
> original intention of publishing them all in book

form, "But now is not the time." I can't understand now why none of us asked him after the war what had become of them. And why did he destroy them? My own supposition is that they represented the end of an epoch, the final summing up of his life's work. They were written at a time when there was no sign of the third great period in his life that was to begin in 1919. He probably kept them until the end of the war, and when further revolutionary ideas began to dawn which would have meant completely recastng them he simply tore them up (Jones, 1963, pp. 334-335).

A letter that Freud wrote to Lou Andreas-Salome, dated April 2, 1918, supports Jones' theory about the tragic destiny of the seven missing papers. This letter was a response to Lou Andreas-Salome's question: Where are the remaining ones, which are already finished?"

Where is my Metapsychology? In the first place it remains unwritten. Working-over material systematically is not possible for me; the fragmentary nature of my observations and the sporadic character of my ideas will not permit it. If, however, I should live another ten years, remain capable of work during tha time, not starve, not be killed, not be too deeply taken up with the misery of my family or of those around me —a little much in the way of conditions — then I promise to produce further contributions to it. A first one in this line will be contained in an essay "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (Strachey, S.E. XIV, 1957 pp. 446-447).

Around 1920, with the addition of the structural theory —— id, ego, superego —— and the dual instinct model —— Eros and the death drive (S.E. XVIII, 1920 and S.E. XIX, 1923), Freud became less optimistic about the possibility of completing, at least in his life time, a coherent metapsychology.

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> Later (in 1915) I made an attempt to produce a
> "Metapsychology". By this I meant a method of
> approach according to which every mental processs
> is considered in relation to three co-ordinates,
> which I described as dynamic, topographical, and
> economic respectively; and this seemed to me to
> represent ther furthest goal that psychology could
> attain. The attempt remained no more than a torso;
> after writing two or three papers... I broke off,
> wisely perhaps, since the time for theoretical
> predications of this kind had not yet come. In my
> latest speculative works I have set about the task
> of dissecting our mental apparatus on the basis of
> the analytic view of pathological facts and
> divided it into an ego, an id, and a superego. The
> superego is the heir of the Oedipus complex and
> represents the ethical standards of mankind
> (Freud, S.E. XX, 1925, pp. 58-59).

On several occassions, Freud (1920, 1923, 1932 ,1938) attempts to incorporate the structural theory and dual instinct model into the 1915 metapsychological presentation. However, the theoretical overhauls were never a total success. The ontological rift between the structural and topographical theories did not allow for a simple synthesis of ideas (Jahoda, 1977; Laplanche, 1976; Ricoeur, 1970). The metapsychological presentation of 1915, which was for the most part a solipsistic system, was concerned with the intrapsychic localities and mechanisms of the mind -- how ideas are distorted, concealed and excluded from consciousness. Whereas the metapsychological theories of the 1920's were of a more intersubjective nature and concerned with the structural constitution and genetic evolution of the "psychical personality" -- i.e., how the ego is dependent upon the conflictual demands of external reality,

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the libido of the id, and the severity of the superego. *

> Whereas the first topography treats these cathetic
> changes from the viewpoint of exclusion from
> consciousness or acess to consciousness (whether
> this access takes place in disguished or
> substitute, recognized or unrecognized forms), the
> second topography deals with the cathectic
> changes from the viewpoint of the ego's status of
> dominance or submission...the ego's dependence on
> the id, the ego's dependence on the external
> world, the ego's dependence on the superego.
> Through these alienating relations there is formed
> a personology: the role of the ego, the personal
> pronoun, is constituted in relation to the
> anonymous, the sublime, and the real, which are
> variations on the personal pronoun (Ricoeur, 1970,
> pp. 211-212).

In "An Autobiographical Study," Freud (1925) refers to

the metapsychology as the "superstructure of psycho-

analysis, any portion of which can be abandoned or changed

without loss or regret the moment its inadequacy has been

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* The transition of metapsychology from a solipsistic to a
more intersubjective system can be explained from a
historical perspective. Around the 1920's there was a new
intellectual movement toward existentialism. Man was now
professed to be a historical being whose self-identity was
determined by the "thrownness" of his or her own biological
and social "facticity" (Heidegger, 1926; Foucault, 1970).
With the addition of the structural and dual instinct
theories man is not only viewed as a biological creature
condition by the existential reality of human desire and
death, but is also viewed as a social being conditioned by
the ethical standards and values of tradition. To quote
Freud: 1. "The conscious ego...is first and foremost a body-
ego." and 2. "Thus a child's superego is in fact constructed
on the model not of its parents but of its parent's
superego; the contents which fill it are the same and it
becomes the vehicle of tradition and of all the time-
resisting judgements of value which have propagated
themselves in this manner from generation to generation."
(Freud, S.E. XIX, 1923, p. 27, S.E. XXII, 1933, p. 67).

proven."

> The subdivision of the unconscious [into
> unconscious proper and preconscious] is part of an
> attempt to picture the apparatus of the mind as
> being built up of a number of agencies or systems
> whose relations to one another are expressed in
> spatial terms, without, however, implying any
> connecton with the actual anatomy of the brain (I
> have described this as the topographical method of
> approach.) Such ideas as these are part of a
> speculative superstructure of psycho-analysis, any
> portion of which can be abandoned or changed
> without loss or regret the moment its inadequacy
> has been proved. But there is still plenty to be
> described that lies closer to actual experience
> (Freud, S.E. XX, 1925, p.32-33).

Antimetapsychologists have a field day with the above

passage. For example, Gill (1976) uses the 1925 quotation

to support his claim that metapsychology is speculative and

thus irrelevant to psychological theory: "Another disavowal

is to be found in Freud's (1925) "An Autobiographical

Study," which is also an illustration of Freud's frequent

reference to metapsychology as speculative" (p. 82).

By referring to metapsychology as the "speculative

superstructure of psycho-analysis", Freud does not mean to

infer that the metapsychological viewpoints are irrelevant

to psychological theory and praxis. Rather, it was Freud's

intention to make the following two points: 1. that the

spatial metaphors of the topographical method of approach

should not be taken literally as if to infer that the

subdivisions of the unconscious were actual localities in

the brain and 2. that metapsychology is an evolving theory

of knowledge and as such its viewpoints can be abandoned or

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modified if deemed necessary.

While Freud was aware of the ontological as well as the epistemological problems which tainted the psycho-analytic paradigm, he never doubted the important role metapsychology played as a heuristic model of explanation.[*]

According to Freud, psycho-analysis is an evolving science and like all progressive sciences it must be able to tolerate theoretical speculation and ambiguity.

> It is only after more thorough investigation of the field of observation that we are able to formulate its basic scientific concepts with increased precision, and progressively so to modify them that they become more serviceable and consistent over a wide area. Then indeed, the time may have come to confine them in definitions. The advance of knowledge, however, does not tolerate any rigidity even in definitions. Physics furnishes an excellent illustraton of the way in which even "basic concepts" that have been established in the form of definitions are constantly being altered in their content (Freud, S.E. XIV, 1915, p. 117).

According to Freud (1933), because of its intangible subject-matter, psycho-analysis must be able to sustain even more theoretical speculation and ambiguity than traditional areas of scientific research: "You must not judge too harshly a first attempt at giving a pictorial representation

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[*]   In a letter dated July 1, 1907, Freud tells Jung that he is thinking about writing a book on the epistemological problem of the unconscious: "I have a glimmer of an idea for a study on the "epistemological problem of the ucs,. and I shall take a few books with me for it" (McGuire, 1974, p. 70). The book, however, was never written.

of something so intangible as psychical processes" (S.E. XXII, p.79).

After meeting Albert Einstein for the first time, Freud, in a letter to Maria Bonapart dated January 11, 1927, writes about the differences between being a modern physicist and the first psychoanalyst. After some reflection, Freud states, it is "No wonder that my path is not a very broad one and that I have not got far in it."

> He [Einstein] has had the support of a long series
> of predecessors from Newton onward, while I have
> had to hack every step of my way through a tangled
> jungle alone.No wonder that my path is not a very
> broad one and that I have not got far in it
> (Jones, 1957, p. 131).

Counter to what the antimetapsychologists would like us to believe, Freud never doubted the theoretical value of his metapsychology (Gill, 1976). Freud's question was not "psychology versus metapsychology," but rather, "what would be an appropriate theoretical framework for a human science whose object of study is the unconscious?"

Since its very conception, metapsychology had been Freud's "ideal and woebegone child" (Fliess letter, December 17, 1896); the regulative principle that has guided Freud's psycho-analytic research into the depths of the unconscious for over forty years.

At different points in Freud's theoretical development, the term "metapsychology" implied different things. For example, in 1895, the term metapsychology referred to the

metaphysical model of the mind which Freud constructed in the "Project For A Scientific Psychology (Freud S.E. I, 1895). (It was the failure of this physicalistic theory to account for the qualitiative experiences of the psyche which in 1897 redirected Freud in the direction of a more metapsychical science.) In 1915, the term metapsychology referred to the metapsychical model of the mind which Freud constructed in the "Papers on Metapsychology" (Freud, S.E. XIV, 1915). (It was the failure of this psychical theory to account for the historical and social determinants of the personality which in the 1920's redirected Freud in the direction of a more metahermeneutical science.) And in the 1920's, the term metapsychology referred to the metahermeneutical model of the mind which Freud constructed in _Beyond the Pleasure Principle_ (Freud, S.E. XVIII, 1920) and _The Ego And the Id_ (Freud, S.E. XIX, 1923). (It was the failure of this metahermeneutical theory to account for the the ego's ability to achieve a certain degree of self-consciousness and autonomy which in recent years has redirected American psychoanalysts in the direction of ego psychology and Continental psychoanalysts in the direction of structuralism, phenomenology and critical theory.)

In sum, while at different stages of Freud's theoretical development the term "metapsychology" referred to various paradigmatic views, at no point in the history of psycho-analysis did Freud doubt the importance of metapsychology as a regulative ideal for his science of the unconscious.

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The last time the term "metapsychology" appeared in print was in 1937 in "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" (Freud, S.E. XXIII, 1937). In this paper, Freud refers to the metapsychology as "The Witch Metapsychology." While Freud himself does not explicitly state whether he believed metapsychology to be a good or a bad witch, I believe it is fair to say, that for the most part, all witches have a little of both qualities.

> If we are ask by what methods and means this result is achieved, it is not easy to find an answer. We can only say: "So muss denn doch die Hexe dran!" --the Witch Metapsychology. Without metapsycho- logical speculation and theorizing -- I had almost said "phantasying" -- we shall not get another step forward. Unfortunately,here as elsewhere, what our Witch reveals is neither very clear nor very detailed (Freud, XIII, 1937 p. 225).

Metapsychology And The Question Of The Subject

While Hartmann and his students are perceptive in raising the question of metapsychology and the problem of the subject, their proposed solutions to the problems at hand are epistemologically as well as ontologically inadequate. Logical empiricism and act psychology are inappropriate models of explanation for the psycho-analytic method. Psycho-analysis is not a positive science, concerned with constructing a "world" or a "self" which satisfies the ego's demands for an intelligible universe. Rather, psycho-analysis is a hermeneutics of epistemology, a "counter-

science" interested in uncovering the structural derivations
and thematic emplotments of its analysand's narratives --
the ego's symbolic attempts to satisfy its own unconscious
demand for an intelligible "life-world."

> In relation to the "human sciences," psycho-
> analysis and ethnology are rather "counter-
> sciences"; which does not mean that they are less
> "rational" or "objective" than the others, but
> that they flow in the opposite directon, that they
> lead them back to their epistemological basis, and
> that they ceaselessly "unmake" that very man who
> is creating and re-creating his positivity inthe
> human sciences (Foucault, 1970, p. 379).

Psycho-analysis cannot be reduced to a positive science
without eliminating those theoretical views Freud heroically
struggled to advance and defend -- metapsychology as a
depth hermeneutics of the unconscious.

The dialectical movement of ego psychology from Hartmann
to Holt is a perfect representation of the problematics one
encounters when attempting to replace Freud's critical
theory with the positivistic assumptions of the natural
sciences. By attempting to turn psycho-analysis into a
positive science, Hartmann was thrown back into the
premetapsychological assumptions of Cartesian dualism.

According to the ideology of logical empiricism, the
psyche, if it is to be scientifically investigated, must
first be operationally defined -- that is, objectified
into a static and immutable "thing" (Radnitzsky, 1970).
However, if the psyche is static and immutable, how can ego
psychologists claim that scientists have the psychological

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capabilities to freely observe their data in a neutral and objective manner? In other words, how can the psyche be both the <u>defined</u> <u>object</u> of investigation and at the same time the <u>subject</u> <u>who</u> <u>is</u> <u>freely</u> performing the research? It was these sorts of questions which thru Hartmann back into the web of Cartesian dualism.

Hartmann, however, was not as fortunate as Descartes. Because Descartes was concerned with legitimizing the physical sciences he was not explicitly confronted with the problem of explaining how the psyche can be simultaneously an object and a subject. Rather than attempting to answer the subject-object paradox, Descartes chose to avoid the question. He professed that there existed two distinct worlds each with its own logos: the world of consciousness ("pour-soi") and the world of things ("en-soi"). The world of things, which was made up of objects, followed the mechanistic principles of physics and thus could be studied by the methods of the natural sciences. While the world of consciousness, which was made up of subjects, was not considered to be an appropriate area of scientific research and its basic assumptions -- i.e., the subject is autonomous and self-reflective -- was to be taken on faith.

By attempting to turn psycho-analysis into a natural science, Hartmann reopened the Pandora's box which Descartes worked so hard to seal off. In short, Hartmann was confronted by the metaphysical question which has haunted Western philosophers for at least two thousand years: How

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can the psyche be both an object of investigation as well as the subject who is conducting the research? Hartmann's solution to the paradox was the "autonomous ego" construct. As I have pointed out in chapter two, giving a theoretical inconsistency a name, however, does not allow antithetical principles to magically coincide in a unified fashion without a clash of opposition. As Schafer (1976) notes, the idea of a construct being simultaneously "autonomous" and "dependent" is a contradiction in terms. Even if the construct is proclaimed to be empowered with only "relative autonomy" (see pages 35-44).

It was the implicit contradiction in Hartmann's "autonomous ego" construct which was the motivational force behind the rise of the antimetapsychological movement and the eventual split of ego psychology into two dialectically opposing schools of thought: the logical empirical camp with its emphasis on the world of things (Grunbaum, 1984) and the action psychology camp with its emphasis on the world of consciousness (Schafer, 1976).

In this present chapter, it was my intention to demonstrate, to the reader, that metapsychology was Freud's attempt to develop a science of the unconscious which went beyond the positivistic assumptions of Cartesian dualism. In essence, Freud's metapsychology presumes neither a behavioral science of objective facts nor a descriptive psychology merely interested in conscious intentions. Rather it proposes to develop a critical metahermeneutical science

studying unconscious tropographical structures and motives which constitute, configure, and regulate the person's symbolic thoughts and actions.

In sum psycho-analysis views man as being a symbolic creature who desires to be an autonomous ego in an intelligible world, rather than, a being who is, in actuality, a free spirit engaged in a cosmic unity.

> Psychoanalysis merits being called upon first, for it carries its challenge to the precise point where Descartes thought he had found the firm ground of certainty. Freud undermines the effects of meaning which constitute the field of consciousness and starkly reveals the play of phantasies and illusions in which our desire is masked...Only, the "cogito" which has passed through the critical test of psychoanalysis is no longer the one claimed by philosophy in its pre-Freudian naivete...What results from this adventure is a wounded "cogito," a "cogito" which posits but does not possess itself, a "cogito" which understands its primordial truth only in and through the avowal of the the inadequation, the illusion, the fakery of immediate consciousness ...Does the philosophy of the subject receive any other lesson from psychoanalysis besides this critical rectification? Rooting subjective existence in desire permits a positive implication of psychoanalysis to appear, one which goes beyond the negative task of deconstructing the false "cogito." Merleau-Ponty suggested calling this incarnation of instinctual drives the "archeology of the subject" (Ricoeur, 1974 pp. 237-245).

Metapsychology And Critical Epistemology

Whereas American psychoanalyst have chose to avoid the epistemological ramifications of Freud's metapsychology by

eliminating the "dynamic unconscious" as a legitimate area of study, Continental psychoanalysts, on the other hand, have chose to directly confront the question of metapsychology and the problem of the subject (e.g., Habermas, 1968; Lacan, 1977; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Ricoeur, 1970)

> Freud himself considered the discovery of the unconscious and the affirmation of its priority to be the most fundamental contribution of psychoanalysis. Subsequent developments have sufficiently shown that these theses are liable to different interpretations. Some have been willing to find in them the assertion of the radically illusory character of consciousness. However, how can one maintain that psychoanalysis is a therapy, or a method of investigation, or a body of doctrines related to metapsychology -- and psychoanalysis in all of these -- and maintain that the unconscious retains always and in every respect its absolute opacity (De Waelhens, 1972, pp. 1969-1970)?

Rather than retreating to the naive realism of the positive sciences, Continental psychoanalysts and philosophers have set out to develop a critical epistemological framework for psycho-analysis which does not resurrect the metaphysical belief in the primacy of consciousness. * Agreeing with Freud that the research techniques of psycho-analysis have a closer affinity to the

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* In recent years, Anglo-Saxon theoreticians have begun to incorporate the critical views of Continental philosophy. For example, see the writings of Thomas Kuhn (1962), Richard Rorty (1979), Nelson Goodman (1984) and Jerome Bruner (1986).

descriptive analyses of imaginary writers than to the quantitiative theorems of natural scientists (S.E. II, 1895), Continental theorists have attempted to construct a critical epistemological framework for psycho-analysis based upon the teachings of structural anthropology, linguistics, and critical hermeneutics (Chomsky, 1956; Heidegger, 1962; Jacobson, 1956; Levi-Strauss, 1963; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Saussure, 1959). *

Beginning with the premise that the "unconscious is structured like a language" (Lacan, 1977), Continental psychoanalysts have begun to analyze their patient's narratives as literary text. By applying the semiotic methods of structuralism and critical hermeneutics, psychoanalysts are able to map out the topographical structures and unconscious themes of their patient's narratives without relying on the reliability of the verbal utterances of the ego as an immediate self-conscious and self-responsible agent.

> As the model of text-interpretation shows, understanding has nothing to do with immediate grasping of a foreign psychic life or with an

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* Schafer (1976) is also interested in linguistics. However, he does not cite the works of the contemporary theorists, but rather, refers to the writings of the linguists who were the leaders in their field several decades ago: e.g., Austin (1946), Ryle (1949) and Wittgenstein (1945). These early linguists, for the most part, believed that "language games" were constructed by the conscious actions of the ego and not bythe linguistical system of the unconscious as radical "Other" (Lacan, 1977).

emotional identification with a mental intention.
Understanding is entirely mediated by the whole of
explanatory procedures which precede it and
accompany it. The counterpart of this personal
appropriation is not something which is felt, it
is the dymanic meaning released by the explanation
which we identified earlier with the reference of
the text, i.e., its power of disclosing a world
(Ricoeur, 1981, p. 220).

In sum, by viewing the patient's personal history as
text, psychoanalyst are able to disclose the structures and
dynamic themes which constitute and regulate the patient's
"life-world" without retreating to the postivistic
epistemological assumptions of the natural sciences and act
psychology.

Before concluding this chapter, one more issues is worth
mentioning: "metapsychology and the question of the
teleology of the subject" (Ricoeur, 1970). As the reader
recalls, psycho-analysis more than a method of investigation
and theory of psychopathology, is a therapeutic procedure
for the treatment of neurotic disorders (Freud, S.E. XVIII,
p. 235). A treatment modality which is based upon the
premise that a patient can be cured of neurotic suffering
by developing enough psychological insight and ego strength
to live with the negativities of everyday unhappiness
(Freud, XXIII, 1937).

Without contradicting his deterministic frame of
reference, how could Freud explain the phenomena of insight
and change without reaffirming the premetapsychological
assumptions of act psychology or indulging in the mystical

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doctrines of the occult?

> It is easy to imagine, too, that certain mystical
> practices may succeed in upsetting the normal
> relations between the different regions of the
> mind, so that, for instance, perception may be
> able to grasp the happenings in the depths of the
> ego and in the id which were otherwise
> inaccessible to it. It may safely be doubted,
> however, whether this road will lead us to the
> ultimate truths from which salvation is to be
> expected. Nevertheless it may be admitted that the
> therapeutic efforts of psycho-analysis have chosen
> a similar line of approach. Its intention is,
> indeed, to strengthen the ego, to make it more
> independent of the superego, to widen its field of
> perception and enlarge its organization, so that
> it can appropriate fresh portions of the id. Where
> id was, there ego shall be (Freud, S.E. XXII,
> 1933, pp. 81-82).

In the summer of 1927, Binswanger confronted Freud with
the question of metapsychology and the teleology of the
subject (self-consciousness, change, spirituality, etc.). To
Binswanger's surprise, Freud responded: "Yes, the spirit is
everything." Freud then went on to tell Binswanger that the
question of the spirit is a legitimate object of study for
psycho-analysis and that one day in the future it will be
adequately worked through. However, for the present, psycho-
analysts must take one step at a time and be content with
working out the metapsychological questions about the
instincts. *

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* Even though Binswanger acknowledges that by the term
"spirit" Freud was most likely referring to "something like
intelligence," he is also quick to point out that Freud's
openness to this line of inquiry was evident (Binswanger,
1957, p. 80).

> Mankind has always known that it posseses spirit;
> I had to show it that there are also instincts.
> But men are always discontented, they cannot wait,
> they always want something whole and ready-made;
> however, one must begin somewhere and one
> progresses only slowly (Freud, 1927, cited in
> Binswanger, 1957, p. 81).

While Continental psychoanalysts have, in recent years, made significant contributions toward the advancement of metapsychological theory, many aspects of psycho-analysis still remains ambiguous and uncertain. Rather than throwing up their hands in discontent when confronted with the paradox of the unexplainable, I agree with Merleau-Ponty's conclusion that psychoanalysts must learn to be open to the mystery and not so anxious to deny the existential reality of the unknown.

> The idealist deviation in Freudian research is
> today just as much a threat as its objectivist
> deviation. One is forced to ask whether it is not
> essential to psycho-analysis -- I mean to its
> existence as therapy and and verifiable Knowledge
> -- to remain, not of course a poor attempt and an
> occult science, but at least a paradox and a
> question (Merleau-Ponty, 1960, cited in Ricoeur,
> 1970, p. 418).

Conclusion

Hartmann and his students perceptively raise the question of metapsychology and the problem of the subject, but their proposed solutions to these issues are epistemologically as well as ontologically inadequate. Psycho-analysis cannot be reduced to an act psychology (Schafer, 1976) or confined to

the status of a natural science (Grunbaum, 1984) without eliminating crucial theoretical views Freud advanced and defended -- metapsychology as a depth psychology of the unconscious.

The movement of ego psychology from Hartmann to Holt represents the problematics encountered when Freud's critical theory is replaced by the positivistic values of the natural sciences. In attempting to reconstruct psycho-analysis into a general psychology within a natural science epistemological framework Hartmann and his students reverted to the premetapsychological assumptions of Cartesian dualism.

While Freud posited his metapsychology as the grounds for a natural science, examining his theoretical and clinical writings, reveals that psycho-analysis is equally concerned with the study of historical and social determinants and with linguistic structures as well as the physiological and neurological determinants or with conscious motives.

Counter to what the American antimetapsychological coalition assumes, Freud never wavered in his justification of his metapsychology. Freud's question was not psychology versus metapsychology, but rather what is the appropriate theoretical framework for a human science whose object of study is the unconscious? At different stages of Freud's theoretical development "metapsychology" invoked various

paradigms. The metapsychology moved from a neurological model to a metahermenutical model concerned with the social grounding of human nature.

After forty years of deliberating about metapsychological theory, Freud began to realize that his depth psychology could not be completed in his life time. The science of the unconscious is a complicated field of study and the nineteenth century conceptual tools with which he had to work with were insufficient for the task at hand.

In recent years, with the advancement in structuralism and critical hermeneutics, Continential psychoanalysts have formulated critical epistemological theories which are more appropriate for the psycho-analytic method of investigation (Chomsky, 1956; Heidegger, 1962; Jakobson, 1956; Levi-Straus, 1963; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Saussure, 1959). Unlike American psychoanalysts, Continential theorists are more concerned and oriented toward the problems of the human sciences than the natural sciences. For example, the problems of intersubjectivity, understanding and explanation, the relationship between interpretation and symbolization, and the hermeneutical circle of distantiation (neutrality) and appropriation (empathy). It is these Continential theorists who have made the most substantial contribution toward the advancement of metapsychology and have remained faithful to the Freudian ethos (e.g., Habermas, 1968; Lacan, 1977; Ricoeur, 1970).

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